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19 NOVEMBER 1986

# West Europe Report

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# WEST EUROPE REPORT

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POLITICAL GREECE

VOA NEGOTIATIONS: POINTS OF AGREEMENT, DISCORD

Athens ENA in Greek 2 Oct 86 pp 12-14

[Text] One week before the new, critical round of negotiations on the Voice of America [VOA] radio stations located in our country, ENA brings to light an important document which describes in detail the diverse positions and claims of the two sides concerning the new framework of the VOA stations' operation.

The old VOA agreement expired in 1977, but up to now the American stations continue to operate tacitly since the two parties have not yet reached an agreement, despite repeated rounds of negotiations.

The issue continues to be a great uncertainty in Greek-American relations. According to the document ENA is making public, the Americans are (invariably) advancing two claims which it considers interlinked:

1. The duration of the VOA agreement should be at least 25 years.

2. It should provide for modernization of the existing equipment by installing new, more powerful, high-frequency transmitters, satellite terminal stations, etc.

According to the document, the Greeks are at this moment negotiating on the basis of a "double defensive line."

First of all, it is not disposed to negotiate its position that the duration of the agreement must be at most 5 years and after its expiration should be renewed every year--a position which derives from the notion that "long-term agreements have a character of dependency." Thus:

The "first line of defense" of the Greeks also provides rejection of the second American proposal for modernizing the VOA installations and counter proposes: It is not necessary that this proposal be included as a condition in the agreement to be signed now. It could be the subject of future negotiations with a corresponding increase in what is given as compensation to Greek Radio-Television [ERT].

With this first line of defense the Greeks are seeking to safeguard a number of demands (they are included in Table 1 of the document which also gives the corresponding American reactions) which concern:

--Safeguarding our sovereign rights, the right, that is, of the Greek authorities to visit and inspect any time the VOA stations which at no time will the principle of "inviolability" be used; and the American obligation not to broadcast programs harmful to Greek interests.

--Safeguarding of mutuality, that is, of the possibility of having Voice of Greece progams effectively broadcast to the U.S. and that ERT should also be able to use the VOA facilities for broadcasts to the Greek area.

--The Americans to pay a one-time lump sum and other restitutions.

The "second line of defense:" The Greeks seem disposed to negotiate the American proposal for a "here and now" modernization of the VOA installations. However, it recognizes that even in such a case (for which Table II for additional compensation was prepared) the Greeks cannot accept the modernization's main point which deals with the installation of VOA ground satellite stations for direct (not through the Greek Telecommunications Organization [OTE]) radio programs from Washington which are relayed by American stations in Kavala and Rhodes.

The reasons the Greeks rejected this part of modernization are based on the arguments that with the installation of satellite stations:

--OTE's exclusive privilege will be violated.

--A bad precedent will be established so that others too (the Embassy of the Soviet Union, for example) could ask for similar treatment, thus creating in the country's wireless networks much more unpleasant situations than presently exist.

--Responsibility is assumed for their protection which will limit the use by Greek services of corresponding frequency zones, thus limiting development of the country's telecommunications.

Whichever of the two lines of defense prevails in the negotiations, which will start in Athens on 10 October, and despite existing difficulties, the fact is certain that as the Greeks have declared in the recent past the agreement for VOA falls within these bipartisan issues which will soon be erased from the list of "uncertain issues."

SCHEDULE 1

WHERE GREECE AND THE U.S. AGREE AND DISAGREE
ON THE VOA ISSUE

GREEK CLAIMS

[American reactions between slant lines]

1. SAFEGUARDING GREEK SOVEREIGN RIGHTS

A. No implementation of the principle of inviolability as concerns areas of installations and activities.

/Indirectly - YES/

B. The right of Greek authorities to visit and inspect VOA stations at any time.

/YES/

C. Inherent right of the Greek government to take all proper counter measures for protection of Greek interests.

/YES/

D. American commitment not to broadcast VOA programs harmful to Greek interests.

/YES/

E. Informing the Greek authorities through transcripts or tapes the contents of programs already broadcast by VOA.

/YES/

F. Need for advance Greek government consent on any important expansion, change, etc., of VOA stations. Any such expansion or change will require, besides advance consent of the Greek government, the determination of any additional compensation the Greek government would be asking on behalf of ERT.

/YES, but the American side understands that the agreement will cover VOA installations as they will be after their modernization and not as they are today/

G. American responsibility to avoid VOA interference with radio, TV and telecommunication services within Greece or neighboring countries--and obligation to eliminate any such interference which may develop; also, payment of relevant restitution to the service experiencing such intereference.

/American responsibility for no radio and TV interference within Greece is accepted as is also only the removal of any interference without restitution however/

H. Sovereignty of the Greek state over areas provided for VOA use as well as over infrastructure and other projects of common benefit built in such areas.

/Greek sovereignty is recognized only over the areas provided for use by VOA/

I. The possibility, after bilateral talks, of realizing projects of common benefit in areas assigned for VOA use.

/YES/

J. When the agreement expires and the VOA stations are removed, the equipment, materials and supplies will come into Greece's possession, for which compensation will be made.

/Greece will be asked for compensation for any type of transfer/

2. MUTUALITY

A. Principle of mutuality and assurance of an effective way of broadcasting Voice of Greece programs to the U.S. and use of the VOA facilities in Greece for ERT broadcasts to the Greek area.

/Two possibilities collectively used:

--Athens-Kavala shortwave broadcasts directly to listeners in North America
--Athens-Kavala-Greenville or Bethany or Delano shortwave relays to South America (a part of the U.S. will thus be covered)/

B. Customs, tariff duty exemption and privileges for Voice of Greece in the U.S. and for VOA in Greece.

/YES/

3. FINANCIAL RESTITUTION

A. A 6.2 million dollar lump sum as a write off of the U.S. financial obligations to Greece for the use of VOA stations until now.

/Offered 1,250,000 dollars/

B. A 1.5 million dollar lump sum as a supplement to technical equipment.

/Left unanswered/

4. HOURS OF TRANSMITTER USE

A. Exclusive use of one of the existing 250 KW shortwave transmitters in Kavala.

/YES/

B. Eleven and one half hours daily use of one 550 KW medium-wave transmitter in Kavala (80.5 hours weekly).

/Forty six hours weekly were proposed/

C. Six hours daily use of one 500 medium-wave transmitter in Rhodes (42 hours weekly).

/Twenty two hours weekly were proposed/

D. At least 6 hours daily use of VOA shortwave stations (in Greenville, North Carolina, Delano, California, and Bethany, Ohio) for Voice of Greece broadcasts.

/A maximum of 6 hour daily broadcasts from U.S. stations not specified in advance was proposed/

5. EQUIPMENT

A. Three equipped 250 KW shortwave transmitters in Avlida.

/One equipped 250 KW shortwave station in Avlida/

B. One 300 KW medium-wave transmitter at Ermoupolis, Crete with the system of its emissivity [sic].

C. One 300/250 KW medium-wave transmitter at Trikala with the system of its emissivity.

D. Two rows of curtain-type antennae in Kavala.

/YES/

E. Transfer of ownership of the three 50 KW medium-wave transmitters in Athens, Kerkyra and Zakynthos to Greece which is presently using them.

/YES/

6. GENERAL ISSUES

A. The U.S. is responsible for the administrative, operational, etc., expenses of the VOA stations in Greece even when they are being used by the Voice of Greece.

/YES/

B. The agreement abolishes all previous ones on this subject.

/YES/

C. Five-year duration of the agreement (adoption of the presumption the agreement will be continued after the initial 5-year period and for further annual extensions).

/Twenty-five year duration (with possibility of denouncing the agreement after an 18-month notice which can be served not earlier than 5 years after the signing of the agreement)/

SCHEDULE 2

THE "SECOND DEFENSIVE LINE OF THE GREEKS"

**Points A, B and C [sic] of the claims in Schedule 1 (table of our claims for an agreement only for maintaining the operation of VOA stations as they are today) remain unalterable.**

**The claim in Point C of the first table remains as they are with the only exception that the Kavala shortwave transmitter for whose exclusive use we are asking (Point C, Schedule 1), must have a strength of 500 KW and not 250 MW. Its ownership should be transferred to Greece after 5 years.**

**Finally, as concerns Point D of Schedule 1, the following should be added to the claims about equipment:**

A. Two 500 KW shortwave transmitters with antennae for the Salonica area.

B. One 1,000 KW medium-wave transmitter with antenna for the Athens area.

C. Exclusive use of one 500 KW shortwave transmitter in Rhodes. Also, 5 years after signing of the agreement, ERT should be given ownership with the right to use the VOA antennae.

D. Ownership of the 500 KW medium-wave transmitter in Rhodes will be in force 5 years after signing the agreement.

E. One 300 KW medium-wave transmitter with antenna for the Athens area.

F. Ownership of the 500 KW medium-wave transmitter in Kavala 5 years after signing the agreement.

G. Five years after signing the agreement (and as long as it is extended) VOA is obligated to use ERT personnel (for training reasons) for the maintenance and operation of its installations.

H. Ten years after signing the agreement and any extensions, ownership of all VOA installations will pass to ERT which will be obligated to relay VOA programs from these installations or part of them. This will be agreed upon between ERT and VOA when the corresponding rent to be paid to ERT will also be decided.

7520
CSO: 3521/20

POLITICAL TURKEY

PROFILE OF 'NEW' ECEVIT

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 5 Sep 86 p 9

[Article by Cengiz Candar: "A Little Peron, a Little Qadhdhafi and Nasser: New Ecevit"]

[Text] For the first time in 7 years, since the by-elections in 1979, I have seen Bulent Ecevit on the hustings, at four outdoor rallies in Istanbul. The meetings in Bayrampasa, Karagumruk, Telsizler and Mevlanakapi were called coffees, but they were really rallies on a small scale.

Hurrying between the rallies at Telsizler and Mevlanakapi on the second night, we had a chance to look in on the SDPP [Social Democratic Populist Party] show of strength in Yildirim Mahallesi, the place where the coffee was held at which Ecevit had spoken 2 weeks earlier. What came to mind was the first Izmir trip when we covered SDPP General Chairman Erdal Inonu at Karaburun, Mordogan, Urla and Cesme. We believe we now have enough data to deal with the DLP [Democratic Left Party] phenomenon and the SDPP.

Most important, we realized that the DLP and the SDPP are two very different phenomena. And, for this reason, cannot be judged by the same criteria. To wit:

On both days, we kept asking Fusun Ozbilgen, who has been reporting domestic politics for a long time, whether there were any familiar faces from the old RPP among the people coming to Ecevit's meetings. On the first day at Bayrampasa, he said, "Only one person caught by eye," and the next day at Telsizler he said he saw "four or five." When, on the second day, we ran into DLP workers whom we had noticed the first day, we asked them "which pre-1980 RPP district organization" they had worked for. They answered, "We were not RPP members, but we have been Ecevit followers for years."

At a coffee where the SDPP Istanbul Provincial organization turned out in force, we could not take a step without bumping into a "familiar face" to shake hands with, from Hikmet Cetin and Suleyman Genc to Ali Dincer and Ahmet Isvan. We met "familiar faces" both of former RPP members and from left wing groups inside or outside the party.

The "organization" was there at the SDPP meeting. One of them said, "Let's hear our slogans," and the slogans participants shouted came by reflex. Once when the electricity went off in the neighborhood, someone shouted, "Darkness will overcome enlightenment" instead of "Enlightenment will overcome darkness," and even this mistake was taken up in chorus until someone else noticed and changed it. The role of the DLP, meanwhile, did not go beyond bringing Ecevit to the small rallies, the coffees, putting him up on a table, adjusting the microphone and turning him loose with the crowd. Ecevit one on one with the crowd. And in dialogue form.

The "cool" SDPP audiences we saw on Erdal Inonu's first Izmir tour and Ecevit's robust audiences had different "states of mind."

Moreover, the people who came to the SDPP show of strnegth in Yildirim Mahallesi -- if we may generalize -- and those who came to see Ecevit differed noticeably in structure as well as state of mind. Ecevit's enthusiastic audiences were almost all laborers and low-income people.

That is, one was all organization. The "organization" in the other served only to establish communication between the leader and the crowd. The leader, or Bulent Ecevit, had direct communication with the laborers and low-income crowd. The SDPP, however, established communication with the same crowds through its organizational units.

Aside from the basic differences, propaganda methods are quite different also. SDPP people refer to the Ozal administration's negative practices in general terms. When asked certain questions, Erdal Inonu would give answers like, "Vote for the SDPP, we will do the rest." Ecevit took up Ozal's economic practices, from the Poor Fund to Oymapinar Dam shares, one by one and explained them in pretty effective polemics.

In contrast, while one noticed that signatures were being collected for a general amnesty at the SDPP meeting and that slogans such as "Jobs, food, freedom" were shouted, in other words, that things had a much more political quality, Ecevit worked up the topic of democracy, starting from the 12 September military regime's "slaughter" of workers' rights. He gave the impression that he was not very interested in the SDPP's general political buzzwords. This must be indicative of the difference in the forces the two of them are based on, or want to be based on, and the fact that they have different aspirations.

The two sides have different approaches to the religious issue, also. The SDPP seems more worried about the "resurgence of fundamentalism," stressing secularism and approaching the development of religious trends in the manner we have grown used to from informed circles for the past quarter century. Ecevit, however, approaches religious trends by perceiving secularism as a mechanism serving to prohibit Alawi-Sunni discrimination. He sees no objection to inviting them to gather under the banner of the democratic left or social democracy, because, for Ecevit, who is distancing himself from the intellectuals, the religious segments of society are an inseparable part of the "people" whose fervor keeps him in the political arena.

It is doubtful whether full similarity exists in the economic programs of the two parties. The SDPP works themes conforming to the old RPP "etatist" doctrine, while the economic principles we heard expounded by DLP Istanbul candidate Murteza Celikel in Bayrampasa fell in line with the "self management" economic model.

As for the RPP heritage, Ecevit does not seem to mind a bit that the concrete RPP heritage in the organizational sense has gone to the SDPP and that most of the former RPP national deputies, etc. have gathered in the SDPP. What he defends as the last general chairman of the RPP and does not want to abandon to the SDPP is the moral heritage. He describes the RPP as "an organization born out of the war for independence" and accuses today's SDPP leaders on that point -- albeit in a roundabout way -- of not risking their heads to do anything during the 12 September period. He hammers on the theme that, therefore, that kind of leadership will not struggle for democracy and the SDPP cannot be the heir to the RPP.

After watching Ecevit at his rallies in four workers' quarters of Istanbul, we could not help but think how Turkey's Third-World similarities are as striking as its Western characteristics and of the impact of charismatic leadership in such a country. If Ecevit and his actions are to be likened to any one thing in particular, it would have to be the many similarities with the Peronist movement in Argentina. Also, in the area of our own professional experience, we feel that he parallels a Qadhdhafi-type leadership or what we might call a Nasser-type leadership. A populism diametrically opposed to any elitist manner.

With this many obvious differences, it is doubtful how much of an impact a campaign against Ecevit as a "divisive element" would have. It seems to us that he relishes this kind of attack anyway, because during this campaign he has stood before thousands of people and launched into fierce polemics to the applause of the people. He said plainly at Karagumruk that he would continue these polemics as long as the campaign lasted. We hear attributions such as, "It was noted that, in response to the reactions, he avoided lashing out at the SDPP this time," but, for this reason, do not consider them valid.

Like it or not, Ecevit has founded a brand new movement. I do not know about the "electorate," but the "people" are with him.

8349
CSO: 3554/21

POLITICAL TURKEY

## ECEVIT INTERVIEWED ON POLITICAL SYSTEM, OZAL POLICY

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 11-14 Jul 86

[Interview with Bulent Ecevit conducted by Rauf Tamer on 20 June 1986 at Ecevit's home; updated remarks by Ecevit provided on 12 July 1986]

(11 Jul 86 p 5)

[Excerpt] [Tamer background] In the period of political life leading to the 12 September intervention, the writer of these lines was one of the strongest critics of Ecevit--possibly the leading one.

Political life has taken a long vacation and as is known, a lot of water has flowed under the bridge since 12 September, every segment of society has learned the necessary lessons, and we have gained a good deal of necessary experience.

During the past 6 years, we refrained from using our pen against a number of people who might be our political opponents but who were also defenseless; furthermore, we also strove constantly for their curtailed political rights "in the name of democracy," irrespective of their right-or left-wing orientation.

That is one thing.

Our differences of political opinion with Ecevit is another.

Nevertheless, it seems to us that to have this interview with him, after so many years, is a journalistic duty, to say the least....

Moreover, one might say that it is a democratic duty as well, as it demonstrates how people who are thought to be past the stage of talking to one another can actually embark upon a civilized dialogue.

Now we will begin our questions and answers. Other than the personal remarks we will make at certain intervals, all the words and statements are those of the Honorable Mr Ecevit.

We publish these verbatim, reserving for him the right to make corrections.

20 June 1986.

Our appointment was at 1700 hours.

I rang the bell at 1700 sharp.

Bulent Ecevit opened the door. He must have been alone in this modest home.

[Tamer] Is Madam (Rahsan Ecevit) not at home?

[Ecevit] She just went to the party office. But she will try to be back before you leave.

[Tamer background] Kubilay Calikoglu quickly completes taking the photographs he came for and we see him off.

So, the two of us are alone in this apartment.

I recall those awe-inspiring meetings.... All those exuberant people filling the squares with excitement at the prospect of seeing Karaoglan (affectionate popular nickname for Ecevit).... The 3 June 1977 meeting in Istanbul in particular.... And Ecevit, then defiant in the face of the information that there would be an assassination, exclaming "My wife and I will be at Taksim Square!" is now sitting there, "just a simple citizen," facing me....

[12 Jul 86 p 5]

[Excerpt] [Tamer background] Ecevit considers that the post-1960 organization of the Turkish political parties was, in a geographical sense, too limited.

How did "this common negligence by both the military and the civilians" affect the country's political anatomy?

We thought it would be useful to raise this subject, even though it may not appears to be related to either continuous or intermittent interventions:

Bulent Ecevit says:

[Ecevit] Political parties must be able to ger closely involved with social organizations and cooperate with society, as this is the way for parties to penetrate the outer reaches of society.

[Tamer] An example, please.

[Ecevit] Let us take a district the size of Bakirkoy or Cankaya, with a population of 500,000 or 1 million. Can a party administration of seven-nine persons feel the pulse of the population of a district this size, or pass on all the messages of the party to them? The parties are also prohibited by law from establishing ties with trade unions and other social organizations. Such restrictions detach the parties from society and deprive them of the capacity to fulfill their functions.

[Tamer] But when such ties are established, tremors ripple through society

[Ecevit] The tremors and incidents that have occurred were caused not by the parties but by organizations and illegal establishments outside the parties, and especially outside the area under the control of the major parties. The vacuum left by the parties in society and social organiztions was filled by certain irresponsible organizations.

[Tamer] Neverthless, the outlook that inhibits risking the kind of organic tie you mention is still here. There is a kind of timidity in society, too.

[Ecevit] Honorable Mr Tamer, one has to risk it. In my opinion, there are greater drawbacks in leaving the field clear for unofficial organizations.... In the pre-1960 era, there were guilds and communes. Fractions and terrorists could not enter such quarter. It was these that were sorely missed when the pre-1980 murders were committed. Just think of it: one lacks antennae and one lacks organic ties with the quarters and villages, yet one has to govern the country. That is the situation arising from the joint neglect by the military and the civilians. It is a climate of "who the hell do the people think they are!"

[Tamer] Can the people handle this organic tie smoothly?

[Ecevit] They can. There are Turkish peasants who have achieved full political rights in Scandinavia. They may perhaps find the social life not entirely to their liking--but never the political life.... Would there be rivers of blood if we had the same here? No.

[Tamer] That is what I am questioning.

[Ecevit] Last year, Rahsan [Mrs Ecevit] and I were invited to Denmark in connection with the local election campaign in which Turks were taking part both as candidates and voters. We went. We held many meetings. We went all over the place. There was one important point that attracted our attention: all the halls where the meetings were held were in elementary school premises.

[Tamer] Why was that?

[Ecevit] It transpired that the local chairmen or the majority of the administrators of the Social Democratic Party are teachers.

[Tamer] How about sour notes from opposing parties? like complaints that politics are being introduced into the schools?....

[Ecevit] None. Because, as all rules of democracy are observed in that political setup, everybody conforms to the rules.

[Tamer] Let us get back to our own steup. That is, for a comparison.

[Ecevit] Right. Our parties are unable to benefit even from experts. Except for the administration, our parties are prohibited from making use of the

services of a specialist staff, let alone have organic ties with popular organizations. This is because university teaching staff members may not carry out for parties. The majority of private firms, even though there are no legal constraints on them, also do not permit experts on their staff to engage in party work. How are parties going to prepare for power under these circumstances, and how are they going to come up with concrete solutions for problems?

[Tamer] It seems that you regard these as factors that will influence the effectiveness of democracy.

[Ecevit] Yes, it comes to the same thing.... A verdict of "there, they failed again".... And then, once again, come the importuning intellectuals and civilian elitists ready for surrender [to a military coup].

(13 Jul 86 p 5)

[Text] [Tamer background] I am trying to arrange these points in proper order in my mind.

Look how the links of the chain come together.

- First, the resignation from the post of leader of the Republican People's Party [RPP].
- The resolve to continue the struggle.
- The desire to share responsibility with old colleagues.
- But inmediately afterward, damaged relations with old friends who, "wishing to form part of a party organization regardless of conditions, acquiesce to an umbrella organization."
- Differences over ideology and principles.
- Also, a parting of the ways with certain people "whose entire activity consist of factionalism."

As I repeat these aloud, Bulent Ecevit sums up:

[Ecevit] The Democratic Left Party (DLP) is a fresh start.

[Tamer] Yes... exactly the opposite of the Correct Way Party [CWP]

[Tamer background] The CWP, a mission.

The DLP, a fresh start. (In my definition), a fresh start, rid of its faults, stripped of its factions.

Speaking of differences, I sensed a difference in the style of the Ecevit couple....

I say that I sensed; I may have sensed incorrectly.

There cannot be a radical change in their world outlook, of course, but it seemed that the vibes were different from the vibes of the sharp-tempered days of the politics of yesteryear.

I recalled, for instance, a recent statement by Rahsan Hanim [formal, respectful reference to Mrs Rahsan Ecevit]. She said:

We do not classify people politically in accordance with what clothes they wear or how they wear their hair or beard, or what kind of music they listen to or even the kind of lifestyle they prefer. (24 December 1985)

In another speech, Rahsan Hanim stated:

Who gave you these incorrect ideas that devout, practicing believers cannot at the same time hold "democratic leftist views?" Who has been telling you such things? Let us not forget that we live in a Muslim country. (18 May 1986)

These ideas are the products of this household....

It is clear that this is the joint viewpoint of the Ecevits.

These are, however, words that will also be well received by voters that are not on the Left. These are not words that will put off the crowd on the Right but, rather, will soothe them.... If you ask me, all this constitutes [electoral] marketing aids that have lain neglected for some 20 years.

[Tamer] Sir, could it be that what I see now represents a more liberal Mr and Mrs Ecevit?... Or is it just me thinking so?

[Tamer backgroung] I cannot say that the world "liberal" I used was a very good choice.... What I had in mind was a free, unrestrained style.

I am talking of an independent and nonaligned voice, with expert knowledge of Turkey and clear of "debts of blood-money." It is just that the word "liberal" slipped out of my mouth:

[Tamer] Am I perhaps facing a more liberal Ecevit?

Bulent Ecevit laughs:

[Ecevit] Honorable Mr Tamer, this is how we have always been.

[Tamer] But we never saw that side of you.

[Ecevit] No you could not, because the conditions then made it impossible for us to break out of the ring and reach these points.

[Tamer] I see.

[Tamer Background] I understand the meaning of "a fresh start" better now. Ever since the movement to form parties began [in the post 1980 military coup period], I have entertained a private suspicion.

There was a niggling thought at the back of my mind that Erdal Inonu did not so much rise to prominence as that he was hoisted there.

Who is Erdal Inonu?

Ismet Pasa's son.

Who is Bulent Ecevit? The new leader who defeated Ismet Pasa at the 1972 Congress of the RPP.

Who was Ismet Pasa?

A symbol held in high regard by the armed forces, especially by the military commanders who carried out the 12 September coup.... Could it not then be said that this was a great opportunity to take the old RPP community from Ecevit and hand it back to the Inonu family? After all... why not go for an ideal name like Inonu rather than for some wrong or dubious one....

You might say, "Yes, but he too was vetoed."

If we examine what happened stage by stage, and look for clues of a staff game, could we not ask if the "veto" was not a stratagem?"

I pose this question, even if it might seem absurd.

[Tamer] Honorable Mr Ecevit, could this operation have been organized by forces that might want to have a kind of revenge for the 1972 Congress?

[Tamer Background] Ecevit looks long and hard at the forest in the distance and remains silent.

Then he says:

[Ecevit] I have never considered such a thing.

[Tamer] Are you saying that such a thing never occurred to you?

[Ecevit] I did not consider it.

[Tamer] I am asking that you give it a try.

[Ecevit] Would you like to have another cup of tea?

[Tamer background] With the Honorable Mr Ecevit, we tried to talk not about the past but always about that which is new.

About today and tomorrow.

How does a leader who sets out not on a mission but for a fresh start see the 1990's?

What is his view of Turkey's place in the world?

[Tamer] What comment do you have about the overall foreign policy of the Turkish adminitration today?

[Ecevit] Trade is naturally important in overall foreign policy. It is natural to emphasize its importance and it is right to do so, but it is not the sole factor. Too much of it is harmful. When that happens, we do not become transformed into Westerners but into a country exploited by the West.

[Tamer background] Ecevit asks "Why do we keep silent in the face of repudiation of our state by the refusal of passports to our citizens from Hatay," and says that he is concerned over the Turkish policy concerning Greece.

He says:

[Ecevit] Basic issues have been taken off the agenda. Various concessions have been made. The Honorable Mr Ozal has maintained the same situation. You may have noticed that the expression "continental shelf" has gone out of use for the past 6 years.

[Tamer] But Ozal's style has been getting harsher.

[Ecevit] The problem is not one of style. There are times when one's style may be soft but carries weight and expresses determination. Conversely, there are times when the style may perhaps may become harsher but the important thing is the contents....

[Tamer] Honorable Mr Ecevit, what do you think about the policy concerning Cyprus?

[Ecevit] I see no fault. Things are working properly as far as that goes. But there is an important matter I cannot stomach.

[Tamer] And what is that?

[Ecevit] We were very careful not to involve any of the politics of [Turkish] Cyprus with our own.... We behaved in this way for two important reasons. First, to emphasize the independence of the TFSC.... Second, in order not to spoil a system where democracy was working better than in Turkey.

[Tamer] Are you saying that this tradition has now been violated?

[Ecevit] Unfortunately, yes.... It was the Honorable Mr Ozal who spoiled this tradition. He established ties with the National Unity Party in Cyprus. And he began giving cash assistance.

[Tamer Background] On the day that this conversation with Ecevit took place, Prime Minister Ozal had not yet visited Cyprus.

By the date the present series of articles went to print, the prime minister had gone to Cyprus and returned.

This is, in fact, what did happen.

Therefore, in order to add immediacy to our series of articles, we asked Ecevit yesterday to provide us with his appraisal of this trip. We are offering this new appraisal as a separate boxed item in today's issue of this series of articles.

Doubts raised by "a shadow cast upon the independence" of [Turkish] Cyprus.

"Amazing" blows delivered to the democracy in [Turkish] Cyprus, "which is seen as working better than in our country."

In a nutshell, "a broken tradition", in Ecevit's words.

We thought all these were reasons "worth obtaining a special statement for" at a time when we are getting close to the 12th anniversary of the Peace Operation.

[Begin boxed item] An Appraisal of Ozal's Visit to Cyprus Ecevit gave the following appraisal in connection with Ozal's visit to Cyprus. We publish it in full.

I had stated that I saw an inclination in Prime Minister Ozal to intervene in the internal policies of the Turkish Cypriot community. Unfortunately, the Honorable Mr Ozal's visit confirmed this concern of mine. He wants to impose certain economic and social policies on the TRNC through moral pressure and even, by more than moral pressure, through the threat that "if you do not implement these, we will cut off aid." This, in truth, is not the way one may behave toward an independent country. Not only that, but the Northern Turkish Cypriot community has a democracy that functions very well and is much more real than in our own country. Not only may Ozal's pressure tactics reise doubts about the independence of the TRNC but they may also harm its democracy. The honorable Mr Ozal in fact sowed the seeds of a great political crisis in Cyprus before returning to Turkey.

Certain know it-all businessmen accompanying Ozal have been proposing government models of their own to Cyprus; they say democracy is a "luxury" for the Turkish Cypriots. One of these businessmen went even further, ridiculing the TRNC and the independence of the Turkish Cypriot community in a very unseemly manner by saying, "I shall proclaim a republic and form a government in a region with 150,000 people at Yesilkoy or Buyukada [districts in Istanbul province]. I read these words by a businessman in HURRIET on 5 July. This businessman seems so cut off from the world as to be incapable of realizing the repercussions that taking the independence of North Cyprus so lightly may create in the world.

The prime minister has in fact not given any signal in connection with his visit to Cyprus that any change is contemplated for the solution of the Cyprus problem or the method to be used for pursuing a solution to this problem in the international arena. Nevertheless, he used a very different and harsh style to create the impression that a new phase has been reached in the international arena. Having left this impression, he announced a government decision to hold by-elections in Turkey on the very day he returned to Ankara. In other words, while meddling on the one hand in the affairs of the Turkish Cypriot community and the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus, he raised the suspicion

on the other that he intends to use the Cyprus issue in our internal affairs, in the electoral campaign. I earnestly hope that this suspicion proves false. [signed] B.E. [end boxed item]

[14 Jul 86]

[Text] [Tamer background]

It was necessary to discuss Ozal's performance.

Such a liberal system....

It has its critics and its admirers. There are also others who stay cool, saying, "Let us wait and see."

One wonders what Ecevit's thoughts are.

Through what spectacles does he view the transformation introduced by the Motherland Party [MP]?

Most importantly, what are his ideas, thoughts, opinions about Turgut Ozal himself.

What has he to say about Turgut Ozal's concept of democracy?

These are the points I set aside for the last of the present series of articles.

Time is getting on.

We agreed on 2 hours; it has already been over 3 hours. Hoping to make the last plane of the day to Istanbul, I attempt once again to organize my ideas while sipping yet another glass of tea....

I begin asking Bulent Ecevit questions concerning Prime Minister Ozal.

[Tamer] Honorable Mr Ecevit, what do you think of Ozal?

[Ecevit] He is undoubtedly a person with certain abilities and he follows a policy consistent with his own line; however, not only I am not convinced that he is using his abilities for the benefit of the country, but I also find his political line very dangerous both from a social and economic viewpoint and from the viewpoint of democracy. Nor does he have anything like a sense of "concept of state." He is attempting to run the country like a catch-as-catch-can commercial firm. Furthermore, he knows propaganda too well.

[Tamer] Too well?

[Ecevit] Yes. Here I underline the word "too well," because to know propaganda too well is not an advantage, but harmful.

[Tamer] All right. He has also implemented measures that have had a shock effect upon society. What do you think of them? Are there any that you would

approve of categorically? Are there any among them that would make you kick yourself, saying "I wish I had done that myself?" If so, then which are they? Can you enumerate them, offhand, one by one?"

After thinking for a bit, Ecevit says:

[Ecevit] Honorable Mr Tamer, every administration does things which--when taken in isolation from their political directions--would be considered "correct" by almost everybody. But the important thing is the general political direction.

[Tamer] How about naming a few examples of the ones that are "correct"?

[Ecevit] Well... take the campaign for the innoculation of children; it is impossible not to support it or not to approve of it.

[Tamer] Oh, no! Let us not reduce it to that point. Why don't we take, say, the tax rebate?...or the case of the value added tax?...or the foreign exchange legislation?...or the enforcement law?...the contrition law...and so forth?

[Ecevit] I do not approve of them in their general direction. An arbitraty way of administering.... I am not a statist in the classical sense of the word, but the Honorable Mr Ozal is destroying the concept of state. The Funds are taking the public services out of the hands of the state. Furthermore, they are putting a large proportion of public expenditures outside the scope of any kind of democratic control. I am seriously concerned over all this. You mentioned the enforcement law. We were responsible for the first change, in the same direction, in the enforcement system during our period in power in 1978-1979. We submitted a law similar to the "contrition law" to the National Assembly during that period, but we came up against great resistance and failed to have it adopted by the Assembly.

[Tamer] I understand. Very well then, how to do you see view the Honorable Mr Ozal's attitudes and behavior on the subject of democracy?

[Ecevit] I do not believe that the Honorable Mr Ozal understands or is committed to democracy in the Western sense. In any case, in a country like Turkey, the economic policy which the Honorable Mr Ozal leads and implements cannot possibly be reconciled with democracy. This is because it is a policy that can be implemented only through "depoliticizing" the segments of the working people by keeping them under pressure and neutralized.... But there is an important point.

[Tamer] And what is that?

[Ecevit] To say "I am the continuation of what went before" is wrong. By not saying so, Ozal has made a very intelligent move.

[Tamer] A very interesting viewpoint.

[Ecevit] Ozal has done the right thing.

[Tamer] In what way?

[Ecevit] Ozal has made a correct diagnosis of a tendency in the people. The Turkish people do want full and true democracy, but they have no desire at all for a return to the pre-12 September period.

[Tamer Background] As I listen to Ecevit, I go through the pages of the calendar in my head....

And I recall the style used by Ozal since 1983.

That is to say, ever since the beginning of the period of the formation of political parties.

Ozal, in fact, never said "I am the continuation of this or that party".... In addressing the broad masses where he sought votes, he confined himself to hinting that he was "nationalist and conservative," but he did not produce any propietary sign "to show connections." He did not point to any such sign.... He was very meticulous in this respect.... He was meticulous to the point of "driving up the wall" those who wished to see, without fail, that particular proprietary sign in him.

We did not get down to discussing the finer points of this topic. But consider that "a country fed up with terrorism"....

The environment of 12 September--with the cause "still not officially signed and sealed."

Then, "intervention."

And a society that, despite the leaders it admired and the parties they had committed their emotions to, "warmly welcomed the intervention"...[that brought down these leaders and parties]. A referendum that received a 92-percent vote [in support of the course of the intervention].

The truth is that, whether we like it or not, the "act of 12 September" has taken place "already."

Applause for the act in question.... But still a "hankering for democracy."

In other words, bad impressions have been left behind.... But there is a past sweetheart one cannot renounce.

Ecevit appears to have accepted, at least as a "fact," that 12 September has cut off an era--as if with a knife--and left it behind. Even though he may not be able to stomach it.

We continue our conversation.

[Tamer] Honorable Mr Ecevit, to say "I am the continuation of what went before" is an incorrect strategy in your opinion. Is that right?

[Ecevit] It is. The Honorable Mr Ozal has shown great sagacity by not saying it.

[Tamer] You spoke of a diagnosis.

[Ecevit] Yes.... The Honorable Mr Ozal has made a correct diagnosis of the inclination of the people.... The Turkinsh people do want full and true democracy, but they have no desire at all for a return to the pre-12 September period.

....

[Ecevit] Naturally, if it ever became the lesser of two evils beyond a certain point, then that would be even worse [sentence as published].

[Tamer] Thank you, Honorable Mr Ecevit.

[Tamer background] As you have seen, we tried to have not a single word looking backward. Had that been our intention, this interview would have been nothing more than an exercise in scratching wounds.

If you like, let us list, inmediately, the sharp questions that present themselves:

- An interpretation of his famous speech concerning land and water.

- The essence and aim of the call to the workers: wrest as much as you can.

- The multifarious catchphrases of the 1970's, from the expression "counter-guerrilla" to "find your own foreign exchange yourself," from the "village-town" to "the people's sector," from "a parliament 10 years behind society" to " esgudum"....

- Even if you do not remember these, there is always the appeal--3 days before 12 September--for "those in the bleachers to invade the pitch..." and so forth....

We asked none of these questions. We touched on none of these points. Had we done so, perhaps the Honorable Mr Ecevit also would have been relieved, and he might even have had the opportunity to provide a logical explanation for each one. But there would have been not only no profit in returning to those areas but, in my view, there would have been dangers, too.

So, I have no regret, thinking "I wish I had asked."

I hope you concur.

That page is closed.

"A fresh start," as the Honorable Mr Ecevit says, let us now look ahead.

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## POWER OF CABINET TO AUTHORIZE CROSS-BORDER RAIDS QUESTIONED

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 5 Sep 86 p 2

["Once in a While" column by Atila Sav: "The Boundary of Law Cannot Be Crossed"]

[Text] Article 92 of the Constitution vests the power "to authorize the dispatch of the Turkish Armed Forces to foreign countries except in circumstances mandated by international treaties to which Turkey is a signatory or by international rules of courtesy" in the TGNA [Turkish Grand National Assembly]. This power cannot be transferred.

This provision, which has the same scope in the 1982 Constitution as it did in the 1961 Constitution, specifies one of the functions of the legislative organ.

The second paragraph of the article specifies the exceptions to this provision. In certain emergency situations, that is "in times when an immediate decision is mandated, the President may authorize the use of the Turkish Armed Forces." This authority vested in the President can also not be transferred.

Sending armed forces overseas is a very serious move. From a standpoint of international law, vesting such authority soley and fully in the legislative organ has a special significance in view of the conflicts that may arise between the sovereignty rights of two nations in such situations. Consequently, the transfer of this right to any other organ of the government cannot be contemplated.

The Decree 259 with the Force of Law published in the Official Gazette on 14 August 1986 introduces changes in martial law and state of emergency legislation and organizes the use of the power "to plan and to execute limited-scope operations outside national borders using land, air and naval forces as needed for the purpose of capturing or neutralizing assailants, each time with the permission of the government through the General Staff Command, using the principle of hot pursuit which is considered legitimate by international law."

What is legislated by this decree is the dispatch of some or all of the armed forces to foreign lands. No matter what terminology is used or what

requisites are sought the ramifications are clear. A power which has been vested in the TGNA by Article 92 of the Constitution is taken away from the legislative organ and turned over to the executive organ.

The importance and value of the operation does not change this legal reality. Our approach is not political but constitutional. Statements have been issued to the effect that the government has issued this decree with the force law on the basis of articles 121 and 122 of the Constitution. However, according to these articles, the government has no such authority. Since the powers of the TGNA cannot be transferred by any "laws," they cannot be transferred by decrees with the force of law.

Article 121 of the Constitution gives the Council of Ministers the right to issue decrees with the force of law after meeting with the President on "situations mandated by a state of emergency." Article 122 gives the same right in "situations mandated by martial law."

Thus articles 121 and 122 of the Constitution specify the scope and the mode of the power to issue decrees with the force of law within the framework of states of emergency and martial law. These provisions are as follows:

The Council of Ministers shall have the power to issue decrees with the force of law after meeting with the President in situations:

a) mandated by the state of emergency in times when a state of emergency exists; and

b) by martial law at times when martial law is in effect.

The same articles also define what these situations are. These situations are those described in the second paragraph of Article 121 and the fifth paragraph of Article 122. These provisions specify "how government operations will be run, how the citizens' relations with the administrations will be affected, how liberties will be restricted (the Constitution says 'limited') or suspended and what obligations will be imposed on citizens in time of war or in situations which may lead to war." Thus, according to these articles of the Constitution, the Council of Ministers can use its power to issue decrees with the force of law for only these specified situations. Because only these issues can be governed by "law."

The situations and issues enumerated do not include the "power to use armed forces." As we stated above, since no law can be enacted with regard to the sending of armed forces overseas, the transfer of this power to the Council of Ministers cannot be contemplated.

Articles 87 and 91 of the Constitution specify the circumstances under which the "power to legislate" can be transferred to the executive organ as the right to issue decrees with the force of law. The transfer of this power--that is the power and the function of the legislative organ--outside the specified circumstances cannot be contemplated.

One of the most important functions of the government is to counteract those who breach laws and the constitutional order. It is appropriate for the government to use all the means at its disposal to perform this function. However, a "constitutional government" is a government whose powers and functions are specified and limited by law. The importance and loftiness of an objective cannot justify the crossing of the boundary of the law. When the said decree with the force of law is carefully examined, it is seen that the Council of Ministers decided to issue the decree in a meeting on 25 July 1986. However, it waited until the operation to proclaim the decree, and the decree was published in a special edition of the Official Gazette on 14 August 1986.

The constitutional organs have the primary responsibility to uphold the Constitution. The mode of operation and the action of the Council of Ministers must be criticized from this standpoint.

9588
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SOCIAL GREECE

## RESEARCH ON ATHENS YOUTH: BLEAK PROSPECTS

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 28-29 Sep 86 pp 6, 14

[Results of research by a group consisting of Loukas Kyriakopoulos, Spyr. Amourgis, Dimosthenis Agrafiotis and Lyda Modiano-Leon, who also wrote the report]

[Text] Greece in the year 2000 will depend on the young of today, who are still in school, serve in the Army, or have just started their professional careers.

The superficial public dialogue and petty politics dealing with daily issues and the every-day trivia cannot serve as models of inspiration. The fatalistic attitude toward the challenges of the future is a cause of pessimism and disappointment.

Participation of the young in government and in its responsibilities means they must claim their rights from an ineffective past and understand their responsibility and their obligations for a difficult future. It is true they need to make great leaps forward.

It is necessary to free the nation's creative powers in an open free society, in a competitive economy with just distinctions and rewards. It is necessary to promote the institutions which assure that freedom does not mean license, that personal freedom can exist only in a free, well-governed state. It is necessary to have the kind of education which provides knowledge and opportunities to all. It is necessary to have security which enables a country to be strong because it relies on its own capabilities.

Greece in the year 2000 should be going through the process of modernization today. Modernization calls for new production relationships which serve production; for new forms of participation which serve a just distribution; and certainly for new dreams. Modernization requires discussing and deciding today the country's basic orientations, with consistency. These are the basic national choices!

## Introduction

The population of Athens was 1 million before the war and 2 million in 1965. This means that one-third of all Athenians over 20 years of age and two-thirds of those over 50 have come to Athens from other parts of Greece. Recent studies calculate that two-thirds of Athenian families own or use a paternal house in their place of origin.

The problem of Athens, then, could be of interest to us but could not be exciting. It could be a purely technical problem with an easy or difficult solution. But the significance of the capital (35 percent of the country's population, 40 percent of the GNP, etc.) is dominant in the country.

If Athens turns "belly up" it is almost certain it will take the entire country with it. There is a theory which holds that this overwhelming preponderance of the capital over the rest of the country's cities is a characteristic feature of underdevelopment and parasitism.

Today we note another downturn into development of Athens; a downturn which could be a desirable goal only to the degree a) it is accompanied by a population increase and the economic upsurge of the privinces, and b) the activities of the capital are oriented toward high-quality services. Unfortunately, this is not the case. The problem "Athens" therefore remains, getting worse, and whether we care or get excited today we are bound to be touched by it one day.

In previous articles we presented "technical" and to some extent "political" aspects of the problem. We believe the "spatial" view of a city and the study of its problems on the basis of a sociological interpretation are different ways to seek answers to the same question: The possibilities for developing and improving the quality of life in a given city.

## Quality of Life: The Theoretical Model

Even though the term "quality of life" and the specific goal "improving the quality of life in Athens" appear to be clear and indisputable, it is difficult to give an objective interpretation or to give them specificity. As Marc Schneider writes in his book (The Quality of Life in Major American Cities: Objective and Subjective Social Indices, 1975), every person gives a personal meaning to what he considers a "good life" in a city. Quite often stereotyped or seemingly subjective opinions of the term quality of life do not jive with the subjective view of each inhabitant.

Therefore, the effort of the scientists is centered on identifying the parameters defining the quality of life in a city. In most cases they end up basing their interpretation on negative notions or on conditions to be avoided such as poverty, crime, pollution, etc.

In an article (HARPERS, January 1975, pp 67-71), Arthur Lewis tried to identify the "worst American city" by taking 24 "quality factors" and calculating the averages. Such factors included crime statistics, parking spaces, educational opportunities, etc.

A similar study published in the ECONOMIST on 24 December 1983 (pp 51-58), using a statistical method, identified "the best country one could live in." In detail, the respondents to the questionnaire identified the country they preferred by checking the following set of factors:

A. Economic Indices (unemployment rates, GNP, numbers of automobiles, telephones per 1,000 inhabitants, etc.).

B. Social Indices (primary and secondary students as a percentage of the population, population density per square mile, percentage of the country's population living in the four major cities, suicide rate, etc.).

C. Cultural Indices (number of TV sets per 1,000 inhabitants, number of Nobel Prize winners per 10 million of the country's population, etc.).

D. Health Indices (child mortality rate, number of doctors for every 1,000 inhabitants, etc.).

E. Climate Indices (medium monthly temperature, hours of sun light, etc.).

Both studies support the view that dimensions of the quality of life are very complex and interdependent. Therefore, the quality of life in a city or a country does not depend only on the structural or technical environment, but also on the human environment. This means that in an effort to interpret the quality of life and examine the possibilities for improving such quality in Athens, interest must be centered on the choices offered an Athenian--whether in social or cultural matters or on matters relating to the economic and technical structure of life in the city.

But even the definition of the term or the knowledge of ways to improve the quality of life in Athens is only a first step. The next and possibly more difficult stage is the study of socio-economic characteristics which prevail in a city. Also, to what extent these characteristics are absorbed by the political leadership and incorporated in their administration and political choices. Finally, to see how these characteristics tie to, or strengthen the quality of life in a city through these political choices. The model of political systems presented by David Easton (see Diagram 1) in which he describes various political, economic, and social elements and the relationships which define them, portrays in a codified form the study we mentioned above.

With the word "environment" (in its broader sense) we express social, economic, and cultural elements which characterize a community, a city, a state. These elements, or the so-called environment, provide the "signals" which

affect the choices of the decision makers (local authorities, government, etc.).

In other words, these decision makers, after relevant "procedures of processing" these elements or signals they receive from the environment, decide on a certain "policy", which will be implemented. The "effect" of this policy will have its impact on the environment followed by a feedback which will renovate and adjust the entire system.

## Elements Which Characterize the Environment in Athens

By using this model we first examine the basic elements which form and characterize the environment in Athens. We refer to the processing proceeding and then we accept and examine the policy which is or is not implemented.

To begin with, the socio-economic characteristics which today describe Athens were formed only in the last 30 years. Therefore, changes in the requirements of the inhabitants and the needs the city must meet have not yet settled.

The rapid population increase, the different mixture of the inhabitants who come from the provinces, increasing housing needs, and the rise in the number of vehicles are all relatively new elements in the life of Athens (see "Family and Child in Athens," L. Movsourou, ESTIA 1985).

Therefore, a general observation relating to Athens is this transitional stage the city goes through and which it has to adjust to find its balance and "personality". The way we talk about the personality of a person, we can also speak about the personality of a city. Just as the sense of "beauty"--as it reflects in dress and behavior of a person--forms a dimension of his personality, in the same way the aesthetics of space, or the "pulse" of everyday life of the city's inhabitants characterize its personality.

Thus, we have "dynamic" cities, "neglected" cities, "modern" cities, etc. How can we characterize Athens? What kind of personality does it have? To what extent is a sense of beauty developed among its inhabitants? And to what extent have we developed a feeling of space?

Our purpose here is not to analyze all parameters and elements which form the environment and life in Athens. We shall rather limit ourselves to identification of certain negative elements which significantly prevail and prevent improvement of the quality of life in the city.

The first element refers to the relation of the city to its new inhabitants. More specifically, we focus here on the inability of the Greek capital to offer opportunities to its new inhabitants to develop and cultivate their special dynamism. Or if the phrase was turned around, we would have said that Athens does not take advantage of the strongest element for its development, nor does it invest as much as it should in something which will determine its future--its youth.

TABLE 1

How Important in Your Life Today Do You Consider the Following?

| | N=356 Boys | | | | N=320 Girls | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Very Important | | Important | | Unimportant | | Total | |
| 15 - 19 | Girls | Boys | Girls | Boys | Girls | Boys | Girls | Boys |
| Friendship | 76.8 | 63.2 | 21.7 | 35.7 | 1.5 | 1.1 | 100.0 | 100.0 |
| Money | 22.0 | 26.1 | 61.2 | 63.5 | 16.8 | 10.4 | 100.0 | 100.0 |
| Steady, sentimental bond | 31.1 | 20.2 | 52.7 | 59.3 | 16.2 | 20.5 | 100.0 | 100.0 |
| Professional career | 76.5 | 70.5 | 21.7 | 27.3 | 1.8 | 2.2 | 100.0 | 100.0 |
| Studies | 60.1 | 51.7 | 32.3 | 38.8 | 7.6 | 9.5 | 100.0 | 100.0 |
| Politics (or social activities) | 13.5 | 10.1 | 63.6 | 44.7 | 22.9 | 45.2 | 100.0 | 100.0 |
| Have a family | 25.9 | 24.2 | 45.4 | 52.8 | 28.7 | 23.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |
| Free time and hobbies | 27.4 | 26.4 | 65.3 | 67.1 | 7.3 | 6.5 | 100.0 | 100.0 |
| Social relations | 40.9 | 30.7 | 56.1 | 62.6 | 3.0 | 6.7 | 100.0 | 100.0 |
| Religion | 11.6 | 9.8 | 50.0 | 48.6 | 38.4 | 41.6 | 100.0 | 100.0 |

TABLE 1A

How Important in Your Life Today Do You Consider the Following?

| | N=117 Boys | | | | N=144 Girls | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Very Important | | Important | | Unimportant | | Total | |
| 20 - 24 | Boys | Girls | Boys | Girls | Boys | Girls | Boys | Girls |
| Friendship | 64.6 | 70.0 | 31.9 | 29.1 | 3.5 | 0.9 | 100.0 | 100.0 |
| Money | 27.8 | 23.1 | 61.8 | 64.1 | 10.4 | 12.8 | 100.0 | 100.0 |
| Steady, sentimental bond | 55.5 | 31.6 | 38.2 | 53.0 | 6.3 | 15.4 | 100.0 | 100.0 |
| Professional career | 66.0 | 68.3 | 29.2 | 27.4 | 4.8 | 4.3 | 100.0 | 100.0 |
| Politics (or social activities) | 17.4 | 12.0 | 66.0 | 57.3 | 16.6 | 30.7 | 100.0 | 100.0 |
| Have a family | 37.5 | 30.8 | 46.5 | 36.7 | 16.0 | 32.5 | 100.0 | 100.0 |
| Free time and hobbies | 30.6 | 23.1 | 63.2 | 68.4 | 6.2 | 8.5 | 100.0 | 100.0 |
| Social relations | 38.9 | 27.4 | 58.3 | 65.8 | 2.8 | 6.8 | 100.0 | 100.0 |
| Religion | 12.5 | 4.3 | 32.6 | 34.2 | 54.9 | 61.5 | 100.0 | 100.0 |

The qualities and qualifications of the young are evident and well known. The young are better equipped to meet the challenges of the future because they have more up-to-date knowledge and livelier imaginations. Because of their age they have greater stamina for work, a stronger desire to create, and greater ambitions. Youth are the force of the future.

But the data contained in a study on the young published recently by the National Center for Social Research [EKKE] in cooperation with the Under Ministry of Youth (see SOCIAL SCIENCE REVIEW, Issue 57, 1985) show that although young people in Athens have all these qualities they find it difficult to find ways to develop them.

When the young respondents replied to questions referring to values of life, their replies support the view that they want to be educated, want progress and in general, express themselves in favor of "healthy" values. (See Table 1 and 1A.) However, when questioned about basic problems faced by their generation, one can clearly see the weaknesses of the city's infrastructure and "dead ends" they face when they "go out" into the world.

Thus, as shown by Table 2, unemployment, bad education, and the lack of city infrastructure for various activities of the young are considered to be the most serious problems.

TABLE 2

What Problems of Your Generation Do You Believe Remain Unsolved?

| | 15 - 19 | | 20 - 24 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | N=356 Boys | N=328 Girls | N=117 Boys | N=144 Girls |
| Unemployment/Economic Problem | 49.7 | 40.2 | 59.8 | 66.0 |
| Generation gap | 11.5 | 24.1 | 2.6 | 9.7 |
| Education, study improvement | 14.9 | 15.2 | 14.5 | 9.7 |
| Amusement, recreation | 7.0 | 5.2 | 1.7 | -- |
| Narcotics | 3.9 | 5.8 | 2.6 | 6.3 |
| Others | 11.4 | 6.6 | 17.3 | 6.3 |
| No answer | 1.6 | 2.9 | 1.5 | 2.0 |
| Total | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |

A corresponding study carried out in 1983 by EEC on youth of the 10 member-countries is also noteworthy: Among the subjects the young consider more important and more hopeful for the future are development and improvement of the living standard (related to material parameters), the quality of life, and development of science and technology (see "The New European," an EEC publication, Dec 82, p 60).

The same study contains another element: The special desire expressed by young Greeks to work for the government, coupled with the phenomenon of delay in starting their careers until age 25. This may be explained as another logical reaction to the limited choices offered by Athens.

On the other hand, a career delay is interpreted by Professor Tsoukalas (see "Greece in Transition," Exandas, 1986) as a deliberate and planned wish of the family in order for the young to secure a socially more acceptable employment (usually a better occupation than that of the parents, such as a civil servant or an employee in the public sector) which gives prestige to the entire family.

On the one hand these data show the importance attached by the young to improvement of the quality of life in the city, and on the other, their chances to contribute to this improvement, but also the city's inability to take advantage of their contribution. Finally, we see their realistic reaction with the choice of a solution which is considered "better among the worst" (a position in the public sector), a phenomenon which serves as the carrier of other social problems which feed the already existing ones.

Active and Inactive Athens Population

A second element characterizing the environment in Athens, and which constitutes part of the "social problem" is the reduction of the population in the 40-45 age group and even more, the comparative decline of the population in Greece.

According to the 1981 census, the age distribution presents a problem in the 35-39 age group. It shows a 20 percent decline compared to the adjacent age groups. This evidently is due to the low birth rate between the years 1942-1946. This group, in the 40-45 age range, comprises the most dynamic persons in public life, business and intellectual life, where they hold leading positions in all these activities.

Compared to all OECD countries, the active population in Greece generally and in the capital area in particular appears to be extremely low. Table 3 speaks for itself.

But if the total active population in Greece is much lower in percentage points than that of other OECD countries, it is equally low or even lower in urbanized Athens. Thus, in 1983 the economically active population did not exceed 46.3 percent of the corresponding age groups, while for men it is 67.4 percent.

Employment

A third element is the extrmely negative change in employment with an increase in office employment and a rapid decline in manual labor (see Table 4).

TABLE 3

Percentage of Active Population (1981)
(15 Years and Over)

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Greece* | 48 (46)** | 68 (69)** | Portugal | 71 | 89 |
| Holland | 58 | 78 | Japan | 72 | 89 |
| Spain | 60 | 86 | Finland | 73 | 77 |
| Italy | 60 | 81 | Canada | 73 | 87 |
| Turkey*** | 64 | 82 | Great Britain | 74 | 89 |
| Germany | 65 | 81 | United States | 75 | 87 |
| Australia | 68 | 87 | Norway | 78 | 89 |
| France | 69 | 82 | Sweden | 83 | 85 |

Sources: OECD, Labour Force Statistics: 1970-82, Paris, 1984

* For 1983, Research on Labor Potential (Employment) of the National Statistical Service of Greece [ESYE], Athens 1984, gives corresponding percentages of 51.9 and 72.0.

** ESYE: Statistical Yearbook, 1983

*** 1980 data.

TABLE 4

Employed (Excluding Farming in Athens
by Ages and Profession

| | A G E S | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | 25 - 34 % | 35 - 44 % | 45 - 55 % |
| Professionals, small businessmen | 30.0 | 26.5 | 19.2 |
| Office employees | 17.8 | 12.4 | 11.2 |
| Merchants, salesmen | 11.7 | 13.1 | 13.5 |
| Artisans, laborers | 29.3 | 33.5 | 37.8 |
| Working in services | 38.8 | 9.7 | 12.3 |
| Others (including directors, high officials in private business) | 2.4 | 4.8 | 6.0 |

Source: Pandazidis, Kasimati, p 54

This trend would not have been a bad choice if it meant the new generation could obtain the necessary training to avoid the traditional industrial and building trades and turn to a technologically advanced economy which requires quality services. A similar trend is evident in Europe as well. The percentage of London Business School graduates going into industry for their first job fell from 49 percent in 1982 to 29 percent in 1985.

However, the educational level, lack of scientific research, and the technological inadequacy do not support the possibility of such a change. According to the KEPE study (Employment in Basic Sectors of the Greek Economy in 1987) in east central Greece and the islands, with Athens accounting for the major part, the rising occupations include:

--Office employees in the branches of textiles, shoe making, clothing, chemicals and in general, various industries.

--Washing, dry cleaning, and ironing in the corresponding industries.

--Doorkeepers, building managers, and cleaning personnel at a higher level.

--Accountants, specialized cost accountants, and comptrollers.

--Assistant accountants, bookkeeping personnel, and cashiers.

--Office employees, warehouse supervisors, weight checkers, telephone operators, and telegraph operators.

--Purchasing and sales supervisors.

--Officers of ships and aircraft and administrative personnel, especially in the Greek aircraft industry.

Among the occupations which remain stagnant are:

--Authors (publishing branch).

--Managerial executives of private and public enterprises and organizations.

--Potters, ceramic makers, wood and stone carvers, stone cutters, etc.

In other words, contrary to expectations, it is apparent that Athens is moving toward another model of distorted consumer behavior and by extension to another model of distorted development where increasingly lower-quality services and marginal facilities are offered.

More Flexible Working Hours

A fourth element which constitutes a form of social problem is the "absence of an enterprising spirit" in Athens. In spite of the country's EEC membership, no competitive abilities have emerged; no innovations are promoted; the search for distinction is not encouraged. As a result Athens finds it difficult to improve the quality of life for its inhabitants, and even worse, it cannot attract the higher level or more profitable forms of activity which are a prerequisite for its modernization.

Thus, while in other productive cities we observe a gradual transition from the secondary sector (industry) to the third and fourth level sector (technology and services) and daily improvement in living conditions for the inhabitants (less pollution, higher wages, more leisure time, etc.), in Athens we are still at the stage of searching for a favorable climate for developing the secondary sector.

As an illustration one may mention the freeing of the "working hour schedule" which is now cited as one of the causes contributing to the "absence of enterprising spirit" prevailing in Athens. This cause could be easily removed. A flexible working hours schedule for stores would serve consumers and the city by reducing commuting, easing traffic and even lowering costs through a more intensive use of installations.

As M. Papagiannakis said in his article of July 12, 1986: "The current working hours schedule (together with the five-day week as applied today when time off of employees means closing down services) leads mathematically to the emptying of our cities and especially of their historic centers for a considerable part of the week. This has incalculable economic, social and cultural consequences."

Cultural Events

The fifth element characterizing Athens and possibly the most widely understood social problem in the life of Athens is the absence of goals for a cultural policy. Athens, although it has a significant cultural history and great potential, is actually a culturally amorphous city.

Dim. Agrafiotis, professor of sociology at the Athens Medical Personnel School and a specialist in matters of cultural policy, presented in a study certain data referring to the low interest Athenians show in the available cultural activities, and to the extremely low level of these activities, as well as to the absence, in the last analysis, of a comprehensive and multisided cultural policy. By way of illustration we present here some of the data mentioned by Agrafiotis:

In Athens, 44 percent of the people never go to the movies, and 24 percent go less than once a month. The average circulation of all Athenian dailies is approximately 450,000 on week days and 350,000 on Sundays. The National Philaharmonic Orchestra gives approximately 20 concerts annually with an average audience of 600, while the opera gives approximately 75 performances with an average audience of 550. Finally, 4 million copies of books are sold on the average every year.

These data are not mentioned to burden the conscience of Athenians...They prove more than anything else the inability of our city to offer a variety of options and also a high quality of cultural events being offered.

In his study Agrafiotis makes certain suggestions which could contribute to our improvement of the cultural life in Athens, such as:

1. The possibility of exhibits where art would be combined with commerce, i.e., combining business and pleasure. For example, exhibits of clothing, jewelry, or fashions mobilizing artists and businessmen with possible profit for all.

2. The development of new ways of co-existence with major stores giving space for exhibits.

3. Mobilization with the aid of a newspaper or a magazine and the Athens Municipality for promoting a cultural event on the subject of, say, the history of social struggles. Such an event could be repeated every year with the same subject.

4. Utilizing the phenomenon "Athens is an aggreate of provinces," with the organization of local dinners in neighborhoods and the preservation of traditional recipes, local costumes, dialects, and rituals.

5. Establishing an international prize to be given to rising--not established--forces such as a young person who has made a major contribution. Something of the sort would be designed to promote the discovery of unknown young people, and it could be applied in sectors which currently have no prizes. A prerequisite for all this would be a committee of judges with great prestige.

6. Offering honors and recognition to persons who have made a contribution to the city without necessarily being known politicians or public personalities. For example, a good merchant, a ship captain in Piraeus, a syndicalist--men who are "model citizens in the city."

7. Establishing local libraries showing books on a subject which is of interest to the neighborhood inhabitants.

These and other similar suggestions give an idea of the potential Athens has to truly become a "cultural capital of the world," a potential which now remains unrealized. Unfortunately, our city cannot satisfy the cultural needs of its inhabitants, let alone call itself a cultural capital.

Reference to the above data identifies the social problems which characterize life in Athens. These problems are being identified--at least they should be--by the decision makers who, after the appropriate processing, formulate their own policies.

Processing Procedures - Implementation

Two elements negatively affect the processing procedures of these data by the decision makers. The first refers to the relationship between the central government and the local self-government. It must be understood that

the city cannot solve its problems or improve the quality of life for its inhabitants unless management is in the hands of independent officials who are directly and exclusively concerned with the interests of the city. Therefore, it is necessary to transfer funds to the local self-government and also management of local affairs to the local authorities.

In other words, it is necessary to make clear that there is a difference between the policies of the state and those of the municipality. In local self-government, management must be in the hands of an independent agency (of private law) to assure its flexibility, without interference by the state, without the rules of state accounting--so that it can spend but also receive (grants, gifts, voluntary aid, etc.) without red tape and cumbersome procedures.

The second refers to insufficient participation by citizens in decision making on the problems of the city. It is necessary for Athenians to understand in time and to decide what kind of life they want to have in this city, and to make their choices the basis for regulatory intervention of the state.

Questions of city planning and other more general issues relating to Athens require 20 years or a generation and, therefore, exceed the term of one government or a mayor. To have consistency and prevent policy changes every 4 years the city residents must be informed and must make the decisions. Athens is every one's business.

In conclusion, we may say that the social problems which characterize the environment; the personality of Athens with the inadequacies of the processing procedures; decision making by the authorities; and the signals, do not lead to effective implementation and even less affect the direction and implementation of policy resulting in the improvement of life in Athens.

Therefore, it is necessary to decide on our basic choices and take advantage of our potential to turn our choices into reality.




Diagram 1

Key: 1. Environment; 2. Resupply; 3. Inducement; 4. Processing procedure; 5. Governing; 6. Impact; 7. Resupply; 8. Environment.

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CSO: 3521/20

SOCIAL TURKEY

IRANIAN POLICIES SEEN PERILOUS TO TURKEY'S SECURITY

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 5 Sep 86 p 5

["Corner" column by Ergun Goze: "A Lesson from the 'Mullaharchy'"]

[Text] Today Iran appears to be under the rule of the mullahs. The term "mullah" means "knowledgeable." Turkish history bears testimony to the deeds of honorable and knowledgeable mullahs. Later on, this term was used to indicate falsification. This was primarily brought about by the Iranian mullahs who lavished on themselves titles unacceptable to our religion such as "Hojatollah" and "Ayatollah" and who began to compare themselves to the clergy class of Christianity.

However, the Iranian mullahs have recently taught us a lesson which may prove that we might not be justified to talk so derisively about them. You will remember that on the occasion of Mr Halefoglu's impending visit to Tehran I wrote that we should pursue a very careful policy with respect to Iran. I also said that for the moment the Iranians are "fooling" us because of their war with Iraq. In fact this is so obvious now that everyone can see it.

Indeed, it was reported that the Karbala-2 offensive launched by Iran against Iraq a few days ago was targeted against the region which was recently bombed by Turkish jet aircraft and that it thus provided substantial support to the Barzani forces that are fighting against the regime of Saddam Husayn. As is known, the separatist bandits in Turkey were supported by Barzani. In the aftermath of the Turkish air operation, Barzani was forced to end its support, and the separatist bandits were forced to seek refuge in Iran. Now, thanks to the Iranian offensive in this region, Barzani has been given breathing room and has the means to act against Turkey comfortably and to help the separatist bandits.

Thus if the report carried by IRNA is confirmed, the Turkish-Iraqi oil pipeline may also be imperiled. But even that is only a minor detail of the main issue. At this point Turkey must think well about the following question: What must, can or will its strategy be in the event of any changes in the regional balance of power?

It is evident that even the "mullaharchy" in Iran knows what it will do and how it will do it and seems to be determined to do it. So much that, after

giving Turkey a couple of tankers of oil and making some vague promises, the mullahs are not hesitant about launching a military operation which may imperil the security of Turkey's borders. What is at issue here is a geostrategic destiny. Turkey has many strong trump cards to play and is obligated to defend very large national interests.

Let us once again state this fantastic contradiction. Iran, which considered a simple pursuit operation undertaken by Turkey against separatist bandits as "interference in Iraq's internal affairs" and which tried to protest it, is openly and officially working to turn Iraq inside out and is even warning: "Let no one try to reconcile me with Iraq."

Can we say: Let us leave Iran and Iraq to do whatever they want?

Can such a diplomacy be contemplated?

Before one answers that question, one would better take a look at a report carried by the Anatolia Agency. According to a report by the London journal DEFENCE, COMMUNICATION AND SECURITY, "Iran is supporting separatists in Turkey. In fact, this has gone so far that Iran, an Islamic republic, is supporting the Armenian 'organization', ASALA, against Turkey."

Yes, but let us be fair: The "mullaharchy" is pursuing a more consistent, disciplined, persistent and ambitious policy than our own excellencies.

9588
CSO: 3554/14

SOCIAL TURKEY

## CONTROVERSIAL RELIGIOUS TEACHER DENIED RELEASE

Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish 12 Sep 86 pp 19,16

[Report by Mehmet Ozakay]

[Text] Appearing before the Istanbul State Security Court yesterday with a clean shaven beard, slightly long hair and a mustache, "Adnan Hoca" was denied release from custody for a second time. The mothers of some of his disciples who came to observe the hearing said after the trial: "All of our children became enemies of Ataturk. They were pushed outside the society."

The trial of Adnan Oktar, who is charged with weakening national morale by engaging in religious propaganda and who may be sentenced to up to 15 years in prison if convicted, continued at the Istanbul State Security Court yesterday. Nazli Ilicak and Akin Kamacioglu did not show up at the trial. Criminal charges were brought against Adnan Oktar following a report published in the daily BULVAR entitled "Adnan Hoca and His Disciples Argue with Young Men. Why Did We Believe in Adnan Hoca?" It was determined that Adnan Oktar was not subjected to medical observation at the Court Medical Department despite a standing court decision. The presiding judge decided that the expert committee which will decide if an offense was committed in the said article be summoned to testify in court by the police. The court also decided that Adnan Hoca be sent to the Court Medical Departmetn and be kept under medical observation since he is already under custody.

After the trial, four women who said that they are the mothers and relatives of Adnan Hoca's disciples stated that they would press their complaints to the end. Requesting anonimity, the four women charged that their children had become unrecognizable and added: "They all became enemies of Ataturk. They were pushed outside the society. Although we are their mothers they do not even shake our hands. They do not want to talk to us because we do not veil our faces. Our children have been ruined. We will work until the very end."

9588
CSO: 3554/15

SOCIAL TURKEY

COLUMNIST URGES EFFORTS TO PRESERVE SECULARISM

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 28 Aug 86 p 10

["Ankara Notes" column by Mustafa Ekmekci: "The Death of Secularism"]

[Text] I am writing this in case the readers were wondering about the latest status of Ali Nesin and Sevan Bedros Nisanyan. On Tuesday, I received the following telegram from them:

"To: Mustafa Ekmekci, CUMHURIYET, Ankara.

"Thank you very much for your help. Hoping to see you soon. Sevan Nisanyan and Ali Nesin."

The telegram was sent from Isparta on Monday. They were still in their barracks. For their discharge, their legal defense counsel needed to go to the Ministry of National Defense on Tuesday, speak and argue with legal experts there and have a discharge order wired to the 58th Division in Isparta.

It is highly likely that by the time this article is published, Ali Nesin and Bedros will have left the barracks from which their friends were "discharged" a long time ago.

There are not many days when I feel happy for choosing the profession of writing and journalism. But seeing the happiness of other people makes me happy too. At times like that, when I think that I am accomplishing something and performing my journalistic duties I am pleased.

In this case, Ali Nesin and Sevan Bedros Nisanyan are only symbols. Many other persons encounter similar problems in their lives. Many of them probably go through their ordeals unknown to the press.

Events in civilian life are immediately reported in the press, but if the issue is related to the military it is hard even to approach it.

Once a retired major came to the offices of CUMHURIYET. He had been forced to retire. In that he was not alone. As he had explained in his petition to the Higher Military Administrative Court, 107 officers were retired from the 3d Army in 1985 because they were considered objectionable. According to what he

told me, most of these officers, whose ranks ranged from lieutenant to colonel, were not of retirement age. On the other hand, they could not be convicted of any offense. The retired major, D.D., insisted that he was unfairly treated and demanded the rescission of the decision made against him. His case was dismissed. As a last resort, the retired major, D.D., had come to the press. He had been reading CUMHURIYET for years. Was it not my duty to investigate his problems and even the problems of those who had not turned to us?

I asked him to send me a detailed account of his case. I agreed to investigate his case.

Haldun Ozen said:

"Do you know what one of my best childhood memories is?"

"What?"

"Listening to prayer calls in Turkish. I could never forget the call to prayer that began with 'God is great, God is great.'"

In our childhood we used to climb up the minarets and recite the call to prayer in Turkish. I wonder if the elderly made us recite the call because it was in Turkish. The muezzin [clergyman who calls Muslims to prayer] could read Turkish, but he was not fond of climbing up the minaret.

In 1950, the Democratic Party reintroduced the Arabic call to prayer. The Turkish call to prayer which Ataturk had recited for years became part of history thanks to the Democratic Party. Ataturkists never forgive the Democrats mainly for this reason. Secularism was trampled upon repeatedly during the tenure of the Democratic Party. They tolerated this in order to win votes. In fact, they instigated it. They thought that they could stay in power for many more years by exploiting religion. Like Ataturk, Ismet Pasa [Inonu] was extremely scrupulous and protective about the principle of secularism. If secularism was lost it was obvious where the nation would go.

When Celal Bayar's remains were taken from the mortuary in Istanbul to be put aboard a plane, former assembly deputies reportedly carried the casket with "tekbirs" [pronounciations that God is great]. It is said that Governor Nevzat Ayaz was forced to say: "Stop them. They are shouting unnecessarily." I witnessed a similar situation during the funeral of Field Marshal Fevzi Cakmak in Istanbul. The crowd marched voicing "tekbirs." Immediately I distanced myself away from the march. I watched it from a distance. Then I walked away.

Today, the main issue in Turkey over which a fight is necessary is religious exploitation. No amount of argumentation on this issue is excessive. Mustafa Kemal says in his handwritten memoirs:

"There are those who say that religious unity has a role in the building of a nation. But we see with our own eyes that the opposite is true in the case of the Turkish nation.

"The Turks were a great nation before they endorsed the Arabs' religion. The Turks' endorsement of this religion did not motivate the Arabs or the Persians or the Egyptians or others who share the same religion with the Turks to join the Turks to form a single nation. On the contrary, this religion weakened the national unity of the Turkish nation; it numbed the Turks' national feelings and fervor. This was a natural outcome. Because the purpose of the religion established by the Prophet Muhammad was the establishment of an extensive supranational Arabic identity. This Arabic ideal was expressed with the term 'community of same religion.' Those who endorsed Prophet Muhammad's religion were obligated to forget their selves and to dedicate their lives to the glorification of the word 'Allah' everywhere. Even so, however, they were supposed to worship and to appeal to God not in their native language but with the book God had sent to the Arab tribe. These worshippers would not know what they were saying to God unless they learned Arabic. Under those circumstances, the Turkish people were turned into senile simpletons reciting the Koran by heart even though they did not understand a word of it." ("Ataturkism," 1st volume, Ataturk's manuscripts, the General Staff Printing Office)

9588
CSO: 3554/14

## PROGRAM TO FURNISH MOSQUES IN EUROPE WITH 'EDUCATED CLERGY'

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 12 Sep 86 pp 3,11

[Report by Nilgun Tarkan]

[Text] Ankara--An intensive "campaign" has been launched to rid Turkish workers abroad from the influence of extreme rightist and religionist groups calling themselves "Suleymanists" and "National Viewpoint." It has been learned that an in-depth report on this issue has been submitted to the National Security Council [NSC].

The program of "appointing a highly-educated clergyman to every mosque in Europe," jointly administered by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Religious Affairs Chairmanship, has been expanded. This work has been proceeding at the instructions and with the approval of the NSC.

It is reported that only about 100 of the approximately 1,000 mosques abroad are under the influence of "extremist elements." It is warned, however, that the peril must not be ignored. It has been learned that Ambassador Oktay Iscen, the Turkish envoy to the FRG, has requested the appointment of 190 well-educated Muslim clergymen to mosques in that country as soon as possible.

Religious Affairs Chairman Tayyar Altikulac said: "Dissonant voices will be silenced when we have an adequate number of clergymen."

Report to NSC

According to the data given to the NSC, until 1978 when well-educated clergymen were first dispatched to Europe, Turkish workers in Europe were subjected to the religious exploitation of the "Suleymanists" and the "National Viewpoint."

The program to send clergymen abroad began to be implemented in 1978, thanks to the efforts of the Religious Affairs Chairmanship and the financial support of worker organizations abroad, the Belgian local governments and the Secretariat General of the World Islamic Association.

Beginning in 1980, budget funds were used to hold competitive examinations among graduates of the Higher Islamic Institute and the School of Divinity and

to appoint the winners of the competition--selected by a commission made up of Foreign Ministry and Religious Affairs Chairmanship officials--as clergymen to Europe.

The "Suleymanists" and members of the "National Viewpoint," who divided up the mosques in Europe among themselves and who tried to indoctrinate the Turkish workers with their extremist views and to exploit religious education for their own ends by introducing Koranic courses, were forced to retreat after these appointments.

Work of Foundations and Associations

The religious foundations in Belgium and Holland were followed by "Turkish Islamic Associations for Religious Affairs" which were first established in Berlin and then in Koln in accordance with German laws.

These organizations, headed by "genuine men of religion" sent from Turkey are reported to be carrying out the following work:

--Procure scholarships for clergymen who want pursue academic studies and earn doctorates.

--Hold funeral services for Turkish workers who die abroad and pay for the repatriation of their remains to Turkey.

--Organize pilgrimage trips which until now were run by destructive and extremist religious organizations.

--Transfer the movable and immovable assets of religious foundations to the Religious Foundation in Turkey.

--Educate the children of Turkish workers within the framework of national education and religious courses.

--Have standardized sermons and orations sent from Turkey read in all mosques and places of worship simultaneously.

--Create auxiliary educational resources for the young. For example, in Koln an apprenticeship for 60 students and a seamstress course for girls are offered in an area adjacent to the mosque. In response to requests, typing and computer courses will be offered free of charge in the same location by the end of this month.

Meanwhile the Turkish ambassador to the FRG, Oktay Iscen, stated that 190 clergymen are needed to maintain authority in these mosques and to prevent the entry of members of extremist groups into new mosques and places of worship.

Religious Affairs Chairman Tayyar Altikulac whom we talked to with regard to this issue said that currently there are 431 clergymen abroad, that the problem will be largely resolved with the dispatch of 250 additional personnel and that at present "the situation is 80 to 90 percent under control."

9588
CSO: 3554/15

COLUMNIST URGES GOVERNMENT ROLE IN BUILDING MOSQUES

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 5 Sep 86 p 2

["Friday Chat" column by Hamdi Mert: "The Mosques Week"]

[Text] The Religious Affairs Chairmanship has proclaimed the first week of every October, beginning in 1986, as the "Mosques Week." During that week mosques will be discussed across Turkey; the mosques' structure, organization, surrounding landscape, architecture and services will be examined.

Memories

I remember the days when I was a student at the Adana Islamic Seminary. Our nation's desire and eagerness to build "mosques" is well known. At that time, mosques were being built everywhere. It is said that at certain ages a person thinks he is "somebody." We experienced that feeling at that time and we advised people to build seminaries rather than "mosques." After all, what purpose can mosques serve without imams [Muslim clergymen] and congregations? Are not seminaries institutions that train personnel for "mosques" like machines making machines? Moreover, seminaries also house "mosques." Thus, schools and not "mosques" should be built. That is what we used to say.

This suggestion, interpretation and approach was indeed correct. But later on, we learned another "truth." The institution of the mosque is truly very important. In 1976, we traveled to Bulgaria by land. We visited Turkish-populated regions in the Soviet Union in 1978 and in Greece in 1980. Turkish-populated regions in Western Thrace, Bulgaria and the Soviet Union have remained Turkish and Muslim only because of the existence of mosques. It is said that during the Lausanne Conference the Greek delegation insisted that Edirne belongs to Greece. The British delegation reportedly objected: "Let us assume that Edirne belongs to Greece. What are we going to do with the Selimiye Mosque?" The magnificent Selimiye Mosque thus saved Edirne without any need for objections and arguments by the Turkish delegation.

That is a fact. With their permanent and strong structures, mosques have, so to speak, acted as our title deeds and seals for the locations they stand on.

Race to Build Mosques

The first mosques "Mescid-i Kuba" and "Mescid-i Nebi" were built by the Prophet himself and his companions. Later, nations and individuals raced each

other to build and to restore mosques. The "state treasury" and the "religious foundations" worked hand in hand. A mosque architecture was developed with the sponsorship of the state.

The caliph sultans took a personal interest in mosque architecture. When the Ottoman Empire was established, "prayer" mosques were built for the sultans. Some "pashas" and "sultans' mothers" also joined this race. The mosques of Fatih, Beyazit, Suleymaniye, Selimiye and Sultanahmet are the fruits of this determination and endeavor.

It is said that the desire to draw the attention of the Islamic world to the center of the "caliphate" was the driving force behind this endeavor. It is a viewpoint. Perhaps it is only one of the motivating causes. However, the primary objective was undoubtedly the desire to display the "exaltation of the word of God" not only on battlefronts but in the country's architecture and to spread the Islamic faith and the Turkish-Islamic spirit by engraving it on earth and rocks.

It is this determination and endeavor that makes these lands "Turkish" and "Islamic"--an endeavor in which the state and the nation compete.

It is said that the Suleymaniye Mosque alone had 485 permanent staff members during the period when the brightest episodes of Turkish history were written. Of these, 297 reportedly provided "religious services."

One wonders what did 485 official personnel did in a single mosque.

Therefore this is the meaning contained in the "name" and "calling" of the institution of the "mosque." The mosque obviously does not mean just "call to prayer" and "prayer." It specially does not mean opening the mosque at "prayer" time and closing it afterwards.

What About Today?

During the last three-quarters of a century, mosques have been physically entrusted to individuals and congregations.

As the population grew, there was a need for new mosques. "Individuals" and "associations" built mosques with "four walls and a ceiling" to meet the needs of the day without being able to think about the past and the future. They built mosques with no character or style. They did that because that is all they could afford and also because of the intellectual drought of the last 1 and 1/2 centuries.

This is wrong. Because the "state" is permanent. The homeland's architecture must be commensurate with the permanence of the state, particularly since mosques are the permanent seals of Turkism and Islam on these lands.

Fahri Koruturk, Turkey's sixth president, visited the Religious Affairs Chairmanship in 1976. He watched the Kocatepe mosque from a distance. He must have liked it because he suggested that we should develop a "mosque architecture" as in our past history and said that this must be done by the "state" which must show the way to the people.

The current Chairman of Religious Affairs was then the deputy chairman of the said agency. Since then, much has been said about a "mosque architecture." The Religious Affairs Chairmanship and the Religious Foundation built projects like "villages," "neighborhoods" and "cities." The "Kocatepe Mosque" was cited as an example of cooperation between the state and the nation. However, this project could never be set on a serious disciplinary course.

Now, while the "Religious Foundations Directorate General" expands its budget for the building and repair of mosques, official allotments are made from the general budget for the construction of "mosques" and "model mosques."

This means that after a long interruption the "state" is once again resuming its role. Indeed, that is the right course.

If the state and the nation are integral, if the institution of the "mosque" has a positive function in our national life and in the continuity of the homeland as a Turkish and Islamic land, then collaboration between the state and the nation must continue on this issue.

From this standpoint, the "Mosques Week" is appropriate and meaningful.

9588
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SOCIAL TURKEY

## BRIEFS

JOURNALIST ACCUSED OF ANTISECULARISM--A prison sentence of 7 and 1/2 years has been asked for journalist-author Sadik Albayrak who is being tried on charges of engaging in antisecular propaganda in his book entitled "Walkers and Sufferers." At the trial held at the Istanbul State Security Court yesterday, the prosecutor said in his statement that the defendant insists in his book that the system of government in Turkey must be based on religious principles and that he describes the republican reforms as a "deluge." The trial was adjourned to a future date after Sadik Albayrak, a former writer in MILLI GAZETE, read his defense. [Text] [Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 5 Sep 86 p 3] 9588

ANTISECULARISM CHARGES DROPPED--Sevket Kazan, a former official of the now defunct National Salvation Party, who was tried on charges of making antisecular statements in a speech in Stuttgart, FRG, has been acquitted. During his trial at the 1st Military Court of the IV Army Corps Command yesterday, defendant Sevket Kazan read his closing defense statement. Kazan said: "The military prosecutor is committed to defending the state. But protecting a statesman is also among his duties. I served as minister of justice and labor and as the deputy speaker of the Turkish Grand National Assembly on behalf of my party. During that time I was not charged with any criminal offenses. I reject the baseless imputation made against me in a country like the FRG where all fugitives from the law have congregated--I mean those who have defected from Turkey--and I ask for my acquittal." [Text] [Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 12 Sep 86 p 7] 9588

CSO: 3554/15

## ANALYSIS OF TRADE WITH EAST BLOC COUNTRIES

AU081200 [Summary] Vienna DIE PRESSE Supplement in German on 8 September devotes 12 pages to Austrian cooperation with the CEMA countries on the occasion of the 10-14 September Vienna autumn fair. The reports include an analysis of Austrian trade with the East Bloc countries by Friedrich Gleissner (2,000 words), in which he presents the historical development of trade with the CEMA countries from 1955 onwards. He stresses that exports to the East Bloc in general are relatively stable, although there are some fluctuations in trade with the individual countries.

Gleissner gives tables providing the following information on Austrian exports and imports to and from the East Bloc countries in 1983-85:

AUSTRIAN IMPORTS (in 1,000 schillings)

| Trading partner | 1983 | Percentage of total Austrian imports | Percentage change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bulgaria | 467,669 | 0.1 | minus 18.5 |
| CSSR | 7,368,863 | 2.1 | plus 1.2 |
| GDR | 2,726,299 | 0.8 | minus 7.7 |
| Mongolia | 784 | 0.0 | minus 14.0 |
| Poland | 3,561,564 | 1.0 | plus 11.3 |
| Romania | 1,572,171 | 0.5 | plus 21.5 |
| USSR | 14,855,983 | 4.3 | minus 11.9 |
| Hungary | 5,930,050 | 1.7 | plus 24.6 |
| Sum Total | 36,483,383 | 10.5 | minus 1.2 |
| World Total | 348,339,135 | 100.0 | plus 4.7 |

| Trading Partner | 1984 | Percentage of total Austrian imports | Percentage change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bulgaria | 665,870 | 0.2 | plus 42.4 |
| CSSR | 7,863,290 | 2.0 | plus 6.7 |
| GDR | 2,540,664 | 0.6 | minus 6.8 |
| Mongolia | 724 | 0.0 | minus 7.7 |
| Poland | 5,035,352 | 1.3 | plus 41.4 |
| Romania | 1,704,165 | 0.4 | plus 8.4 |
| USSR | 19,625,299 | 5.0 | plus 32.1 |
| Hungary | 8,110,884 | 2.1 | plus 36.6 |
| Sum Total | 45,546,248 | 11.6 | plus 24.8 |
| World Total | 392,093,921 | 100.0 | plus 12.6 |

| Trading partner | 1985 | Percentage of total Austrian imports | Percentage change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bulgaria | 764,365 | 0.2 | plus 14.8 |
| CSSR | 8,328,997 | 1.9 | plus 5.9 |
| GDR | 2,641,588 | 0.6 | plus 4.0 |
| Mongolia | 1,321 | 0.0 | plus 82.5 |
| Poland | 4,773,377 | 1.1 | minus 5.2 |
| Romania | 1,609,381 | 0.4 | minus 5.6 |
| USSR | 19,150,890 | 4.4 | minus 2.4 |
| Hungary | 8,501,940 | 2.0 | plus 4.8 |
| Sum Total | 45.771,859 | 10.6 | plus 0.5 |
| World Total | 430,969,325 | 100.0 | plus 9.9 |

AUSTRIAN EXPORTS (in 1,000 schillings)

| Trading partner | 1983 | Percentage of total Austrian imports | Percentage change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bulgaria | 2,602,255 | 0.9 | plus 24.5 |
| CSSR | 2,586,145 | 1.3 | minus 14.4 |
| GDR | 6,327,799 | 2.3 | plus 76.8 |
| Mongolia | 22,999 | 0.0 | minus 51.4 |
| Poland | 3,101,495 | 1.1 | plus 36.6 |
| Romania | 1,027,982 | 0.4 | minus 38.2 |
| USSR | 10,782,253 | 3.9 | plus 14.1 |
| Hungary | 6,112,228 | 2.2 | minus 4.9 |
| Sum Total | 33,563,156 | 12.1 | plus 13.1 |
| World Total | 277,139,438 | 100.0 | plus 3.9 |

| Trading partner | 1984 | Percentage of total Austrian exports | Percentage change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bulgaria | 2,287,851 | 0.7 | minus 12.1 |
| CSSR | 3,498,431 | 1.1 | minus 2.4 |
| GDR | 6,806,967 | 2.2 | plus 7.6 |
| Mongolia | 16,312 | 0.0 | minus 29.1 |
| Poland | 3,401,127 | 1.1 | plus 9.7 |
| Romania | 1,123,133 | 0.3 | plus 9.3 |
| USSR | 14,072,861 | 4.5 | plus 30.5 |
| Hungary | 6,959,775 | 2.2 | plus 13 9 |
| Sum Total | 38,166,457 | 12.1 | plus 13.7 |
| World Total | 314,504,394 | 100.0 | plus 13.5 |

| Trading partner | 1985 | Percentage of total Austrian exports | Percentage change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bulgaria | 2,706.174 | 0.8 | plus 18.3 |
| CSSR | 3,888,223 | 1.1 | plus 11.1 |
| GDR | 4,413,881 | 1.2 | minus 35.2 |
| Mongolia | 20,993 | 0.0 | plus 28.7 |
| Poland | 4,288,518 | 1.2 | plus 26.1 |
| Romania | 1,130,534 | 0.3 | plus 0.7 |
| USSR | 13,409,894 | 3.8 | minus 4.7 |
| Hungary | 9,162,188 | 2.6 | plus 31.6 |
| Sum Total | 39,020,405 | 11.0 | plus 2.2 |
| World Total | 353,962,448 | 100.0 | plus 12.5 |

Gleissner points out that short-term predictions for the further development of East Bloc trade are not very favorable due to the decline of the price for energy.

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ECONOMIC BELGIUM

## WATHELET ON WALLOON REGIONAL FINANCES, ECONOMY

Brussels LE SOIR in French 16 Sep 86 p 2

[Interview with Belchior Wathelet by Guy Duplat, date and place not provided]

[Text] In spite of the rain, Martens' week-end shouldn't have been all that gloomy. The interprofessional agreement reached at dawn on Friday morning was a veritable godsend for the prime minister. With the start of construction on the Val Duchesse highway last July, this marks the second major harvest that Martens' program has reaped and tucked safely into the silos.

Even so, the battle is not yet over for the man who challenges the deputy from Ghent. The Community spokesman, as we all know, has his big nose sniffing in that quarter. Tomorrow—Tuesday—the fourth chamber (Flemish) of the Council of State will sit; perhaps jointly with Happart when things quiet down. Furthermore, Val Duchesse is still an everyday bone of contention. This is why Melchior Wathelet is sticking his own knitting needles into the ravelling process others have already begun.

[Question] The government is asking for 6.5 billion in savings for 1987, to come from the regions and communities. In your view, is that an impossible demand?

[Answer] I think everybody would agree right now that we cannot alter the regional grant appropriations. That means that we shall have to sit down and negotiate, to find other ways to save money, And we are ready to do so.

[Question] But what about the 6.5 billion?

[Answer] Those numbers are fake! The government forgets that it has, among other things, imposed economy measures on the back of the communes and that we must, to some degree, make up for that. It forgets that it has wiped out the 400 million called for this year and the 800 million promised for next year in funding for our industrial comeback. Most important, though, it seems to have forgotten the 220 billion in arrears on the low-cost housing program. On the Friday before Pentecost, I agreed to pay a portion of that enormous debt, amounting to 7 percent of the regional allocation. What it will boil down to is the 6.5 billion from Val Duchesse or that Thursday agreement: You can't have both!

[Question] In other words, you do not want to make such massive cuts in spending as the national ministerial departments would like you to make. That's not a terribly courageous attitude..

[Answer] But it is precisely because we went through our own Val Duchesse back in 1980, when they passed the regionalization laws. They worked out a very miserly funding plan, far from adequate to deal with the responsibilities that were shifted onto our shoulders. When low-cost housing was run by the national government, it ran up 220 billion in debt. Since housing was regionalized, nobody has built any housing for the low-and middle-income people. They regionalized urban renewal without any funding and we were unable to complete the major projects undertaken before 1980, etc. And despite that 1980 Val Duchesse, our budget since 1980 has been balanced. With that in mind, there can be no question of saddling us with the same percentage of budget cuts as that borne by the central government.

[Question] But does that mean undoing Val Duchesse?

[Answer] Yes.

[Question] In order to break out of the current deadlock, they plan to force you into spending cuts by regionalizing such para-governmental agencies (water, housing, employment), without providing you with the means to pay for them?

[Answer] I repeat that I am ready to make cuts, and I don't much care what form they take. If they prefer to do it via gratuitous transfer of the para-governmental agencies, why not? Just let them show some moderation in mandatory spending cuts, as I said before! It's Mr Geens, who presides over the Flemish executive body, who doesn't like anything about this transfer of the para-governmental agencies.

[Question] There is a lot of talk here about vast sums of money and about distributing them.

[Answer] True. The Act of August 1980 is an absurdity. It lumps regional responsibilities together with tax refunds that have nothing to do with those responsibilities. They made up their minds, for instance, to regionalize the water supply problems, but to pay for it they regionalize the real property taxes! That is ridiculous! The two have nothing to do with one another! There is no funding to cover the real needs! And so I say that, given the conditions set by the August 1980 law, I cannot accept an additional autonomy as Geens would have me do. I cannot in conscience do it, and in refusing I am upholding the interests of Belgium and of the Walloons. I want to see some real negotiations about funding before there is any discussion of additional autonomy.

[Question] Would CVP Eric Van Rompuy say that the Walloons are penniless beggars, if they refused to adopt the principle that everybody ought to pay his own way?

[Answer] There is a spiteful arrogance about Erik Van Rompuy, mixed with fantasies about territorial rights. Everybody has his holy wars! I would answer no: we are not beggars. But if somebody is bound and determined to regionalize, I demand that Flanders not be permitted to make that decision unilaterally.

[Question] You are very proud of your Wallonie, but, at a time when the A.C.E.C., Cockerill-Sambre, and Tubemeuse are up to their necks in problems, shouldn't you be more prudent?

[Answer] The heart of Wallonie does not beat in pure harmony with Cockerill-Sambre as it did a few years ago, A lot of little plants and businesses cropped up, which, taken together, mean that unemployment is on the decline in Wallonie, that industrial production here is rising faster than anywhere else in Belgium since the start of this year—while Flanders looked on Wallonie as backward until the end of the century! The net rate at which new companies are springing up is faster here than anywhere else. We have the highest productivity. No, I think that, like trees, the one that falls makes a very loud noise, but the one that is growing makes none at all.

[Question] Tell me: are the A.C.E.Cs cruelly short of government orders?

[Answer] A country, our country, can progress only if it is fair in placing its procurement orders among its regions. But, from another angle, we must pool our efforts so as to become less dependent on government orders. In the area of industrial policy, furthermore, I think we shall have to shift far more away from a subsidized system and toward a system of tax incentives.

[Question] Let's talk about your Walloon executive branch. Nobody seems to talk about it very much...?

[Answer] That's because happy people have no time for fussing and feuding. If we are at odds we make big headlines, but our problem is that we listen to one another. When a plane crashes people talk about it, but when it takes off safely every day, there's not a line about it in the papers.

[Question]Increasing your majority is not on your agenda?

[Answer] No!

[Question] But you do have some plans?

[Answer] Of course we do. Among them are budget reform, which will simplify and clarify our accounts, and administrative reforms. Our administration could become a laboratory for government. We shall be setting up a marketing office, in charge of promoting public service, and it will have an ombudsman service. In short, we intend to manage human resources, as we learned in American universities.

[Question]You plan to go to Flanders Technology next May, even though Dehousse refused to go?

[Answer] Why shouldn't Wallonie attend such a salon? After all, we go to Japan, or to Quebec, don't we?

[Question] Let's wind up with Happart. What do you think of his possibly being stripped of his office?

[Answer] Of course, we are waiting for the State Council's decision, but the French-speaking position is clear: communal democracy must prevail. The law and the constitution lay down no particular condition whatsoever. I must add, though, that, sound as the French-speaking community's argument is, the man who is its symbol and spokesman poses some problems. Jose Happart has taken on a political coloration, which is precisely the same as that of the members of Parliament who herded the Fourons off to Limburg. And I think that, if I were mayor, I would make it a point of honor to speak the mother tongue of 30 percent of my constituents. I repeat, however, that none of this goes to the root of the problem.

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ECONOMIC BELGIUM

NATIONAL BANK SEES GOVERNMENT FIGURES AS TOO PESSIMISTIC

Brussels LE SOIR in French 20/21 Sep 86 p 2

[Article by Vanden Driessche: "1986 Budget: Martens VI Too Pessimistic, The National Bank Corrects Its Range"]

[Text] Martens is a little bit wrong, but Spitaels is not entirely right. As a matter of fact, in a 1986 budget analysis, the National Bank reviewed the impact of the decisions of the Val Duchesse plan discernable in 1986. And it concluded that expectations for the 1986 Treasury budget balance could undoubtedly prove to be somewhat too pessimistic: The budget balance would gain 15.5 billion over the amount called for in the general budget report. "Good," said Minister of Budget Guy Verhofstadt commenting on this conclusion.

The report of the National Bank obviously emphasizes that the measures chosen in Val Duchesse primarily affect 1987. Some of them, however, should begin to be felt as early as 1986, with the result that some 62.4 billion in savings would already be realized this year. These 62.4 billion mainly affect expenses: 36 billion in current expenses and 13 billion in capital expenditures, the balance being obtained from a 13 billion appreciation of the yield of certain current Treasury revenues and from one billion picked up again at FRI. To be sure, this report dates back to 8 August last. The results it offers, however, are not affected by a significant change in context, which could have changed neither the chosen hypotheses prevailing in the preliminary budgetary works, nor the basis of the achievements of the early months of the year. Thus, in light of the Val Duchesse decisions, the National Bank concludes from the analysis of the reduced Treasury expenditures and improved revenues that, in addition to 4 billion the breakdown of which cannot yet be done, the largest share of the 1986 reorganization will consist of efforts imposed directly on companies and individuals and for substantial amounts: 19.5 to 15.5 billion. It remains to be noted, adds the National Bank, that the savings requested by the state from the public transportation and communications companies will more than likely be achieved to the detriment of individuals since they will be expressed for the most part through the loss of jobs. Net state investments and purchases of goods and services should drop by 7.4 and 4.8 billion and the net balance to be financed through the Treasury would be reduced by 6 billion in interest charges. Two billion should be released to local authorities in terms of transfers and the same amount to the other authorities. The report emphasizes, however, that it concerns gross

savings whose multiplying effects in terms of losses derived from additional revenues or expenses in unemployment benefits cannot be neglected. It is thus advisable to take into account the growth of the GNP corrected by the influence of Val Duchesse.

Analysis of current fiscal and non-fiscal revenues and of the first 1986 achievements and the similar analysis of expenses led the research service to a certain number of adjustments and personal conclusions. And these conclusions cast a doubt on the government's certainty: As a matter of fact, the National Bank wrote that "From what may be gathered from the previous parties, the budget previsions pertaining to the 1986 Treasury budget balance could undoubtedly prove to be slightly too pessimistic. As a matter of fact, the appreciation of current revenues, approximating 17 billion tied to a more than expected substantial economic growth and an approximate saving of 15 billion at the level of the public debt budget, would only be partially compensated by various budgetary surpluses which may be anticipated in terms of current and capital expenditures. The 1986 Treasury budget balance would amount to 542 billion, or 15.5 billion less than the amount called for in the general budget report." The National Bank adds that, on the whole, taking into account treasury transactions the estimate of which is realistic, the Treasury financial deficit would reach 15 billion less than anticipated and would account for 11.1 percent of the gross national product as compared to 12 percent for the previous year. Finally, if the financial deficit is about the same in 1986 than in the first 7 months of last year, the possibility of a deficit slightly lower than that of the budgetary forecast cannot be excluded, says the National Bank, since two factors are still liable to slant the comparison between the 2 years, namely, the effects of the Val Duchesse plan, which will be felt most of all in the second semester, and the different distribution in the timing of certain payments charged to the Treasury. Is Martens VI too pessimistic? That was the comment made by Guy Spitaels, president of the Socialist Party, in our publication; he spoke about a surplus of 70 billion which could be available in 1986 and 1987. Minister of Bduget Guy Verhofstadt stated ironically: "So, I see that the National Bank agrees with the government more than it does with the leading president of the opposition." But joking aside, let us stay with 1986. On this subject, Guy Verhofstadt points out that 15 billion account for no more than 0.75 percent of the 200 billion savings expected in the Val Duchesse plan. He adds: "Let us hope, however, that it is true; this shows that we are cautious people."

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CSO: 3619/2

ECONOMIC BELGIUM

GEENS ON FLEMISH, WALLONIA ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT TRENDS

Brussels LE SOIR in French 20/21 Sep 86 p 2

[Text] "Economic indicators are all going in the same direction and describe a two-speed Belgium." Gaston Geens, president of the Flemish executive, picked up again one of his favorite themes during the presentation of a review of the Flemish regional economy over the last 5 years and of Professor Daems', from the KUL, study on the two structural characteristics of the Flemish industry. He also voiced a few puzzled thoughts concerning an economic and monetary union between partners with different growth rates, pointing out that the political consequences of the situation would have to be analyzed, especially on the subject of transfers. He immediately added, however, that "any improvement for Wallonia is also good for Flanders, firstly, because we coexist within an economic and monetary system, secondly, because Wallonia and Brussels are our best customers and vice versa."

What are the indicators on which, one more time, the president of the Flemish executive relies to ascertain his claim to a "two-speed Belgium?"

1. The general economic situation indicator: Since 1985, the Wallon curb has been dropping under that of Flanders, but, for all that, the last months of 1986 have registered an upswing movement which does not exist on the Flemish side where the decline has been steady since the beginning of last year.

2. The potential industrial employment rate: Better in Flanders but, overall, with a less than satisfactory trend for this year, whereas Wallonia, on the contrary, is progressing.

3. The industrial production index (except for the building trade): It has been growing in Flanders since 1981, whereas its development has been more uneven in Wallonia, and, once again, showing a decline in 1986.

4. Industrial investments: Those made in Flanders have caught up with and exceeded those made in Wallonia in 1984 and their rate has remained higher ever since, even if there has been evidence of recovery in Wallonia since 1985 to mid 1986.

5. The small business turnover: It stopped increasing at the same rate, even though it is growing in the two regions: The rise is slower in Wallonia.

Similar curbs but, once again, with one-level lag, unfavorable to Wallonia for exports.

6. Total number of unemployed receiving benefits: Curbs crossed late in 1985 with Wallonia rallying...

7. Total number of unemployed 25 years old and under receiving benefits: The curbs shows a more stable profile in Wallonia than in Flanders, where, in absolute figures, their number is evidently greater. Larger and younger population: No mystery in this difference.

8. Job seekers: This last comparison was made with job seekers for the whole of Europe of the Ten: Since 1984, a drop in their number has distinguished Flemish development whereas their number continues to increase for Europe as a whole.

Flanders Technology

From a more general standpoint, the diagrams in Geens' report show that development has been parallel more than it has been different, but with a certain lag in level. The president of the Flemish executive also announced the launching of "P Days," that is to say, "projects days," in three regions (Limbourg, Campine and Westhoek) which greatly need to sell themselves to investors. Flanders too, sometimes, has two speeds. As for the third Flanders Technology event, it should have a "tremendous success": The new fair center, which will house it, will be completed late this year and 40 percent of the space has already been reserved by the 300 participants already registered. The United States and the USSR should be participating in this third fair, whereas Wallonia, Italy, Quebec Province, Australia and France took options on stands. With regard to advanced technology, Professor Daems' report notes that, proportionally, Brussels has more jobs to offer in that area even if, in absolute numbers, more jobs in this sector are found in Flanders. He further added that in Flanders the potential for jobs in research and development doubled between 1975 and 1981.

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CSO: 3619/2

ECONOMIC TURKEY

REPORT ON SECOND REVISION OF FOREIGN TRADE GOALS

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 5 Sep 86 p 1

[Article by Erdal Saglam: "Foreign Trade Goals Revised Second Time"]

[Text] Ankara - Minister of State for Economic Affairs and Deputy Prime Minister Kaya Erdem and State Planning Organization Undersecretary Yusuf Bozkurt Ozal attended a meeting in Ankara day before yesterday at which the macro economic indicators for the first half of the year were reviewed and the 1986 goals were revised as a basis for the 1987 program, it was learned. Import and export figures, changed once before on the basis of developments during the year, were changed again, setting Turkey's final 1986 export figure at $8 billion and imports at $11.5 billion.

Exports had first been set at $8.7 billion in the 1986 program, but owing to the oil-producing nations' reduced income in the early months of the year and the consequent downward trend of exports, Turkey's exports for this year were revised to $8.2 billion. The goal was again slimmed down in light of exports accomplished in the first 6 months, and Turkey's final export target for 1986 was set at $8 billion. The 1986 import target, meanwhile, had been set at $12.1 billion in the program but was reduced to $11 billion because of the expectation of a reduced oil bill and has been raised again and given final form at $11.5 billion. Despite estimates that Turkey's 1986 oil bill would be half of the previous year's, import targets had to be raised again, admitting it to be "an indicator of Turkey's inability to take adequate advantage of the drop in world oil prices."

Higher Exports

Meanwhile, earlier estimates, based on declining world oil prices, that the 1986 oil bill would be less that $1 billion were reportedly redesignated at a little over $1 billion at the recent meeting owing to the rising trend in prices.

Also discussed at the meeting attended by Kaya Erdem and Yusuf Bozkurt Ozal were "solutions proposed for getting the declining trend in exports back up." A decision in principle was reportedly agreed upon at the meeting for stressing investment incentives to increase exports.

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ECONOMIC TURKEY

TRADE RELATIONS WITH HUNGARY, COMECON REVIEWED

Istanbul DUNYA (Supplement on Hungary) in Turkish 22 Jul 86 p 2

[Article by economist K. Naci Sahin: "Counter-Trade and COMECON"]

[Text] Barter is the oldest known form of trade in the history of mankind. With the invention of money, the barter system yielded to the familiar process of buying and selling, to the trade in goods, having given "equitable" service to mankind; nevertheless, the barter system has survived to this day as the purest form of trade.

When the explorations that began with the new era resulted in the discovery of America and the sea routes to Africa, India, and China, the barter system assumed international dimensions. Wealth and slaves from these newly discovered regions began to be brought to Europe in exchange for copper, wine, wheat, horses, textiles, and weapons. With the development of international trade, the extensive use of the precious metals gold and silver in trade was followed in the 19th century by that of banknotes of a given gold value.

With the speedy development and integration of national and international trade that followed the industrial revolution, various monetary systems of international significance evolved and survive to this day. Nevertheless, with the introduction of new concepts in international trade in recent years -- such as counter-trade and compensation -- the exchange of goods, of which barter is the purest form, has gained a new immediacy.

Great crises of international dimensions, especially in the aftermath of World War II, and the problems encountered by developing countries in the process of development have resulted in large balance of payments deficits for these countries. When the difficulties faced by COMECON countries, with their nationalized external trade, to meet their growing hard currency needs were added to these problems, the exchange of goods on various scales and using various methods such as counter-trade and compensation began to be applied in international trade at an accelerated rate. This method, in essence, is as follows: a country that wishes to import goods from another country stipulates that a certain proportion of the payment for its imports will be paid for by exports to the other country. Thus, both countries in question manage to export their own products and, without spending any hard currency, acquire the products they want.

They method is currently used mainly by countries that have nationalized their foreign trade (including intergovernmental deals involving oil), and by COMECON countries in particular.

From the 1970's onward, the COMECON countries, beginning with the Soviet Union and followed by the rest of the COMECON members. Have been proposing the counter-trade-compensation system as a condition, particularly for the purpose of overcoming the deficit in their foreign trade with the OPEC countries. The state corporations for foreign trade in COMECON countries have had definite instructions to balance their imports with exports, both on a current basis and within the framework of their global activities, on conditions whereby they achieve a net profit in the end. Naturally, this practice could not have been expected to yield great and decisive solutions at once, but over a period of some 10 years, COMECON member countries have largely overcome the deficit in their trade with the OECD. During this period, COMECON countries have adopted a number of administrative decisions to facilitate counter-trade and compensation transactions, and as a result, the ratio of this kind of transaction in the total international trade of these countries has risen steadily.

In the beginning, Western companies were reserved in their attitude toward this development, thinking that such methods would create practical difficulties and waste time, but with the growing conviction that this system was here to stay, they adapted to the situation and produced commercial, servicing, and financial establishments or departments specializing in this kind of trade.

It would be useful at this point to dwell upon the forms and elements of the counter-trade and compensation practices that we have tried to describe in brief outline. One faces a confusion of concepts, sometimes arising from faults in translation. The simplest, generally accepted description of counter-trade is: "agreement by the seller that part or all of the payment for the goods it sells will consist in purchases of goods (goods can be products, licensing, technology, etc.) from the purchasing country." It differs from normal trade practice wherein no counter-purchase is related to the export transaction or made a condition of exports.

There are many forms of counter-trade. These forms contain the following elements, with the form of counter-trade being determined by the nature and proportion of these elements that go into shaping it:

- Contract types, numbers, and restrictions introduced
- Goods involved in reciprocal exchange
- Parties besides the buyers and sellers
- The rate of exchange
- The time factor
- The form of payment

Counter-trade has two forms. The first is compensatory trade; that is, compensation that is concerned with an approximate exchange takes place not between governments but between companies and is applicable over a period of

less than 3 years. The second form involves large-scale, often government-to-government turnkey projects realizable over 3-35 years.

OECD studies on East-West trade and counter-trade practices have arrived at the following conclusions:

1. COMECON member countries will insist on counter-trade practices not only to balance external trade but because the products of COMECON member countries are not of a standard to enable them to compete in Western markets.

2. Unnecessary complications are proving impossible to prevent in practice. It is therefore necessary to take measures to prevent possible risks. Detailed research must be carried out, bearing in mind the various dimensions and forms of counter-trade, and risk-reducing arrangements must be introduced. All statistical data concerning general and specific practices must be gathered and very carefully examined.

3. Embarking upon long-term and balanced counter-trade with COMECON member countries on the basis of specific projects would be of greater advantage to both sides.

To sum up, these new methods arising from balance-of-payments difficulties that have entered international trade are now a fact. The share of these practices in international trade is steadily growing, and in the case of trade with COMECON member countries, they constitute the preferred method.

With few exceptions, foreign trade firms in COMECON countries are organized on the basis of products. Within the structure of these firms there are subsidiary organizations on a regional basis, and counter-trade transactions involving several firms are largely coordinated by the corresponding desks at the ministries of trade or by specialist firms.

In Hungary, a COMECON member country, there is no specialist firm for counter-trade. However, the special transactions unit that exists in almost every Hungarian foreign-trade firm is responsible for the coordination of counter-trade in issues that are within the area of operations of the firm in question. In Hungary, as in other Comecon member countries, those of the country's products that have the prospect of being sold for convertible currency are not included in counter-trade; conversely, they are eager to export in payment for their imports such of their goods as they have difficulty in selling or they have themselves imported from other COMECON countries on a ruble basis and on clearing accounts.

Hungarian foreign trade organizations treat scheduled imports needed for the economy differently from unscheduled imports. In the first instance, not only is there no requirement for counter-trade but also funds needed for the imports are allocated in advance. In the second, in those cases where the importing and exporting firms agree, the Hungarian firm either applies to the ministry for permission to import or may perhaps fortunately have on hand an import permit which it may put to use. If no import license has been obtained

the method of easing the way for getting it lies in creating the necessary funds either by importing products within the area of operations of the firm in question or -- if this proves impossible -- from other Hungarian external trade firms, thus creating the machinery to enable the use of these funds in the exports to be made to Hungary. The proportion of imports against exports varies, depending on the extent to which the imported and exported goods can be bought and sold for hard currency.

Select Turkish foreign trade firms have managed to adapt swiftly to these developments in international trade and have achieved deals in the realm of counter-trade practice that have had repercussions on an international scale. Turkey can, by overcoming difficulties encountered in practice, act as a bridge between Middle Eastern and COMECON member countries and thus both increase the prospects for selling its goods and improve its balance of payments by expanding the volume of its external trade and increasing its hard currency earnings through controlling the traffic in goods between third countries.

We consider that Hungary is a match for developed countries in the level of its development and in sociocultural fields, and that, because of the quality of its goods and its superior knowledge and experience in international trade, it constitutes a market for Turkey with a far greater potential than is currently being exploited. The difficulties encountered in the Hungarian market are no different from those in other markets. Moreover, the absence of quotas and so forth and the fact that Turkey has become a country that enjoys a preference in imports constitute an opportunity that our exporters must exploit.

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CSO: 3554/167

ECONOMIC TURKEY

## ADDITIONAL BORROWING SAID NECESSARY FOR DEBT PAYMENTS

Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish 5 Sep 86 p 4

[Report by Cetin Cetiner]

[Text] Ankara--We have been living continuously in debt and turning the millstones with carried water with a mentality of "debt drives the brave forward." Turkey, whose foreign debt totals $27 billion, will have to make payments totaling $1.3 billion in the last 4 months of 1986. Central Bank officials stated that these payments will necessitate additional foreign borrowing. Stating that as of the beginning of September $2.9 billion was transferred in debt repayments out of a total of $4 billion scheduled for this year, Central Bank officials said: "Of that amount $1.7 billion was applied to the principal and $1.2 billion was applied to the interest."

The Central Bank officials described the foreign borrowing necessitated by the principal and interest repayment schedule as "debt leads to debt." The officials recalled that Turkey fell into the debt swamp in 1977, that it became unable to repay its debts, that it repeatedly rescheduled its debts until 1982 and that it was eventually decided to pay the country's debts on an accelerated schedule in the years 1985 and 1986. Stating that the rescheduling of debts was in fact a "good opportunity" for Turkey, the officials said:

"Beginning in 1985, interest rates began to decline worldwide, and this was accompanied with a well-known decline in oil prices. The decline in interest rates reduced Turkey's dollar-denominated foreign debt repayment burden, but payments in non-dollar currencies, which constitute about 40 percent of the country's debt payments, rose in cost in terms of Turkish currency."

The officials indicated that real increases in the dollar's exchange rate as well as increases in the exchange rate of other currencies such as the deutshemark, the yen and the French franc, with respect to the Turkish lira, prevented Turkey from benefiting sufficiently from these favorable international developments. The captains of the economy said: "Even so, however, the decline in interest rates and oil prices have softened the effect of large-scale debt repayments on Turkey in 1985 and 1986."

Central Bank officials also reported that $1.2 billion was borrowed in additional loans from abroad in the first 6 months of 1986 and that this amount may rise to over $2 billion by the end of the year. The officials added that nearly $400 million a month will be paid out in debt repayments in October and November 1986 and that this will almost certainly necessitate additional borrowing.

[Boxed item:] We Owe 365,000 Turkish liras Per Person

As Turkey's foreign debt increases, the burden on 51 million Turkish citizens is also mounting. Turkey's current debt of $27 billion translates into $529.41, or 365,292 Turkish liras for each Turkish citizen.

In the 1930's the Turkish Republic owed $79.5 million to foreign countries, a legacy from the Ottoman Empire. At that time per capita foreign debt was $4.48 or 5.87 Turkish liras.

9588
CSO: 3554/18

## ARTICLE CALLS FOR NEW INCENTIVES TO BOOST EXPORTS

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 12 Sep 86 p 4

[Article by Dr Haluk Cillov: "The Need for Export Incentives"]

[Text] We note that exports have steadily declined in the first 6 months of the year. Indeed, our exports have declined from $3.640 billion in the first half of last year to $3.517 billion in the corresponding period of this year. It is evident that at this rate it will not be possible to attain the $8-billion export target set for this year.

The failure of the present administration to repeat this year its export success of the previous two years is the result of various factors.

Firstly, there have been substantial declines in our exports to Iraq and Iran and even Libya. Moreover, export incentives in the form of tax rebates have been gradually reduced and even completely eliminated in some categories of goods. In addition, it is said that operations such as "imaginary exports," which were tolerated to a certain extent in the past, are controlled more tightly this year. Thus, the "export encouragement policy" run generously by the Undersecretariat of the Treasury and Foreign Trade has become a relic of the past. Finally, stagnation and protectionist policies in world trade have led to difficulties in exports to the EEC.

At the moment, one cannot say that Turkish exports benefit from any effective incentives other than exchange rate adjustments. So much so that, for example, although domestic cotton prices are about 25 percent higher than world prices, cotton yarn is expected to compete in foreign markets, but no one thinks about using the cotton stockpiles of the public corporations to help exporters to become more competitive.

Also, the efforts of large investment firms are no longer adequate. Exporting firms have gradually begun to prefer the import business.

Finally, one must not forget that the steady decline in the value of dollar has made exports less attractive.

In sum, it appears that the eagerness for and the dynamism in exports is on the decline.

Consequently, we will have to say that new export incentive measures are necessary and that, more importantly, these measures must be instituted without delay until our exports attain their true potential.

It is true that Turkey's signing of GATT in 1985 to the effect that "no subsidies will be provided for exports" will pose some practical obstacles. However, this agreement will go into effect in 1987, and, moreover, an extension may be possible.

What is important is to make sure that the new "incentives" to be introduced do not blindly support unfair competition or even smuggling.

In our opinion, exports can be encouraged most effectively by paying attention to the quality of the products to be exported, by definitively ending inflation which has been spurring domestic demand and by ensuring price stability.

Recent statistics indicate that the decline in exports is not restricted to agricultural products and that it has spread to industrial products. Consequently, the need to rescue our export trade from its current stagnant state is more urgent in view of its vital importance to our economy.

I hope that the mistakes made in the economic policies of the last 2 years have taught "many lessons" to our leaders.

9588
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ECONOMIC TURKEY

## AGRICULTURAL GROWTH FORECASTS CALLED 'TOO OPTIMISTIC'

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 12 Sep 86 p 6

[Text] Ankara--Osman Ozbek, the president of the Administrative Council of the Turkish Union of Agricultural Chambers, said that "agricultural forecasts are made in accordance with what the heart desires."

Stating that his organization finds current forecast figures too optimistic, Ozbek said that the production of some agricultural products can be increased by about 10 percent this year through the use of good seeds and if weather conditions are favorable and that, however, that would not be enough to ensure a 7.1 percent growth in overall agricultural production.

Ozbek said:

"The forecast growth rate of 7.1 percent in agricultural production is too optimistic. That is a figure that may affect the gross national product. I believed that the rise of the agricultural growth rate from 2.7 percent last year to 7.1 percent this year would be a miracle."

Ozbek also insisted that the wheat harvest forecast of 19 million metric tons for this year is too high. He said: "Turkey has the potential for that much production, but it does not have that much production."

Noting that Turkey's annual demand for wheat is approximately 14 million metric tons and that, however, the announced wheat crop figures are too high, Ozbek said:

'We Will Go Hungry'

"Last year, it was announced that Turkey's wheat harvest was 17 million metric tons. Since domestic wheat consumption was 14 million metric tons, why did Turkey have to import wheat? Last year's wheat exports were not significant. If this year we export with expectations of a 19-million-metric-ton wheat harvest, we will go hungry."

Ozbek added that of 14.5 million metric tons of wheat consumed in Turkey, 10.5 million metric tons are consumed domestically, 1.5 million metric tons are used as animal feed and 2 million metric tons are used as seed.

9588
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ECONOMIC TURKEY

## BRIEFS

CEMENT FROM ROMANIA--Following the lifting of curbs on cement imports to improve the balance between supply and consumption of cement, a contract has been signed with Romania for the purchase of 140,000 metric tons of cement. According to the information obtained from Turkish Cement Producers' Association officials, 10,000 metric tons of the 150,000 metric tons of cement to be bought from Romania will soon be ferried to Turkish ports and will be shipped to regions where the shortage of cement is most acute. The cement bought from Romania was contracted at $20.50 per metric ton. The officials noted that 9,000 metric tons of the 150,000-metric-ton contract was delivered in August. The balance of the contract will be delivered to Turkey in shipments of 10,000 metric tons each. [Text] [Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 5 Sep 86 p 9] 9588

ANKARA-ZURICH DIRECT FLIGHTS--Swissair, the airline of Switzerland and one of the premier air carriers in the world, is beginning direct air service between Ankara and Zurich. Stating that the service, which is currently envisaged at a frequency of two days a week, will begin on 26 October 1986, Swissair officials said that they decided to start this service following insistent requests from frequent passengers who live in Ankara. As is known, Swissair had a direct Ankara-Zurich air service previously, but it ended this service 4 years ago. Stating that the airfare for the Ankara-Zurich flight will be the same as that for the Istanbul-Zurich flight, the Swissair officials said that the daily Airbus flights between Istanbul and Zurich will continue unchanged. [Text] [Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 5 Sep 86 p 5] 9588

EEC CUSTOMS REDUCTION POSTPONED--The 10-percent customs duty reduction Turkey has agreed to implement for goods imported from EEC countries this year, has been postponed to 1 January 1987. The said Council of Ministers decision was published in yesterday's edition of the Official Gazette. [Text] [Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 12 Sep 86 p 6] 9588

CSO: 3554/16

MILITARY FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

ALPHA JET LINKS ANTI-HELICOPTER ROLE WITH GROUND SUPPORT

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 2 Sep 86 p 12

[Article by Siegfried Thielbeer: "Alpha Jet Against the Hind--New Method of Engaging Soviet Combat Helicopter"]

[TExt] "What is the purpose of a Soviet helicopter equipped solely for combat?" The reason is clear to the commanding general of the British Rhine Army, General Farndale: If any weaponry system were suited for attack, the Soviet M-24 Hind undoubtedly is, and it is being introduced in increasing numbers to Soviet troops. The Hind is a true combat machine: not an antitank helicopter in the Western sense, it is more precisely an airborne armored combat vehicle. Equipped with eight laser-controlled antitank rockets, four rocket launchers for attacking area targets and a quad machine gun, this helicopter is meant to support Soviet troops on the battlefield. The lower side of the helicopter is reinforced with armor at its most critical points as a protective measure against enemy infantry fire.

In developing the helicopter, contrary to the Western practice of emphasizing lightness and maneuverability, the Soviet approach enhanced the survival chances of the vehicle using armor, weaponry and speed. Their operational principles also consider combat in enemy territory, which, excepting American helicopters, is avoided in Western countries, because these countries have considered the survival chances to be too low when encountering heavy air defenses.

There is another distinction between this vehicle and western combat helicopters: the Hind can also transport an infantry squad and their weaponry. This makes it particularly well suited for landing air storm troops behind enemy lines, since the vehicle can supply fire support. Like a combat airplane, this helicopter can accompany invading armored troops, immobilizing enemy defensive armor from the air. There is an astonishing similarity between the Hind specifications and those of a Soviet BMP armored vehicle. This was shown in a study of the Fund for Science and Politics, whose author, a former Polish officer, once participated in the development of this tactical concept: the Hind and the BMP can both carry an infantry squad of eight men, are both equipped with rockets and machine guns, and have a range of 300 km. The helicopter can apparently move across contaminated areas quickly in nuclear exchanges.

With its high velocity (320 km/hr versus approximately 220 km/hr for the BO-105 or the French Gazelle), the Hind can scarcely be engaged by Western helicopters and is in fact a serious threat to unarmored Western versions. Eventually the antitank rockets of the German Army, employed by helicopters and land vehicles, should also be capable of engaging helicopters, but not before the 1990's. How can troops defend themselves against the Hind in the meantime? Mobility and antiaircraft guns can be used against individual helicopters, but what happens if the helicopters appear in greater numbers? The Americans have examined some highly refined tactics for this. Their combat helicopter, the AH-1 Huey Cobra, and the Air Force A-10 Thunderbolt combat aircraft, work in concert against larger numbers of enemy armored vehicles. The helicopters fire far-ranging rockets from concealed positions at enemy antiaircraft guns, immobilizing infantry air defense with their machine guns. The extremely maneuverable Thunderbolt can then neutralize tanks using rockets and bombs and its 30 mm Gatling guns (firing 70 rounds per second). The armored Thunderbolt also protects its own troops from enemy helicopters. An American A-10 pilot stated, "We are not afraid of the Hind; they should be afraid of us."

Thus it is not surprising that the West German Air Force is also studying means of countering this new threat. What is required is a weapons system that would have to be faster than the enemy combat helicopter so it could pursue this vehicle and quickly provide a center of resistance. A capability of slower flight and high maneuverability would also be needed so that the enemy helicopter could not withdraw by virtue of its own maneuverability.

To some extent these prerequisites are fulfilled by the often underestimated German-French ground combat aircraft Alpha Jet, whose capabilities approach those of the A-10 Thunderbolt and are in contrast to the reduced flight range and weaponry of the Tornado. This unpretentious aircraft, of which the German Air Force has produced 175 units, flies at approximately 1000 km/hr, triple the speed of a helicopter. It is also extremely maneuverable at very low altitudes and can fly sufficiently slowly so that the pilot can recognize and engage helicopters. Since 1982, tactical employment exercises have been conducted by the air tactical training detachment of Fighter Bomber Air Wing 49 in Fuerstenfeldbruck and in German fall maneuvers. Large CH-53 army transport helicopters simulated the Hind. These exercises were successful.

The 27mm fixed guns and air-to-air rockets were also tested to determine if they could destroy the armored Hind. The commentaries from Alpha Jet pilots, even if dismissed to some extent, are clear: "This helicopter has no chances anymore." This small aircraft can overtake it, and the Hind, less mobile than Western helicopters, cannot escape once the dogfight begins. "Perhaps the helicopter could conceal itself in a forest clearing, but it would not be able to leave that area," stated an aircraft commander.

Whatever threats the Hind helicopter poses for Western armored vehicles and helicopters, it is inferior to the Alpha jet, including the range of its weaponry systems. The Alpha guns and air-to-air rockets exceed the capabilities of Hind machine guns and antitank guided missiles, respectively. This helicopter only finds protection in air defense groups, for its offensive capabilities are readily broken. The only difficulties are presented by operational coordination. Penetration by this helicopter must be recognized

rapidly and reported to air forces quickly. How can one distinguish at greater distances between friendly and enemy helicopters?

Defense ministry specialists articulate the solution: "Individual enemy helicopters will be able to get through, even in the future, and the local air defense forces of the army and air force must be prepared for this. But larger helicopter concentrations can be engaged by bombardment of their takeoff areas and through direct engagement by the Alpha jet." However, it is stressed that the chief task of the fighter bombers is engagement of the enemy land forces. Armor piercing guns, Maverick rockets and bombs are employed to provide close range air defense on the battlefield. "Thus the Alpha jet has no new mission, but has acquired a supplemental one. Above all, we are now in a position with this weapon to engage enemy helicopters."

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MILITARY FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

DETAILS, DEVELOPMENT OF 'SKORPION' MINE SCATTERING SYSTEM

Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German Sep 86 pp 54-57

[Article by Guenter Schaefer: "SKORPION--A Modern Minelaying System of the Army"; first paragraph is WEHRTECHNIK introduction]

[Text] When tacticians think about a possible conflict these days, they will certainly reach different conclusions in many areas. But there is one thing that they will likely agree on in any case: on the contemporary battlefield, on which in part motorized and highly mobile armed forces oppose each other, the time lapse of the events is quite different from what one is accustomed to and is substantially faster. Mine warfare must adapt to these constraints. The existing possibilities for minelaying and the preparation of minefields by means of the--still necessary--hand laying, minelayer trailer with plow, and the firing of mine-ejecting projectiles of the artillery rocket system is now being supplemented through the SKORPION mine-launching system, in which minefields difficult to clear can be laid quickly and with great accuracy in every terrain still passable in a tracked vehicle. Delivery of the system, which is described in the following report, to the Bundeswehr began recently.

SKORPION dates back to a tactical requirement (TaF) from the year 1972, in which the equipment now being delivered to the field forces can be recognized only in its rudiments. It called for "mine dispensing devices" (MSM) for the dispensing of mines from vehicles, for the scattering in a range of up to 3,000 meters (abandoned in the definition phase for tactical reasons) and for the dispersing of mines from the air. The actual cluster weapons were spoken of as antitank and antipersonnel mines, the latter only as "desired," however. The minefields were to be difficult to overcome during their effective time. At the end of this time, through adjustable self-destruction, the clearing of the mines was not supposed to be necessary and the crossing of the mined terrain by vehicles was to be possible. At this point, it is not necessary to go into the tactical value of minefields, about which this magazine has often reported. Naturally the TaF for mine dispensing devices gave and gives a lot of attention to this aspect.

Material Development Process

The development process for today's equipment required about 10 years from the conceptual studies to the deployment authorization in the first quarter of 1983. It would require too much space to give all of the details.

But of special interest in this case is the fact that the prime contractor, the firm Dynamit Nobel, was facing the problem of developing a new mine launching system, for which there was nothing comparable anywhere that could serve as a basis, "around" an already developed antitank mine AT-2 (it was initially foreseen as a warhead for the light 110 mm artillery rocket). The astounding thing is that despite this starting position the development of the overall system was carried out without excessive use of resources and has the magnitude of "a half TORNADO." The initial thoughts on a carrier for the new mine launching system were concentrated on a wheeled vehicle of the follow-on generation of motor vehicles before turning to a tracked vehicle of the M-113 family beginning in about 1977. (Here as well arose the never-resolved difference of opinion about the advantage "wheel or track.") The armor-protection study was suspended for reasons of weight and mobility and in favor of the quantity of ammunition to be carried.

The dispersing of mines from the air as called for in the TaF took place very positively parallel to the "vehicle" development and led to a functional model of a helicopter conversion kit for the Bell UH-1D (that has already been given practical testing). In 1978, however, the demand was reduced because of the necessary saving of funds. But the requirement probably still exists.

In 1979, the term MSM/mine dispensing device was replaced by the planning term MiWS/mine launching system. The technical testing of the vehicle began that same year. The continuous driving testing of the mine launcher was carried out in 1981. The delivery of the launch vehicle of the type M548G A1 from the M-113 family to the future mine-launcher units for use as transport vehicles began that same year. The advantage not to be underestimated was that the units were able to become familiar with the vehicle and its features.

Technical testing of the overall launch system began in the fall of 1981 and field testing at the beginning of 1982. They led to type classification and to deployment authorization in the first quarter of 1983. The invitation to bid on production continued through the beginning of 1984 and the construction contract was signed in December 1984 with the prime contractor Dynamit Nobel.

It covers the construction of 300 mine launchers and, in a first portion, the delivery of 10,000 mine magazines with mines as well as reloadable training magazines.

The most important sucontractors are the Scherer firm for the retrofitting of the vehicle (the vehicles come to the firm "serviceable" from the field), the Honeywell firm with responsibility for the EPAG (adjust, test and fire device) and fuze components for the AT-2 mine, and the Krauss-Maffei firm, which builds the mine launching system and undertakes the final assembly and system testing for the mine launcher. The testing of the mine launcher inspection batches took place in the second quarter of 1986. In this connection, special

emphasis should be made of the fact that the basic material data on logistic readiness (and in the past that was a "weak point" in many systems) have been prepared and printed since the beginning of 1986.

The delivery of training ammunition and industrial training began even before the delivery of the first SKORPION mine launching system built with series funding to the field forces on 3 June 1986. Service ammunition, that is, AT-2 mines intended for operations, will be delivered to the field forces beginning in July 1986, About this time or a little later, series production will be increased to 12 mine launchers per month, so that it can be assumed that the program will end in late fall 1988. The principal users of the SKORPION will be the tank engineer companies of he brigades and the engineer battalions of the divisions.

The Mine Launching System MiWS

The mine launching system SKORPION, the details of which will be discussed in more detail in the following, has a total weight of 12 tons with a length of 5.85 meters, a variable width depending upon the transport, load or launch positions of the six mine launching units (these three positions are possible), and a height (over the machine gun) of 3.19 meters. The crew includes two soldiers: a driver and a system operator (from the cab).

The main components of the mine launching system are:

--the launch vehicle,

--the mine launching system with EPAG,

--the mine magazines with AT-2 mines.

Launch Vehicle

The already-mentoned launch vehicle M548G A1 is being used by the field forces as a transport vehicle and is furnished with the system. Propelled by a six-cylinder 154 kilowatt (210 horsepower) diesel engine, it attains a maximum speed in terrain of 40 kilometers per hour with an operating range (fully fueled) of about 500 kilometers. For its own protection, the vehicle has a Machine Gun 3 in the caliber 7.62 mm used by the Bundeswehr mounted on a rotary ring over the cab. As was already mentioned, armor for the cab was dispensed with for several reasons.

Mine Launcning System With EPAG

Mounted on the load surface of the launch vehicle are six mine launching units that are horizontally and vertically (three positions) rotatable, into each of which five mine magazines are inserted from above. Each mine magazine has four ejection units each having five antitank throw mines. Thus each mine magazine contains 20 antitank throw mines and each of the rotatable mine launching units accommodates 5 magazines and thus 100 mines ready for launch, so that the combat-ready launcher carries 600 mines. The empty weight is 1,900 kg and the combat weight is about 4,000 kg.

The EPAG/adjust, test and fire device is the "fire control system" of the mine launching system. It is located in the cab and serves in the advance setting of the barriexr data and in the automatic ejection of the mines. Keyed into the device before the beginning of the minelaying are the effective times of the mines (six are possible: from "short to long"), the mine densities, whether they are launched alternately to both sides or to one side, and whether automatically in accordance with the course or individually tubewise. The EPAG has self-testing, tests of the distance transducer, cable and ammunition, operational monitoring and an indicator for ammunition ready to be ejected.

Mine Magazine

The mine magazine is made of metal, is foamed out on the inside, and has the four already-mentioned ejection units that are glass fiber-reinforced plastic tubes. The five mines in each tube are launched simultaneously through a single pyrotechnic charge. The magazine is packaged in "expendable packaging" on a NATO palette and is reloaded by hand from the truck into the mine launching units. Armedfor combat and with cabling, a magazine weight about 70 kg and its dimensions are a length of 728 mm, a width of 130 mm, and a height of 520 mm. The reusable training magazines were already mentioned.

Antitank Throw Mine AT-2

The AT-2 mine of the Dynamit Nobel firm is the same and can also be fired by means of rocket artillery. The only difference is that in artillery firing the mines come down with the help of a miniature parachute, whereas the thrown mines follow ballistic trajectories. When they hit the ground, they automatically put themselves in working position, extend the target sensor in the form of a thin-wired antenna, and arm themselves automatically. The initial arming procedure was performed when the mine was launched.

A shaped charge is triggered in the width of the vehicle when run over, when there is an attempt to remove it manually, and at the end of the programmed effective time (self-destruction). The shaped charge penetrates any known tank hull with an effect in the crew compartment. The AT-2 mine practically "sealed into" the mine magazine has a long storage time of at least 10 years; this is especially true for the battery as well. Each mine weighs 2.22 kg, the diameter of the mine body is 103.5 mm, and the height is 128.7 mm, 165 mm with the cover cap.

The tactical use of the AT-2 mine is largely fixed. To contain a tank attack, therefore, a density of 0.4 mines per running meter of barrier is taken as a basis because of the effect of the mines on the entire width of the tanks. A fully-loaded SKORPION can lay a corresponding barrier strip 1,500 meters long and about 50 meters wide within about 5 minutes.

In closing, it must be mentioned that besides the specifically named subcontractors a large number of other suppliers contribute to the overall system. Examples are the Eisenwerke Kaiserslautern with the welded platform,

Wegmann with platform parts, VALVO with integrated circuits for the mine and Kabelmetal Electro with a special cabling as well as a number of other sub-subcontractors.

In coining the term "new era" in the takeover of the first series equipment on 3 June 1986, Lt Gen Hans-Henning von Sandrart, army chief of staff, talked of the importance of land mine warfare in combined arms combat and its lasting improvement through the new SKORPION mine launching system. The chief of staff literally: "Tne further tactical-operational development of an up-to-date barrier capability as part of our defense readiness is not only a task of the engineers as part of engineer tactics. It is an important integral part of the further conceptual development of the system army as a whole."

Whereas the army chief of staff coined the concept of a "new era," Dr Homburg, member of the board of the prime contractor Dynamit Nobel, spoke with satisfaction on 3 June of a "world premiere." Indeed, nowhere in the world does SKORPION has a comparable counterpart.

9746
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NEW SUPREME COMMANDER DISCUSSES DEFENSE GOALS

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 3 Oct 86 p 6

[Article by Bengt Falkkloo and Anders Ohman: "New Supreme Commander Bengt Gustafsson: Difficult Task Ahead"]

[Text] A native of Skane who wanted to be a pilot but wound up instead as an officer in the engineers and built many bridges--that is Sweden's new OB [supreme commander of the Armed Forces], General Bengt Gustafsson, 53, who has now assumed his new post.

He regards himself as a good listener who tries to make other people's good ideas a reality. But being too spontaneous is his weak point, he says. So it is good to have colleagues who can hold him back.

The Soviet Union is not the biggest threat to Sweden's peace. In a wartime situation, either superpower is likely to take over the country or parts of it if necessary, he says firmly.

Bengt Gustafsson did not hesitate to compare weapons with Volvo automobiles and refrigerators when he talked to DAGENS NYHETER about the future of the Armed Forces. Striking a balance between personnel, organization, and equipment and between quantity and quality will be the new OB's hardest job.

He says: "We in the Armed Forces have been compensated [for inflation] as though we were buying Volvo automobiles and refrigerators. But we are buying defense materiel, an area in which the price trend has moved upward much faster."

That is why the Armed Forces are currently experiencing a conflict between quantity and quality. People in the Armed Forces are also becoming more expensive at a rate that keeps pace more or less with the growth in the national economy.

"If a sector of society is to continue to grow or at least to keep up with technological developments and make things better for its personnel, it must receive its share of national economic growth. That is something that we in the Armed Forces have not gotten for the past 15 years. Since 1972, our share

of the GNP has dropped from 3.4 percent to 2.7 percent. So it is not odd that there are conflicts within the organization and that we are worse off."

OB Level

If the Armed Forces gets the 3-percent annual increase in defense spending that is called in the "OB spending level," Bengt Gustafsson believes that the conflict "we are confronted with" will disappear.

At the OB level, fighter aircraft, surface attack vessels, and armored units--units of the kind that will be involved in a dueling situation in wartime--will have equipment just as good as that of an attacker.

The OB says: "Then we will be able to maintain an organization such that we will be able to defend this big country. Sweden's large land area with its many forests and difficult terrain requires many infantry units."

Continuing Overhaul

But the OB will continue to overhaul the peacetime organization. So far no one has come up with a good idea on what it should look like. It is not a good thing to close down regiments in various defense districts. The connection between society, people, and Armed Forces is "almost visible" in those regiments, he says. Some hopes were placed in the Army commander in chief's idea of having mixed services in the units. But that would have involved big investments and been unprofitable from the long-term standpoint.

The OB says: "The situation today is that we must continue with the pattern from the 1970's and close down regiments at random. We have not come across a good principle to follow."

Bengt Gustafsson was a member of the Commission on Compulsory Military Service (VK-83), and he says that certain changes in the length of military service may be considered. The absolute minimum is 7.5 months. It is conceivable that the current period will be shortened slightly in the case of companies with independent missions. The period needs to be lengthened for other groups. The training period for armored infantry units was recently lengthened to permit joint exercises. Some units should have more frequent refresher courses. They are required by the RBS-70 surface-to-air missile system, for example. The proficiency level at the start of refresher courses has been below what would be required at mobilization. Other missile units may need even more frequent refresher courses.

Very Good Contact

The OB laughed and said: "I thought it was encouraging that 55 percent of those due for refresher courses in the Goteborg District could be brought in for 1 week out of the year."

The new OB does not want to scrap the conscript conferences. They have provided him with very good contact "with the guys." But the elected

representatives of the conscripts should visit the minister of defense to discuss improvements in family allowances, daily pay, or other things.

The OB says: "If the politicians decide to increase their allowances, we in the Armed Forces should be compensated for it."

When DAGENS NYHETER met with Bengt Gustafsson, he was wearing a brandnew uniform for the day, with four stars on his shoulders and glistening oak leaves. He was also modeling the new 1987-style uniform with its short and stylish waist-length jacket.

The volunteer defense organizations in Kiruna presented him with a genuine Lapp knife when he left his post in Boden as commanding general of the military command to become OB. Engraved on the knife--made of reindeer antler and a first-class piece of Lapp workmanship--are the words: "To B. Gustavsson, our general."

The fact that his name is misspelled makes no difference. The new OB looks moved and proud.

DAGENS NYHETER saw him in the afternoon as he was leaving Armed Forces Staff Headquarters in Stockholm. He was jumping into his car with a game under his arm--yes, you guessed it: the Submarine Game.

11798
CSO: 3650/7

MILITARY SWEDEN

## CURRENT ORGANIZATION, ARMS, DEPLOYMENT OF SERVICES SUMMARIZED

Vienna OESTERREICHISCHE MILITAERISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT in German Sep/Oct 86
pp 468-474

[Article by Heinz Magenheimer: "Sweden's Armed Forces: Military System, Organization, Arms"]

[Text] Defense policy: Several military incidences along the Swedish coastline led not only to disagreements in foreign policy but also to discussions on the state of the country's defense. After the Soviet submarine U-137 of the W-class penetrated the skerries off the Karlskrona marine base in late October of 1981 "incidences" had also occurred in subsequent years: According to Swedish statements Soviet submarines had violated Swedish territorial waters at least five times in the summer and fall of 1985. The Swedish commander-in-chief, too, discussed these and similar incidences in November, which led a number of high-ranking naval officers to make critical comments on present security policy--some of them also in the daily press--and to warn against neglecting the defense readiness. (1)

On 29 October 1985, a Swedish reconnaissance ship "Orion" equipped with highly sophisticated electronics was rammed by a Soviet minesweeper east of the island of Gotland and suffered slight damage. The minesweeper evidently attempted to prevent the "Orion" from observing a Soviet fleet exercise. The incidence took place in open international waters, in a sea lane which both sides claim as an economic zone. Although the incidence was quickly settled through diplomatic channels, it revived the discussion on defense problems. A new "realism" seemed to prevail in certain sectors of the public. (2)

The sea waters mentioned where the collision took place have been a subject of negotiations between Sweden and the Soviet Union for many years: While Sweden wants to make the center line between Gotland and the Baltic coast the border, the Soviets insist on a border halfway between the coasts of the two mainlands.

If this area would be declared a "gray zone" as the Soviet would like, the Soviet navy could operate as close as 12 miles off the island of Gotland. The negotiations which were continued in March of 1986 have not yet brought any results.

The Swedish national defense is faced with the challenge of organizing and arming the armed forces to meet potential threats and at the same time make do with an ever decreasing share of the national income. The build-up of strong Soviet land, air and naval forces on the Kola peninsula and in the Murmansk-Severomorsk area is considered to be a particularly important factor.

Another geographical problem is the long east and south coast. There is general agreement that much stronger naval forces than the current ones would be required to effectively monitor this coastline. Due to the country's large north-south distance (approximately 1,500 km) and the small population (8.33 million) relative to the national territory the ability to respond quickly once the intentions of an attacker have become clear is a basic requirement. However, because of operative problems and other conditions--mobilization, transport--a quick concentration of forces is considered to be very difficult to achieve. To make up for at least some of these disadvantages the air force in particular is responsible for delaying enemy attacks as long as possible to gain time for completing the mobilization.

In the past few years the percentage share of defense expenditures has decreased; already in 1972 a "zero growth" had been decided upon in view of the disarmament policy. Bwtween 1967 and 1974 the defense budget including expenditures for civil defense increased by an average of 1.2 percent annually, while these sectors increased by a total of only 3 percent in the years 1975-1983. For fiscal year 1985/86 (starting 1 Jul 1985) 25.1 billion Swedish kronor were appropriated; this is slightly more than 3 percent of the gross national product and almost 8 percent of the national budget.

In the past few years the tight budget situation has led to the closing or shut-down of garrisons, echelons, and naval units. As an example, in 1972 the air force still had, for instance, 33 fighter and fighter bomber echelons, while slightly less than 18 such echelons were in service in 1982. (3)

Even if the reason given for the reduction in units and equipment is the disproportionately fast rise in the cost for arms and equipment, the preparation of the 5-year defense plan which will take effect in 1987 has come under certain pressure. While the government estimates a maximum total sum of slightly less than 117 billion Swedish kronor for the years 1987-1992, the commander-in-chief advocates a minimum amount of 124.8 billion Swedish kronor, which would make it possible to modernize the forces of all military branches. An annual increase of 3 percent would seem to be absolutely essential. In addition, the arms deficiencies which have been developing need to be corrected. (4)

The official security policy is based on the assumption that Sweden would not become the main target of an enemy attack, but would only be considered as a possible area for passage on land and in the air or as a base for an aggression which would be part of a more long-term, conventional war. Officially, it is expected that the forces directed against Sweden as part of a war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact would only be of limited size.

However, the most recent statements by naval officers indicated that possible surprise actions in the air and at sea--for instance with air assault troops,

small submarines and commando units--to paralyze important bases are now given a greater chance of success. According to this view an invasion of Sweden with heavy losses would no longer be essential.

Army organization and mobilization: The military system is based on a general draft between the ages of 18 and 47. Basic military training lasts from 7.5 to 15 months depending on the service performed. This is followed by up to five repeat training periods, the first of which takes place four years after completion of the basic training with the remaining three to follow in 3-4 year intervals. For the average draftee the training periods last 8-17 days; they go up to 17 -31 days for company commanders.

At age 30 to 35 most draftees are moved to the territorial defense. In addition, there is the opportunity to do voluntary arms training. Draftees with reduced fitness will perform support services in case of mobilization.

Since 1 Jun 1983 women, too, have been eligible for military service. An officer career is also open to them. When they have reached the age of 18 men and women can also serve as volunteers in the home defense.

Sweden relies on the "cadre milita system", i.e. higher-level positions are held by active officers which leaves most of the training to the reserve and drafted officers. The current armed forces consist of approximately 18,000 military personnel, primarily officers with approximately 49,000-50,000 draftees annually in addition, who do their miliatry service. In addition, the professional staff also includes approximately 23,000 civilian employees, and approximately 12,000 reservists in the officer corps. These reserve officers are called up at certain intervals to serve in their respective functions. As a cost savings measure it is planned to reduce civilian personnel by 6,000. (5).

When mobilization is completed after an estimated 3-4 days the armed forces will consist of approximately 800,000 men, i.e. almost 10 percent of the population. 300,000 of them will be in the army, approximately 300,000 in the territorial defense, approximately 100,000 in the home defense units, and the remaining 100,000 in the air force and navy.

The peacetime army organization with approximately 47,000 personnel is divided into six military regions, four of which encompass the central and southern parts of the country. The island of Gotland is under a separate military command which belongs to the "military region East". The military region commanders have under their command all formations of the three services stationed in their territory both in peacetime and in war. If needed, the military region commands which encompass a total of 23 defense districts form six corps commands, which have authority over divisions, independent brigades as well as units of the territorial defense. The equipment of the field army is kept in approximately 1,500 camps spread all across the country.

The peacetime organization relies on 42 regiments, i.e. battalion-size units of the different arms of the military which form and train complete units from the respective draft contingent for a possible war. Such a unit is maintained

for 10-15 years. A few years ago there were still 50 regiments, which have been reduced gradually. In addition, the army has 22 schools including 5 officer schools.

At present, the wartime organization of the army comprises 29 brigades, including 19 infantry brigades (of these 11 type 77 brigades and eight type 66 R brigades), four "Norrland brigades", four tank brigades, one mechanized brigade, and one "Gotland brigade". It is planned to combine several brigades into divisions, six of which can be deployed with the corresponding divisional troops. In addition to the brigades there are independent infantry, tank, artillery, and FIA-battalions. The territorial army has approximately 100 battalions and 400-500 independent security companies.

According to the parliamentary resolution of 4 Jun 1982, by 1992 the mobilization strength of the field army will be reduced to 26 brigades, including 5 tank and 5 Norrland brigades. As a comparison, in 1972 there were still 30 brigades.

The type 77 infantry brigade which is the most frequent one, is divided into three motorized fighter battalions (four rifle companies and one heavy company each), one reconnaissance, one tank rifle company (with combat tanks), one armored rifle battalion (motorized), one FIA-company, as well as one artillery, one pioneer and one supply battalion. The personnel level of 5,400 men is quite substantial.

In contrast to this organization the infantry brigade (type 66R) has only partially motorized battalions as well as one cycle battalion. By 1989 the army will have undergone a reorganization which will mean a better motorization of the infantry brigade "type 66R" so that six infantry brigades "type 66 M" will be created. These infantry brigades are primarily intended for combat in the border and coastal areas.

Of the existing 11 "type 77" infantry brigades one will be reorganized as a "Norrland brigade", which will result in a total of five Norrland brigade. This type of brigade differs from the infantry brigade 77 by the addition of a rifle battalion and is more mobile since it is equipped with snow-tractor vehicles. The personnel level is approximately 5,500 men. The plan is to reassign the Norrland brigades as a type 85 brigade by 1989. They are supposed to be fully equipped with field howitzers 77, a tank-FIA-company with nine guided missiles RBS-70 and an additional armored rifle company with PAL TOW. (6)

As part of the reorganization or reassignment it is planned to provide the infantry brigades with new vehicles including full-chain vehicles Bv 206 by 1989. It is noteworthy that the infantry brigades are relatively heavily equipped with anti-tank weapons: Each rifle company, for instance, has an rPAK-platoon 90 mm and the battalion itself still has such a platoon for 4 rPAK 90 mm. The armored rifle company of the brigade has 12 light tanks Ikv-91 (90mm) while the motorized armored rifle company has another six rPAK 90 mm on full-chain vehicles. The artillery battalion of the brigade is divided into three batteries with only four field howitzers 77 each (range 22-30 km).

The tank brigades with approximately 5,000 men are divided into three tank battalions (24 combat tanks per battalion), one artillery, one pioneer, and one supply battalion as well as one reconnaissance, one FIA-company and two armored rifle companies. Dividing the tank battalions into staff and supply sections and also into two tank and two armored infantrymen companies and one artillery battery each results in a mixed mechanized unit without a large number of tanks.

Among the combat tanks the turretless tank "S" (Strv-103) and the "Centurion" stand out. The current reorganization will result in a brigade type 63 M, which will include the combat rocket tank 551 with PAL TOW and the FIA-tank 701 equipped with the FIA-rocket RBS-70 "Robot". Both systems are based on a redesign of the previous cannon battle tank IKV-102/103. The two armored rifle companies of the brigade will be fused into a mixed armored rifle battalion.

Since most of the peacetime garrisons which consist mainly of 1-2 training battalions are located in the more densely populated southern and central part of the country, approximately south of the Karlstad-Uppsala-Norrtaelje line, large-scale movements to protect northern Sweden must be expected if a defense situation arises. A troup movement from the Stockholm area to Upper Norrland (Boden-Luleaa area) means that a distance of approximately 700 km must be covered.

In case of an attack against Upper Norrland four Norrland brigades, supported by 5 infantry brigades and 2 tank battalions will be responsible for delaying tactics and defensive combat. It is expected that it will take approximately one week to get the troops combat-ready and in place. Since the troops will be transported primarily by rail, securing railroad lines and train stations will be crucial. (7).

As several statements indicate the "weak point mobilization" will be improved: First, in coordination with their training schedules, each military branch will alternately provide a combat-ready infantry battalion which can be moved to any part of the country using C-130 transport planes. Furthermore, each military region keeps alarm companies and platoons in readiness to meet the requirements in their own territory.

With regard to armaments for the army the automatic rifle Ak-5 (5.56 mm) will be introduced shortly, as well as the 84-mm anti-tank gun AT-4 (range 300 m) which is also manufactured under license for the U.S. army. The Bofors Odnance company is developing the all-weather anti-tank missile BILL (RBS-56) which will be used in the rifle battalions starting in 1987. This weapon which proved to be promising in tests has proximity sensors which guide the missile to the target from above. In the future, the PAL TOW will also be used on the 20 anti-tank helicopters Bo-105, which were ordered in 1985.

Furthermore, the end-phase guided anti-tank projectile Strix is being developed in cooperation between FFV and Saab Missiles; it can be fired from the 120-mm grenade launcher at distances exceeding 8 km.

The search for artillery weapons includes a multiple rocket launcher, possibly based on the Haegglung BV-206 vehicle. Moreover, a target location system will be tested, i.e. a reconnaissance drone either with infrared sensors or as a video device. With regard to ammunition, end-phase guidance and sub-ammunition will be tested. Among the FIA-weapons the 40-mm Bofors cannon "Trinity" deserves mentioning which fires a novel ammunition with a proximity igniter which is highly efficient and has a rapid firing sequence. Redesigning the light tank Ikv-91 for a 105-mm cannon will hopefully lead to export orders. (8)

Compared to 1984, Sweden's weapons exports fell by 7.8 percent in 1985. In 1985 they amounted to 2.14 billion Swedish kronor which is 0.8 percent of total Swedish exports. In late March of 1986 a contract for delivery of 400 field howitzers FH-77 was made with India.

The air force: The air force consists of approximately 9,000 men and approximately 450 fighter planes; they have a high combat readiness even in peacetime. Some observers even consider the air force to be the most important component of Sweden's armed neutrality.

The deployment of the forces is as follows: (9)

| | |
|---|---|
| 4th squadron (Oestersund): | 2 echelons (fighter) Viggen JA-37 |
| 5th squadron (training squadron) (Ljungbyhed): | 4 echelons SK-60/SK-61 (training and light combat aircraft) |
| 6th squadron (air attack command, Karlsborg): | 2 echelons (air attack) Viggen AJ-37 |
| 7th squadron (air attack command (Saatenaas): | 2 echelons (air attack) ViggenAJ-37 |
| 10th squadron (Aengelholm): | 3 echelons (fighter) Draken J-35 F2 |
| 13th squadron (Norrkoeping): | 1 echelon (reconnaissance) Viggen SF/SH-37<br>1 echelon (fighter) Viggen JA-37<br>(One support echelon F-13M is in Malmslaatt) |
| 15th squadron (Soederhamn) (air attack command): | 1 echelon (air attack) Viggen AJ-37<br>1 echelon (multi-mission) Viggen SK-37 |
| 16th squadron (Uppsala): | 2 echelons (fighter) Draken J-35 F-1/SK-35<br>1 echelon (air attack) SK-60 |
| 17th squadron (Ronneby): | 1 echelon (fighter) Viggen JA-37<br>1 echelon (reconnaissance) Viggen SF/SH-37 |
| 21st squadron (Luleaa): | 2 echelons (fighter) Viggen JA-37<br>1 echelon (reconnaissance) Viggen SF/SH-37 |

In addition, the 14th squadron should be mentioned which serves as a school for aviation and telecommunications training (Halmstad) as well as the 18th squadron (Tullinge near Stockholm) which is also set up as a pilot training center (pilot guidance services). Three squadrons (6th, 7th, and 15th) are

combined under the command of the air attack forces (Goeteborg) and are intended for missions on land and over sea.

In early 1983 the 1st squadron (Vaesteraas) which was equipped with Draken J-35 was closed down and the personnel and the planes were transferred to the Tullinge base. In late 1985 the 16th squadron discontinued one fighter echelon with Draken J-35 F-1. The two remaining echelons equipped with "Draken" will be re-equipped with "Viggen" in the course of 1986.

If the training squadron in Ljungbyhed is included there is a total of 10 squadrons (not counting the two schools in Halmstad and Tullinge). The echelons available are 11 fighter, six air attack, four light ground combat, three reconnaissance as well as one multi-mission echelon (re-equipment and training squadron), i.e. a total of 25 combat echelons. In addition, there is a transport echelon (C-130 Hercules) and 10 helicopter groups with one each assigned to a squadron airport. An echelon usually consists of 18 airplanes.

A few years ago, the reduction of the squadrons and echelons resulted in one fighter squadron each being placed under the command of an air defense zone: (10)

AD-Zone Upper Norrland: 21st squadron
AD-Zone Lower Norrland: 4th squadron
AD-Zone, center: 16th squadron
AD-Zone, south: 10th squadron.

Now that the 21st squadron has given up its Draken inventories and the 16th squadron will convert its two echelons which are equipped with J-35 F-1 to Viggen in the near future the three echelons of the 10th squadron in Aengelholm are the only remaining ones to fly the J-35 F-2. This squadron is also used for training the Austrian pilots on the J-35.

The most important plane in service is the Saab-37 Viggen which was introduced in 1971 and is used in the versions AJ-37 (air attack), JA-37 (fighter), SK/SH-37 (training, reconnaissance, attack against naval targets). Maximum speed is approximately Mach 2.0 at 11,000 m, the air attack version can carry approximately 7,000 kg of armaments, distributed among 7 external stations. A total of 329 Viggen units will be delivered.

Development and testing is concentrated on the multipurpose fighter plane JAS-39 "Gripen" by Saab-Scania; the decision to build it was made in 1979/80. In view of the cost the plan was to develop a plane which is smaller than the "Viggen", which would be adapted to the particular Swedish requirements and would cut the weight approximately in half thus enabling it to start and land on sections of the interstate system.

Furthermore, the JAS-39 was supposed to utilize the country's experience in electronics, avionics, and armament. In addition, the plan was to use system parts of foreign firms, for instance, the General Electric F-404 engine, but in a modified version. At the same time, a long-range anti-seacraft projectile (Rb 15F) was developed.

The "Gripen" is a plane with delta wings and slats which also functions as an air attack and reconnaissance plane in addition to its primary role as a fighter plane. The pulse-doppler-radar produced by Ericcson Radar Systems can locate and pursue several objects at the same time. According to Swedish data the electronic equipment which includes, for instance, an interference and a noise suppression device is highly efficient. (11)

According to current plans the first flight of the prototype will not take place until the second half of 1987 due to delays in putting the pilot guidance system in operation. Initially, 30 planes will be purchased. The cost of the total program is estimated at approximately 38 billion Swedish kronor by the turn of the century. The training plane JAS 349 which is under development competes with a potential advanced model of the Saab 105 SK 60.

The navy: With slightly under 10,000 men and 43 naval units of any size worth mentioning including 12 submarines this branch of the military seems to be in greatest need of reinforcement. The shipbuilding industry which is faced with great economic problems has shifted increasingly to export orders. For instance, patrol boats of the Stanflex 300 type are being built for Denmark in the "sandwich" mode. Plans are to expand the combat ship flotilla which consists of 30 units. Here, emphasis is on the Stockholm-class where each boat carries six naval target projectiles RBS-15. At present, four ships of the Stockholm-class, four minesweepers and four submarines are on order. The main bases are Karlskrona, Muskoe near Stockholm, Harnoesand and Goeteborg.

The financing plan for the years 1987-1992 which was submitted by the commander-in-chief would make it possible to purchase 10 speedboats, two submarines and missiles against naval targets. The coastal defense, which is based on 30 mobile and fixed battalions with numerous artillery (105mm, 120mm, 152mm) would also be strengthened considerably. Therefore, it is expected that the next 5-year plan will set the direction for arms decisions in particular for the navy.

FOOTNOTES

1. See also: "Sweden--The Submarine Incidence: A Summary," in OEMZ 2/1982, p 169; FAZ 14 Nov 1985 ("New Submarine Debate in Sweden").

2. "Sweden's Difficult Relationship to the Soviet Union," in FAZ 11 Nov 1985, p 7; NZZ 7 Nov 1985, p 5.

3. WEHRTECHNIK 3/1984, p 64.

4. INTERAVIA AIR LETTER, 8 Oct 1985, p 6; NZZ 14 Feb 1986 ("Swedish Security Policy Discussions").

5. The Swedish Total Defense Information Committee, Stockholm 1983; WEHRTECHNIK 3/1984, p 63.

6. SOLDAT UND TECHNIK 3/1985, p 164; TRUPPENDIENST-pocketbook: "The Armies of the Neutral and Non-Aligned Countries in Europe" (Vienna 1986), p 159 ff.

7. "Neutrality at the Intersecting Point of the Two Military Alliances," in NZZ 9/10 Feb 1986, p 5.

8. General information on this subject: John Reed, "The Scandinavian Armaments Industries," in : ARMADA INTERNATIONAL 1/1986 p 12 ff; MILITARY TECHNOLOGY 3/1986, p 18 ff.

9. DEFENSE UPDATE, June 1982, p 20.

10. TRUPPENDIENST 3/1983, p 326.

11. MILITARY TECHNOLOGY 3/1986, p 23; AEROSPACE, Oct 1983, p 14 ff.

Map: Higher Commands, Bases, and Garrisons in Sweden



Key:

1. Garrisons with at least 1 batallion / School
2. Military region East
3. Support sections for the 13th squadron
4. 10th squadron
5. Training squadron
6. Air attack command
7. Naval base
8. Atlantic Ocean
9. Norway
10. Sweden
11. Upper Norrland
12. Lower Norrland
13. Supreme command
14. Military command, military region East
15. East
16 South
17. Training
18. Gulf of Bothnia
19. Finland
20. Latvian SSR

12831
CSO: 3620/20

## BRIEFS

EGYPTIAN TANK CANNON CONTRACT--Turkey, which has bought production licenses from various foreign high-technology firms for many years, will soon take the first step toward selling a production license. According to the information obtained, MKE [Machine and Chemical Industry Establishment] has won first place in the bid Egypt opened some time ago for the supply of and production licenses for 105-mm tank cannons and munitions. Thus, MKE has won the right to license Turkish patents for tank cannons to be manufactured in Egypt. Officials reported that in addition to MKE, the Santa Barbara corporation from Spain and the PRB corporation from Belgium bid on the Egyptian contract and that only MKE's bid was found favorable in technical and price terms. The $4 million contract for the sale of manufacturing licenses for 105-mm tank cannons and munitions is expected to be signed soon by Egyptian government officials and the MKE Directorate General. After the accord is signed, tank cannons will begin to be manufactured in Egypt under a Turkish patent. [Text] [Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 5 Sep 86 p 9] 9588

F-16 ENGINE TESTING CONTRACT--The Alarko firm is reported to have won the contract for the construction of the engine-testing facilities for the F-16 military aircraft factory in Murted. According to the information obtained, a 5-billion-lira contract has been signed with Alarko for the construction of the F-16 engine testing facilities. The construction of the facilities will begin next month and will be completed by the end of 1987. [Text] [Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 12 Sep 86 p 6] 9588

CSO: 3554/16

ENERGY TURKEY

GASOLINE STANDARDS RAISED

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 12 Sep 86 p 3

[Text] Ankara (TERCUMAN) - Gasoline is going to be "bluer than blue" as of 1 October. Regular gasoline is going to be raised from 81 to 91 octane to conform to European standards and will be dyed blue. Minister of State Kazim Oksay, making the announcement, said that the new color of gasoline would not reflect on prices.

Kazim Oksay said that regular gasoline would be raised from 81 octane to 91 octane and would be dyed blue to distinguish it from super gasoline. Oksay pointed out that the change would begin on 1 October and said, "It will be applied nationwide. Regular gasoline will now be blue. Raising the octane will have many benefits, including energy conservation and as regards air pollution."

Kazim Oksay also revealed that efforts are in progress to raise the octane of super gasoline and listed as follows the advantages of 91-octane gasoline and its contributions to the economy:

"Vehicles produced in Turkey and Europe are designed for a high compression rate. So 91-octane regular gasoline will give high efficiency and performance. In this way, 3 percent-5 percent savings of fuel will be obtained throughout Turkey and we will get better mileage than with low-octane gasoline."

Minister of State Kazim Oksay said, in answer to reporters' questions at the press conference, that there would be no price hike on petroleum products in 1986, but he could not speak now for the first half of 1987.

Oksay, asked whether Iraq and Libya had caused a hitch in payment of our oil bills, replied, "It is true that Libya and Iraq are reducing their exports due to their own economic situations, but there is no drop in our exports. Our exporters have filled the void in the Middle East with export links to America and Europe."

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- END -

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20 NOVEMBER 1986

# West Europe Report

FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

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# WEST EUROPE REPORT

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POLITICAL DENMARK

JUSTICE MINISTER DEFENDS NEW POLICY ON REFUGEES

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 20 Oct 86 p 13

[Article by Justice Minister Erik Ninn-Hansen: "A Humane Refugee Policy"; first two paragraphs are BERLINGSKE TIDENDE introduction]

[Text] Erik Ninn-Hansen has been justice minister since 1982. He served as defense minister and finance minister in the Liberal-Conservative-Radical coalition government. He is a Conservative member of Folketing.

Justice Minister Erik Ninn-Hansen describes the changes that have just been made in the Alien Act and the work that is being done to find an international solution.

In 1983 Folketing passed the Alien Act by a large majority. One of the central elements in the law was the establishment of the legal status of refugees. When the law was enacted Denmark went farther than any other country in the world in its commitment to issue residence permits to refugees. The law was passed in the belief that other countries would also assume their share of the responsibility for taking in refugees.

The international stream of refugees has increased steadily since 1983 and we have seen that asylum seekers come to Denmark in greater numbers than is the case in other West European countries in relation to population size.

To be able to go on dealing with both asylum seekers and refugees in a humanitarian way the government has had to constantly review how case handling and legislation can be adjusted to the increasing stream of refugees so that fundamental legal guarantees are respected.

The changes that have just been made should be seen in relation to the fact that in recent months there has been an explosive increase in the number of asylum seekers entering Denmark. For example the influx was so large in September that it corresponds to accepting 30-35,000 asylum seekers on an annual basis.

To limit the stream of refugees Section 48, Paragraph 2 of the Alien Act now states that asylum seekers can be turned away at the border if they have come from a country where there is no risk of persecution as outlined in the

Refugee Convention of 28 July 1951. But if the foreigner has come directly from a country where he risks persecution as outlined in the convention or where he is not protected against being sent to such a country, he cannot be denied entrance.

However the basis for determining whether an asylum seeker should be given refugee status has not been changed. Both refugees under the convention and de facto refugees still have a right to be granted asylum if they have special ties with Denmark.

The change in the law includes a provision that carriers bringing a foreigner to this country can be fined if the foreigner does not have the proper travel papers and a visa. The provision should be seen in the context of the Chicago Convention which already makes airlines responsible for making sure that passengers are in possession of the documents that are needed to enter a country. Unlike the other changes this provision has not been put into effect. It will not be implemented unless there are repeated violations by the airlines, as we have seen in the past.

As I mentioned, the purpose of the latest changes in the law is to limit the present stream of refugees without endangering people in distress. It is also an important factor that the changes provide better possibilities for clearing up the large number of cases that involve asylum seekers who have already entered the country and are waiting to have their cases dealt with by the Alien Directorate or the Refugee Board.

However at no time has the government sought to avoid taking its share of the responsibility for the international refugee problem and we will always be prepared to accept our share of the world's refugees.

It is very hard to estimate how many spontaneous asylum seekers will come to Denmark following the changes in the law. When the changes were approved it was with the understanding that there might be a need to grant more than the present number of entry visas in the future to people who are subject to acute political persecution in their homeland or in another country.

It is an indication of the government's sense of responsibility with regard to the refugee problem that the Alien Act contains a clause that proposals will be submitted in the 1987/88 Folketing year concerning revisions of the law. Until then the government will follow developments very closely in order to see if the forecasts of the number of refugees Denmark will accept prove to be accurate. At the same time the government will determine whether the limits that have now been set on the number of asylum seekers and refugees to be accepted should be changed.

The refugee problem is an international one and it requires international solutions. Thus Denmark has taken an active part in consultations initiated by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in May 1985, which were followed by talks in Stockholm in November 1985 and in The Hague in April 1986. This was done in the hope that pressure on the part of Denmark among

others would help create a basis for regional solutions in cooperation with the High Commissioner for Refugees.

In light of the recent explosive development in the number of refugees the government turned to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees on 29 August 1986, asking that initiatives be taken to implement a broad international solution to the problem of distributing the stream of refugees. However this has not led to any results so far.

The government has also brought the matter up at the United Nations General Assembly which convened a short time ago.

Denmark has also pressed for an international solution in the Council of Europe. Denmark and Sweden were responsible for taking up the problem of the so-called country of first asylum. This involves the question of whether a refugee in one country can be denied asylum on the grounds that another country in which he has resided was the country of first asylum.

In November 1985 and again in August 1986 I addressed the other Nordic countries about the question of refugee distribution among various countries and the question of a joint Nordic effort under international auspices. An intensive and open cooperation is now occurring in the Nordic countries with regard to the refugee problem.

The close cooperation in EC can also contribute to the creation of an international solution to the refugee problem. In September the EC political committee discussed the rising number of asylum seekers and Denmark was able to outline the problems created by the rising influx of asylum seekers on that occasion. Along with West Germany and others we warmly advocated an international solution. After that Denmark took the initiative for further talks that will be taking place in London today, 20 October.

The changes we have now implemented in the law underline the need for strengthening international efforts. This is a question of people in danger whom all countries must cooperate in assisting. The government will intensify its efforts to arrive at a real international solution that will guarantee refugees a proper reception in all countries and placement in the countries with which they have special ties.

The discussion in connection with the changes that have been approved in the Alien Act has also stirred up the debate of our entire reception system for asylum seekers and refugees.

Today the Alien Directorate is responsible for asylum seekers while they wait to have their cases dealt with--which can take some time, of course, especially if the case has to be decided by the Refugee Board. The Danish Red Cross runs the centers where asylum seekers stay.

If a person is given refugee status the Social Affairs Ministry assumes responsibility for him. In cooperation with the Danish Refugee Aid Society the Social Affairs Ministry has set up an integration program that is offered to all refugees and lasts for 18 months.

Thus it can take a very long time from the point when a refugee seeks asylum in this country until the day he becomes part of Danish society--as much as a couple of years. In my opinion it is very important to adapt refugees to Danish society as quickly as possible. Denmark should not be just a waiting room where these people in distress stay and in which they are moved around from place to place. We must give refugees an opportunity to become functioning residents of this country, people who understand and respect the rules and customs in effect here in the same way as we understand and respect the special characteristics of the refugees. I think it is vital that the process leading to the absorption of a refugee into Danish society be as quick and as expedient as possible. The Red Cross has pointed out to me that the present system, under which as I said it can take several years before a refugee is absorbed into society, is not expedient. This is a view that I share. A refugee should be quickly placed in the local community where he will be integrated and where aid will be granted and not in a center where he is moved around with no permanent residence and where he has no influence over his own situation.

We now have a law that once again makes it possible for Denmark to decide which foreigners it wants to accept. I think this is a good thing. But there should be no doubt that we will continue to help people in need around the world. We will continue to provide this help on an international level by aiding the many poor nations in the Third World that contain many refugees. We will also continue to accept refugees in this country, both those who come here spontaneously and those who come in under the UN quota. The goal is to insure good conditions for the refugees we continue to accept at a level that would have seemed enromous just a few years ago. We now have an opportunity to deal with asylum seekers more quickly and in a better way and to incorporate refugees into society at a rate that is satisfactory for them and that local communities can handle. And in reality that is the core of a humane refugee policy.

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POLITICAL DENMARK

## RADICAL LEFT PARTY ON SECURITY, COALITION, ECONOMIC ISSUES

Copenhagen WEEKENDAVISEN in Danish 26 Sep/2 Oct 86 p 2

[Article by Solveig Rodsgaard: "Only Security Policy Can Give an Election Out of Season"]

[Text] The Radicals have clearly announced that they support the government. But for the government there are still difficulties in dealing with the situation with the alternative security policy majority around the government. There the Radicals are dealing with the Social Democrats and the Socialist People's Party.

Only a security policy onslaught against the government can sabotage the government's cooperation with the Radical Left on economic policy. The Liberal Party's group chairman Ivar Hansen says that a security policy clash could end in an election. But beyond the security policy it is difficult to see problems that can destroy the good climate between the government and the Radicals. At the Radical national meeting in Nyborg last weekend there was also clear support for the Niels Helveg Petersen line and the role of the Radicals as a supporting party.

The government is well aware that foreign and security policy is a sensitive area with the Radicals, and if broad policy unity is to be created on these matters, it must take place together with the Social Democrats. Precisely this question of the reestablishment of the previous traditional cooperation between the nonsocialist parties and the Social Democrats is being negotiated at the moment in the Folketing committee concerning Danish security policy, called the Ostergaard committee, and in a few months the committee will report. This will also be an indication of what can be expected of security policy initiatives in the coming Folketing session.

In spite of the clear report from the Radicals' national meeting on the party's position in relation to the government, foreign, security, and defense policy was also discussed at the national meeting last weekend. And these issues will also be discussed at the Liberal Party's national meeting during the coming weekend, in which Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen will presumably be asked to answer how long the government can accept being directed by the security policy majority around the government. Among other things, the Liberal Party's defense committee in Copenhagen County has made a sharp defense and

security policy statement that will be dealt with at the national meeting. And to WEEKENDAVISEN the Liberal Party's group chairman Ivar Hansen has clearly appealed to the Social Democrats for cooperation in these areas: "I cannot rule out the fact that it finally can end with an election on security policy. But I think that we must have an understanding with the Social Democrats. It cannot help anything to have the Social Democrats think that they can coast in this matter. The party must not run from responsibility. If the Social Democrats try to do this, one must ask the people. It is naturally the prime minister's decision on what will happen. But I think that the report coming in a few months from the Folketing's security policy committee will be a straw in the wind of what we can expect from the agenda in the coming session.

"I would also say about defense policy that if the Social Democrats hold fast to the viewpoints laid down in the party's position on a defensive military, there will be no defense compromise from this side of the Folketing. That is quite certain."

Radical Defense

At the national meeting of the Radical Left Party the Radical leader Niels Helveg Petersen said that the Radicals are turning against all forms of military escalation, also for the Danish defense forces. And he found the Social Democratic plan for a protective defense force "tailor made for a compromise with the government for a new period. But if the Radical Left Party can attain concrete and real influence, we will not stand on the sidelines. We will specify our demands."

Niels Helveg Petersen thinks that the government has not finished its plans in the defense area. "We will demand an answer from the government on how the Danish defense forces are to be fitted into the present budget framework. Every new weapons system is more expensive than the one it replaces. For this reason alone there must be changes made in the structure and content of the defense forces. But what is the government thinking of? We hear very little about this. The government cannot simply hide."

The Radical Left Party leader stressed that it is obvious that the party will take part in the Nordic parliamentary cooperation on making the North a nuclear free zone and that it is also obvious that the Radical Left will take part in the World Peace Conference in Copenhagen next month. It is this congress that the Social Democratic Party does not want to take part in because the party thinks it is communist dominated.

In the security policy statement, which was unanimously passed by the national meeting, it is stated that the Radicals will continue to work for a nuclear free zone in the North, combined with a Danish protective defense force. Furthermore, the party finds that disarmament and reduction of arms are the most important issues, and a first step in this direction is the accomplishment of a stop in nuclear testing. The government is encouraged to "stress clearly and unambiguously to our NATO partners, particularly the U.S., that the greatest stress must be placed on the immediate execution of a testing stop."

A Blow to the Left Wing

But in the economic area, the ten Radical Left members of the Folketing are ready to help the nonsocialist government, and at the national meeting there was great satisfaction with the efforts of the Folketing group so far. This was quite remarkable, because most of the delegates to the Radical Left national meetings are by tradition to the left of the Folketing group. There were only a very few who seriously talked about a renewal of the previous traditional cooperation with the Social Democrats, and this was not welcome among the majority of the delegates. This was shown concretely in the elections to the main leadership. The former mayor Kr. Thule Hansen, who proposes that the Radicals should reject cooperation with the government in favor of cooperation with the Social Democratic Party and the Socialist People's Party, was sent from third to last place in the leadership by the delegates at the national meeting. Former Folketing member and EEC parliamentarian for the People's Movement Against the EEC, Sven Skovmand, lost his place in the leadership completely, moving to substitute place number one. Skovmand had said at the national meeting that he would criticize the Folketing group if they did not listen to signals from the Social Democrats and the Socialist People's Party. "Niels Helveg Petersen must listen more and not be so dependent upon the nonsocialist government."

The party's deputy chairman, Keld Anker Nielsen, was elected as number one to the main leadership just as he was last year. Nielsen had spoken earlier of cooperation with the Social Democratic Party, but he did not speak during the policy debate. The only real left-wing radical who is back in the main leadership is Birgit Bjornvig, and she did not mention the question of cooperation in her speech at the national meeting.

The Economic Policy

With this clear result from the national meeting and with the substantial backing for the Folketing group, Prime Minister Poul Schluter does not have to worry about a majority for the continued tight income policy and therefore does not have to worry either about how far the Radicals also will support legislation on economic adjustment, which comes right after the Folketing meets on 7 October.

But the Radicals will also continue to have something to cooperate with the government on. This was also present in the decisions of the national meeting. The Radical leader Niels Helveg Petersen himself thinks that the national meeting showed a different and new Radical awareness of what the party wants and what this means in Danish politics.

In the domestic policy resolution it is stated that the general agents in economic policy are necessary but not sufficient to assure further progress in employment and equilibrium in the balance of payments. One of the areas the Radicals are particularly interested in is educational opportunity for children and adults, and in the coming Folketing session the Radicals will initiate a series of proposals in this area.

In the statement the public sector is praised, and it is stated that in the coming agreements public employees will be assured wage increases in agreement with the raises in the private sector. It is stressed that the possibility of meeting the demand of the public employees for equality is greatest if voluntary agreements are made with the public employee organizations.

The Radicals will also work for the gradual introduction of a citizen's wage, and it is stated that important steps in this direction are the introduction of legally determined payments in the Social Security Act and youth wages to young people under the Social Security Act. It is also stressed that a peoples pension to everyone is a step toward the citizen's wage, and that "all attacks against this principle must be warded off."

Efforts for the restoration of nature and against damage to the environment must be strengthened, and the party will continue in the coming Folketing session to make proposals for ecological agriculture.

And in the last point in the statement it says that the Radicals "will continue to work for an agreement to carry out the party's proposal on surplus distribution and joint ownership."

Dates are not set in the resolution, but the party's labor policy spokesman Jorgen Estrup pointed out at the national meeting that the Radicals and the Social Democrats are very close in their work for joint ownership and obligatory surplus distribution: "Why don't we carry this out? One reason is naturally that the governing parties will not vote for it. But we are not completely without fault. Obligatory distribution has not come about primarily because the Socialist People's Party will not cooperate. Because Gert Petersen dogmatically clings to the central fund. Because Gert Petersen refuses to go along in a compromise in which the Radical Liberal Party takes part. The Socialist People's Party must get rid of its sensitive feelings if it is to be taken seriously. Back packs and velvet gloves do not go together."

Liberal Party National Meeting

As stated above, the Liberal Party will have its national meeting this coming weekend. In addition to the treatement of a series of proposals -- among others the sharp security and defense policy statement and a proposal for obligatory surplus distribution -- the national meeting will adopt a policy of "A Safe Life in Freedom." The program has been worked out by a committee with representatives from the Liberal Party's Folketing group and the main leadership, and there are five elements in it: 1. greater personal freedom, 2. greater safety, 3. more personal initiative, 4. greater responsibility for the future, and 5. more economic freedom. The program has been debated in all the party meetings, and several proposals for amendments have been sent in. After the national meeting, a committee with the Liberal Party's deputy chairman, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, as chairman will finally draw up the program.

On Sunday Party Chairman Uffe Ellemann-Jensen will open the policy debate. He will give an account of governmental cooperation up to now and of the results

that have been achieved, and he will propose a new four-year cooperative proposal. But in spite of this, the Liberals will nevertheless speculate on why it is the Conservative People's Party that is winning out in the governmental cooperation. Opinion polls are not so good for the Liberal Party. The last Gallup poll in BERLINGSKE TIDENDE gives the Liberals 11.7 percent, while voter support in the elections in January 1984 was 12.1 percent.

"The demands of cooperation can feel like a straitjacket. But what is it to be able to throw out one's arms and cry out one's thoughts and wishes to the whole world if one simply cannot get any of them put through?" Jensen explained in the latest issue of the Liberal Party's monthly, LIBERAL.

Progressive Party Meeting

The Progressive Party will also have its national meeting next weekend, and it will also take place with a glance at the opinion polls. In the latest Gallup survey the party stood at 2.8 percent as opposed to 3.6 percent in the elections. On the other hand, Observa's test election in JYLLANDS-POSTEN Sunday showed that the Progressive Party -- together with the Radicals -- can assure the four party government a majority over the Social Democrats, the Socialist People's Party, and the Greens. But the guesswork continues. The Radicals want on no account to be together with the Progressive Party.

On the political side of the national meeting, much time will be spent on Mogens Glistrup's book, "Out of Tax Reform Traps," which the Progressive Party's Folketing group has just published. The book, which is 248 pages long, was sent in advance to the delegates.

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POLITICAL FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

## PAPER CRITICIZES INTERVENTIONISM IN SPD ECONOMIC PROGRAM

Frankfurt FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG in German 30 Aug 86 p 11

[Editorial by Hans D. Barbier: "Wanted: A Schiller for the '90's--The SPD Needs an Economic Program"]

[Text] The Social Democratics will once again have to thoroughly revise the decisions they made at their Nuremberg convention regarding their economic policy. The program, a mishmash of state interventionary measures motivated by ecological and social concerns, of tax hikes and new forms of co-determination, does not mark any political balance, irrespective of how a person may wish to assess this concept of economic policies from a political-economic viewpoint.

You can almost bet that the Social Democrats will be denied the opportunity to achieve a governing majority in the upcoming Bundestag, election even in thier own ranks. But the Nuremberg convention did illustrate one thing: it won't be Johannes Rau's fault. He is the candidate for Chancellor and will probably be able to mobilize for himself all those votes which are currently available to the SPD. Therefore, the SPD, with its sights on 1991, will haveto reexamine its economic policy platform. It will be difficult to guess in which direction the economic platform will vary from its current unstable state. The danger that the party will resign itself to a course that is literally socialistic or syndicalistic does not seem to be very grave, in view of the fact that the conservative groups still prevail in the delegate assembly. On the other hand, however, one cannot recognize any readiness to give up legislative perfectionism, thousands of state interventionary measures, and collectively organized self-preservation in all areas of life. One fears that after 1987 the Social Democrats will go another step further in this direction. For many of them, the social model is in fact the universal health insurance plan in every sense.

So as it stands, the Social Democratic platform will not be able to remain long, in any case. Except for its decision concerning energy policies, the platform does not fulfill even the most insignificant requirements of election campaigning. On the other hand, the energy decision is composed solely of campaign tactics. It appeals to everyone, from the works committee concerned with employment to the staunch opponents of nuclear energy. That can draw in the votes; however, it is not a calculated energy policy. The

divestment schedule which seems so precisely timed is restricted by an agreement proviso which reduces the party's claim to leadership in energy policy to an empty formula. The nuclear power plants will be shut down, and if unions, works committees, workers, the energy industry, firms, communes, scientific and citizen initiatives can be convinced, they will be eliminated.

Viewpoints on distribution almost completely dictated the aspects of fiscal policy decided upon in Nurenberg. These elements were based on the wish that the state make available financial management tax levers for tasks of a higher order, such as the improvement of the global condition and the creation of social justice. If the SPD politicians concerned with fiscal policy would only make the effort to take into account the impact of their philosophy on the distribution of taxes on the course of the progressive tax schedule, that is, to favor the "small" and ask the "large" to pick up the tab, then it would be instantly clear to them with which percentage cut-off points they are pushing the skilled worker into a bind. At work, should he be available for an essential and pressing special shift, or should he flee into the fiscal gray area of working and being paid under the table? Whoever drafts the steepest possible graduated progressive tax schedule for reasons of distribution, finds himself immediately forced to pursue those taxpayers on the fringe of respectability who have dubious write-offs and possible tax configurations.

The decisions concerning economic policies, where they go beyond the employment program financed by deficit and taxes, the Social Democratic variation of the old dream of planification. Economic and social advisory groups provide advice on what will be invested where, according to which priority. The Social Democrats do not decide; they stand behind the FRG constitution. This is what comprises the state along with the help of a flood of decrees. This description may contain a hint of exaggeration; however, it makes the risks of the Social Democrats' economic policy assessment plain. The "innovative entrepreneur" (from whom the SPD expects the technical and economic solution to the conflict between the elevated goals of environmental protection and rising prosperity in the categories of political-economic accounting sits in a confining mesh of laws and social advisory councils. He cannot be at ease in this field of programs, and he will therefore hesitate to delegate the responsibility for economic policies to the Social Democrats.

It will not be easy for the SPD to distance itself from the philosophy of the prevailing legislative perfectionism, In its role as opposition party, it has so often repeated the unfounded claim that economic policies of free enterprise lead to social indifference and disunity that it has actually begun to believe that, or to see no way of getting around this idea without losing credibility. The SPD is a party that argues. But it prefers to argue with itself. It will be difficult to bring the SPD to the path of a not only alleged but actual free enterprise-oriented policy by placing before it arguments and examples from without the party. It is up to someone from their own ranks to help the Social Democrats achieve this policy. The SPD needs a Karl Schiller for the 1990's. At the moment, there is no economic

leader. It is not by chance that Hans Apel and Wolfgang Roth, still "the" speakers of the SPD Bundestag group on financial and economic policies, needed two ballots to join the newly-elected executive committee. Politics can only be carried out through people, at lease in a democracy. In the 1960's, Karl Schiller showed how much the voters grew to expect competence in a party once a political area of expertise was represented by a person who combined factual judgment with the respect of his own party. Such intellectual leaders are in short supply. They can only develop their powers of influence if the party does not force them into ideological boxes.

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POLITICAL PORTUGAL

## POSSIBILITY OF CAVACO SILVA-SOARES TRUCE AGREEMENT ANALYZED

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 27 Sep 86 p 3

[Article by Jose Antonio Saraiva]

[Text] Victor Constancio, speaking of the good relations between Cavaco Silva and the current president of the republic, said that they were an indication of the "weakness of the cabinet."

This statement is somewhat surprising in view of the fact that Victor Constancio belongs to the group in the PS whose members said not so many years ago that the poor relations between Sa Carneiro and the man who was president of the republic then were an indication of the weakness of that cabinet (which, in creating conflict with the president, was seeking a means of asserting itself in the eyes of its electorate).

The problem cannot be posed, then, in this fashion.

Cavaco Silva, when he devotes a certain attention to Mario Soares, or when he encourages his ministers to accompany the president on his travels, is merely trying to establish a certain type of relationship between the cabinet as a soveriegn organ and the Presidency of the Republic as a sovereign organ.

In other words, in treating the chief of state with deference and scrupulously respecting all of the prerogatives which the presidential post confers on its holder, Cavaco Silva is placing Mario Soares in a position in which it will be difficult for him to fail to treat the prerogatives of the prime minister and the sphere of action of his cabinet with equally scrupulous respect.

In a word, Cavaco is giving respect in order to receive it.

Cavaco Silva, avoiding an attack on the president, has proposed a "nonagression pact" to Soares. He hopes that the president will also refrain from attacking him and will allow him to govern.

And it is obvious that at this time, such a pact is of interest to both.

It is of interest to the prime minister because Cavaco Silva seems to be the kind of man who, believing that he has a mission, is interested above all in being allowed to pursue it to the end without interference from third parties.

It will be remembered that Cavaco Silva made a point of forming a cabinet alone, rejecting the sharing of responsibility for governing with others.

It will also be remembered that the conflict between Cavaco Silva and parliament had its origins precisely in the fact that this body made the realization of the prime minister's plans difficult by amending or rejecting his draft laws.

However, Cavaco Silva does not belong to the group of politicians who like others to interfere in their area of activity, in order to have an excuse for poor government.

He wants to govern alone, so as to verify the results in the end and emerge the sole winner or loser. For this reason, he respects the authority of the president of the republic.

But this way of viewing the relations of the prime minister and the chief of state suits Soares as well.

Soares is basically interested in an attitude toward him of a delicate and reverent sort on the part of Cavaco Silva, who is respected by the country, since this enhances the prestige of the presidential post that he holds.

On the other hand, Soares aspires to enjoy the support of the two major sectors which make their influence felt in Portuguese politics--the socialists and the social democrats.

Therefore, since he sees that the majority in the PSD are loyal supporters of Cavaco Silva, he will take no action which might be viewed as a challenge to the present prime minister.

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CSO: 3542/9

POLITICAL PORTUGAL

## CONSTANCIO DISCUSSES FUTURE OF SOCIALIST PARTY

Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 27 Sep 86 p 3

[Interview with Vitor Constancio by Manuel Anta; date and place not given]

[Text] Party May Change Its Political Timing

[Question] The polls make it clear that Vitor Constancio is losing all along the line in the clash with Cavaco Silva, his main opponent.

[Answer] About this situation, if indeed it represents the reality, I think the following. In the period following the Socialist Party congress, when we were exposed to mass media attention, the public opinion polls, as was natural, showed popularity figures for me close to those of the present prime minister. He, it will be remembered, has enjoyed the best propaganda conditions with relation to the public for more than a year. Nothing could be more natural than that following this period of great prominence in the mass media, my popularity level is down. The fact nonetheless remains that as a result of the congress and my leadership, the PS has gone up in the polls, and our position today, from this point of view, cannot be compared with that we previously had. Moreover, my personal popularity level is above that of the party. This gives us excellent reasons to hope for greater PS recovery, so that the most immediate political goals can be achieved.

[Question] And they are?

[Answer] Recovery of a leading position for the PS on the Portuguese political scene; recovery of the votes lost to the PRD; and making the PS into the only credible alternative to the present government. And, since I am doing well in the polls, they tell us that we are on the right path.

Ethical Fidelity

[Question] Rigor and ethics--these were the key words in your speech, in an implicit assertion that prior to your achieving socialist leadership, they were missing from the vocabulary and the practice of the PS. Whether you like it or not, will these concepts continue to be a kind of stone of Sisyphus for the PS, infinitely heavy but always rolling downhill again?

[Answer] There is no reason for your question, particularly since you are trying to extract from my speech the idea that in speaking of ethics and rigor I was attempting a negative comparison. For many years now these values have been a priority concern in my political discourse. I have not just begun now to refer to them. In speaking of them, I am not seeking to make comparisons with other situations, but am merely affirming what is my style of political action.

The reason for the existence of the PS is to defend not interests but values and principles. It is obvious that ethical concerns have always been a part of the life of the PS.

[Question] This conflicts with the image of some of the former leaders...

[Answer] That is a conclusion which the public must draw, and it is not for me to do so. My task is only to remain faithful to what I think my role in political life should be. And nothing more!

The Bipolar Option

[Question] You said recently that any alliance with other parties is excluded. Has the PS of Constancio discovered the charms of bipolarization?

[Answer] The strategy of the PS is in fact to present itself in the coming elections, whenever they may be held, without any commitment to or alliance with another party. The purpose of the strategy of the PS is to succeed in establishing a more stable political or party system in Portugal. This will only be possible if there are two large parties offering themselves to the electorate as alternatives.

[Question] This is called bipolarization.

[Answer] The word has taken on other connotations in Portugal because of the way it was presented in 1980, and I do not like to use it. What I am seeking is a bipolar system with two hegemonic parties. The healthy functioning of Portuguese democracy in such a way as to offer the citizens alternatives and to guarantee greater stability depends upon it.

[Question] And what if one of these two hegemonic parties wins the elections and finds itself forced to form a minority government? Do you agree that in such a case stability will vanish?

[Answer] No, provided that this government taking office as a minority knows how to negotiate and to emerge strengthened by a constitutional mechanism which enables it to govern, or if we have a coalition of much smaller parties. A government made up of one large party and another or several other smaller parties (very much smaller) can function with some efficiency, but this is not the case with coalitions of parties of approximately the same size.

[Question] Can the PS initiate talks now, then, if it wants, with a party definitely smaller than it is--for example, the CDS, so that in a favorable post-election period the two could establish themselves in the government?

[Answer] No. That situation is unrealistic. The PS is not seeking an arrangement. Its political position is very clear at this time--we are in the opposition and an alternative. We are not, however, a merely destructive opposition, but are prepared to go ahead with our own proposals and to negotiate. However, we will vote against the government whenever a question of censure or a vote of confidence arises.

Manipulation and Scandal

[Question] Is the conclusion, then, that the PS is not in a hurry?

[Answer] This was said during the campaign before the congress and afterward--we are not in a hurry. However, it is a fact that the government persists in practices which in my view distort some of the operational mechanisms of the democracy and even of the state of law, such as the establishment of patronage groups in the North and South of the country, and above all the control and manipulation of the media. All of this is aggravated by the scandalous practice of using advertising spots to announce state measures. We may even change the political timing as first established.

[Question] Which means what?

[Answer] For the time being, merely a warning. If, however, a political crisis develops, either because the government causes it or because the PRD ceases to serve as the government's crutch, the PS is prepared to discuss any type of solution. Even elections.

[Question] You spoke a moment ago of government manipulation of the mass media. This is a strange charge coming from you--the secretary general of a party which, while in power, made of the media a private reserve.

[Answer] I do not agree with the premises of what has just been said, and I would remind you, moreover, that Professor Cavaco Silva also said, when he came to the PSD, that he wanted to put an end to manipulation of the media. Now there are aspects of media manipulation today which have never before existed in Portugal. I am speaking of the scandalous practice of using advertising spots for putting out pure political propaganda, using public funds. This has never before been seen in Portugal, and it transforms government leaders not into aspiring statesmen, but into common petty politickers. I am also speaking of the fact that never before in Portugal has economic information been juggled in this way. As far as I know, no government body has issued an analysis of the economic situation since the beginning of the year. Thus far, the government has even refused to give the parliament the results on the 1985 budget or the 1986 Supply Fund accounts. No index of industrial production for 1986 has been published to date, perhaps because the index for the first 3 months of this year was below the industrial production level last year.

Consumer Populism

[Question] In the economic sector, your criticisms of the government are endless. Is it possible to do better? And how?

[Answer] I think that it is possible to do much better in a situation in which the improvement in the international situation has given Portugal a very broad area in which to maneuver. This year we will have a balance of payments for current transactions with a surplus considerably in excess of $1 billion, exclusively as a result of the decline in oil prices, in the prices of other raw materials and in international interest rates. On the other hand, this situation has very important budget consequences. The 1986 budget deficit will be lower than that initially expected by more than 100 million contos, a situation which, up to this point, the government has concealed.

[Question] Faced with a situation like this...

[Answer] ...there could be in Portugal greater economic growth, strengthened investment, and, based on more jobs, an increase in the labor contribution to the national income and resolution of the problem of back wages on a larger scale. On all these issues, the government has failed, causing the country to lose a tremendous opportunity.

With a short-term, provisional policy of consumer populism based on the elections, none of the basic problems of the economy has been attacked. The government failed to establish any system for the recovery of enterprises in trouble or for making them viable. It has taken no decisive steps toward reorganizing industry in any sector, nor has it reorganized the state business sector or continued the proper reorganization of the financial system.

Confidence in Soares

[Question] Alvaro Cunhal recently talked of a government of "independents."

[Answer] I believe that any political crisis which might occur would have to be analyzed on the basis of concrete conditions. It would be irresponsible to establish a definitive position now with regard to various possible scenarios, since this might compromise a solution which, faced with a specific existing situation, might prove the best. I can tell you, however, that a solution involving a government of "independents," and one administered and supported by the parties to boot, is still quite unusual in a democratic regime.

[Question] Everything seems to be smooth sailing between Belem and Sao Bento. Since during the last PS congress there seemed to be a clear preference on the part of Belem for the Gama "solution" over that Constancio proposed, aren't you afraid these excellent relations may at some later date work against you?

[Answer] Although one can do no better than to question the source, I reject your conclusion about the position of the president of the republic during the last Socialist Party congress.

In connection with the basic question you are asking me, I have confidence in Mario Soares and in the honest way in which he has been carrying out his duties as president of all the citizens of Portugal.

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POLITICAL PORTUGAL

## MEMBERS OF CONSTANCIO'S SHADOW CABINET IDENTIFIED

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 27 Sep 86 p 2

[Article by Teresa de Sousa]

[Text] What is the clear image Vitor Constancio wants to present of the post-Soares PS? Is it that produced by the structuring of the new shadow cabinet which he solemnly presented to the country on Wednesday, or that which emerges from the composition of the national secretariat elected at the congress last June?

It could always be argued that the two bodies play different political roles, one being an executive leadership body which defines party strategy, while the other is the spokesman for "the sectorial policies of the PS" and its "assertion as a government alternative." The socialist leader himself made a point of emphasizing this in the speech he gave when he introduced his shadow cabinet.

However, the question is the more legitimate since many of the political figures whom the secretary general of the PS would have liked to see underwrite his candidacy for leadership are participants in this new structure, and the national secretariat was the end result of the arrangements and compromises needed to guarantee an easy victory at the congress.

Apart from the proportions between the minority and the majority which Constancio is believed to have sought to maintain in the structure of this new body, it can be no accident that it includes such individuals as Gama or Antonio Barreto (while Almeida Santos, for example, is absent), Guterres, Sampaio and Cravinho--auguring (almost) the "ideal" PS Constancio is thought to have wanted to rally in support of his election to succeed Mario Soares.

Technical competence as a criterion, linked with the desire to escape the sectorial "lobbies" of the PS, is another characteristic which stands out in the choices made by Vitor Constancio. As a result, the fact that an independent of a technocratic cast emerges as the official in charge of the agricultural and fishing sector can be no accident, while a recent adherent of the PS, with open ideas unrelated to any "duty" to the powerful trade-union structure headed by Torres Couto, has been chosen as the spokesman for labor and social security affairs.

It is possible to note also that the "shadow ministers" of a more technical sort have come to this socialist structure by way of their direct links with the secretary general (with the exception, perhaps, of Vera Jardim), and may serve to strengthen what one hears called today the "pro-Constancio faction." Or, in other words, the route towards consolidation of Constancio's leadership in the next congress, following the phase of "conquest" through which the former governor of the Bank of Portugal had to pass.

For all of these reasons which can be glimpsed behind the organization of the shadow cabinet of the PS, the public risk taken by the socialist leader on last Wednesday entails a double danger.

On the one hand, the very establishment of a new structure with as little tradition in Portuguese politics as the shadow cabinet will not be an easy task. Above all when the PS has to do battle on various fronts (against the government, the renewal faction and the communists themselves) in order to move away from the delicate position in which the 6 October elections left it and to impose itself as the main force opposing Cavaco Silva.

On the other hand, the coordination of the various PS "images" and "structures," the management of the multiple factions and groups, will require that Constancio evidence tremendous capacity, so that this complex game of internal balances consolidates his leadership rather than resulting in chaos.

Antonio Baretto

Antonio Guterres



Armando Trigo de Abreu

Eduardo Ferro Rodrigues

Recently returned to the PS, he became famous as the "father" of the Basic Agrarian Law. He has now opted for a more "cultural" post, and perhaps one with greater impact in the long run. He is one of the figures with the greatest political weight in this shadow cabinet, although he is not a member of any of the leadership bodies of the PS. He served earlier as minister of trade and tourism and agriculture under the first and second Mario Soares governments. A deputy for Evora, 43 years of age, he has a doctorate in sociology from the University of Geneva. In the "war" between Gama and Constancio, he maintained the careful neutrality of one who regards himself as an "equal."

Antonio Guterres

A politician par excellance (he is today the strong man of the socialist organization), he has in addition a sufficient background of experience to justify his appointment to the industry and trade post. An engineer, 37, he

has always been professionally linked with the public institutions for economic planning and industrial development. He left the post of director of the IPE recently to devote himself body and soul to his preferred profession--politics. At the IPE, he promoted a program of support for the technological modernization of Portuguese industry, which may have developed the skills needed for efficient operation today in an area as complex as industrial policy.

Armando Trigo de Abreu

An "illustrious unknown," he has been appointed to this shadow cabinet almost exclusively because of his technical competence. An agronomical engineer, 45 years of age, he is regarded as an expert on water resources, an issue regarded by the PS as having priority in environmental policy. The official in charge of this explosive sector was appointed this year as coordinator of the programs of the National Scientific and Technological Research Council and as national administrator of the Scholarships Program of the Scientific Affairs Division of NATO. In the PS, his activity has always been discrete. He has been aligned with the former secretariat and was a member of the National Socialist Commission from 1980 to 1982.

Eduardo Ferro Rodrigues

An economist, 36 years of age, he recently joined the PS, having formerly been affiliated with the New Left. And, like Gomes da Silva, he is one of the great novelties in this shadow cabinet. Although in charge of a department as delicate as labor is, he does not come from the trade-union apparatus of the UGT. This gives him reasonable maneuvering room at the outset for dealing with labor legislation, which is such a polemic sector. He is a guest professor at the Higher Institute of Labor and Business Sciences and a technician at the GEBEI. However, his profile is markedly political.

Fernando Gomes da Silva



Ferraz de Abreu

Jaime Gama

Joao Cravinho

An economist, 48 years of age, he is the only independent in this shadow cabinet, and he is perhaps one of the greatest surprises among the choices made. The official in charge of the agriculture department of the Pinto & Sotto Mayor Bank, he is regarded as one of the most competent Portuguese technicians on agricultural matters, particularly in the field of agrarian economics. Politically, he has been situated between the PS and the PSD. The fact that he was one of the closest collaborators of Antonio Barreto when the

latter was minister of agriculture under the second Soares government certainly weighed in his favor. He also worked with Constancio on the European Integration Commission.

Ferraz de Abreu

The political rise of this physician of 69 who has been appointed to the health post in the shadow cabinet is recent. The vice president of the socialist parliamentary bench, he was on the slate of candidates for the national secretariat of the PS elected on the recommendation of Constancio at the last congress, which caused some surprise. His is not the profile of a politician, but rather that of a sensible man and mediator of conflicts.

Jaime Gama

One of the socialists with the longest political experience, despite his 39 years, he was defeated by Constancio at the last congress but is today one of the most credible voices when it comes to defense issues. He heads the parliamentary commission in that sector, where he has pursued work disturbing to the present executive branch, which has in this sector one of its weakest points. He belongs to the socialist minority and he has previously served as minister of internal administration and foreign affairs.

Joao Cravinho

An engineer, 49, he came from the ranks of the so-called ex-GIS. He has already served as minister of industry and has until the present been the spokesman of the PS on economic matters in the parliament. A politician of known technical competence, he is nonetheless an especially polemic figure, not only because of the forthrightness with which he normally defends his positions, but also because of the tendency of the theses he defends, sometimes regarded as too radical. The fact that he was not included in the national secretariat chosen by Constancio at the last socialist congress was viewed with some surprise. However, he now has a leading place in the finance and planning sector in the shadow cabinet of the PS.

Jorge Sampaio

Luis Filipe Madeira

Miranda Calha

Murteira Nabo

The man in charge of the explosive international relations sector in the national secretariat of the PS, he is taking over the foreign affairs sector in this shadow cabinet. Although he was never, like Gama, minister of foreign affairs, he did hold the post of secretary of state for foreign cooperation

under the Fourth Provisional Government, and he was closely involved with the negotiations with the FRELIMO and the People's Republic of Mozambique of 1975. He was a member of the European Commission on the Rights of Man for 5 years, and he is regarded as knowledgable on international issues. The possibility that he will impose an orientation different from (less pro-American) that pursued under the leadership of Soares on the foreign policy defended by the socialists is understood.

Luis Filipe Madeira

The choice of the former president of the Algarve Regional Tourism Commission to head the internal administration department was not an obvious one. Filipe Madeira is neither an influencial politician nor a technician of recognized competence. However, he is a member of the national secretariat of the PS and has close ties with the Algarve region. These two reasons may perhaps have led Constancio to choose him, in the complex interplay of criteria which govern the composition of this cabinet.

Miranda Calha

He belongs to the socialist minority and is regarded as Gama's "right-hand man." The man who will head the youth and sports sector in the socialist shadow cabinet is 38 years old and has a degree in Germanic philology. Miranda Calha is, moreover, an experienced politician from the former Soares majority who enjoyed tremendous popularity and whose competence in the post of secretary of state for sports under the last Soares government was recognized. He served as secretary of state for regional and local administration under the second government headed by the current president of the republic.

Murteira Nabo

This circumspect socialist of 47, who has a degree in economics, won public notoriety when he served with unanimously acknowledged competence in the post of secretary of state for transportation under the "Central Bloc" government. As the official responsible for the transportation and communications sector, Murteira Nabo supported the positions of the so-called ex-secretariat, but his technical reputation almost always placed him above this traditional internal division among the socialists. He is a member of the board of the PS Studies Office and an alderman in the Lisbon Municipal Chamber.

Vera Jardim

Rosado Correia

Vera Jardim

A lawyer of 58, he was a contentious candidate for the Order. He came into the PS with a group formerly belonging to the GIS, in which his friend and colleague Jorge Sampaio was a leader. Discreet in his party activities, he served two terms as a voting member of the PS Arbitration Commission, being always aligned with the former secretariat in the battles which marked the internal life of the party from 1980 to 1983. In the justice post in the shadow cabinet now, he served as secretary of state for foreign trade and tourism under the Second and Third Provisional Governments, during which time he worked closely with the present socialist leader, who was also a secretary of state at that time.

Rosado Correia

An architect from Oporto, 46, he served as minister of social infrastructure under the last Soares government. He is an alderman in the Oporto Municipal Chamber and a member of the political and national commissions of the PS. Since he is a friend of Almeida Santos, his support of Constancio at the last PS congress caused some surprise. The great popularity he enjoys in the self-governing bodies and among the socialist militants in the northern part of the country will certainly have played a part in the fact that he was chosen.

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## PCP REPORTED AVERSE TO BIPOLARIZATION

Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 20 Sep 86 p 2

[Article by Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa]

[Text] Just as Expected

The PCP and its efforts to lead the opposition. The October labor campaign. The goal of minimizing the merits of the economic and social policy being pursued. The urgent need for unity with the government to defeat the communist strategy. All of these subjects were the leading topics of the main speeches made at the PSD National Council meeting held last weekend, beginning with the lengthy address by the president of the party and prime minister.

Strictly speaking, everything was predictable. No surprises, no exceptions. Political logic is that way--inevitable. What must be will be. However, let us review this logic.

Our article last week had to do with only one of the two aspects of the planned communist escalation--the social aspect.

In the social sector, the communists are preparing a strike campaign for the autumn. And in this connection, there are many who agree with them.

The crucial question which remains is, however, different. Will these people also agree to the risk involved in the political attack by the PCP on the trend toward bipolarization, attempting to make General Eanes into the chronic but most promising guarantor attached to Dr Cavaco Silva?

Because the tactical talent of the PCP can be seen precisely in this double and double-dealing campaign.

On the one hand, it threatens strikes. And with the other, with its parliamentary political opposition, it beckons.

It is challenging the economic and social policy of the government through the trade unions. And it is disputing the trend toward bipolarization and its own political extinction in the great national debates.

A Superb Economic Situation

The fact is that the PCP (which is usually quick to foresee the future, even that which can victimize or minimize it) now realizes that the present economic situation is unparalleled. Never since 1976 has any constitutional government enjoyed such excellent economic prospects (not even the government of Dr Sa Carneiro).

The effects of the policy of the preceding government, which could already be felt in the second half of 1985 (in the recovery of exports, the turnabout in the balance of payments, the slowing of inflation), plus the international situation (decline of the dollar; the drop in oil, which alone meant a gain of about $1 billion for Portugal; the prices of raw materials and community aid)--all of this together has produced a gala year for the Portuguese economy.

Thus there are those who are already speaking of a balance of payments surplus of $1.6 billion and a state budget deficit 150 million contos below what was expected (which, moreover, has made various populist measures possible for Dr Cavaco Silva).

Obviously, uncertainty is preventing an investment upsurge. Obviously, any lasting disturbance on the foreign markets could affect the exceptionally optimistic picture. Obviously, a burst of consumerism might push the rate of inflation up again toward the middle of 1987.

But overall, Dr Cavaco Silva has had unique luck, and he has been able to manipulate it (with careful economic "timing"), to make it profitable and to turn it into an economic talisman (controlling inflation), such as to make it possible to draft the budget and a medium-term development plan (finally!). Taken alone, this merits praise.

The PCP at a Crossroads

We have, then, a superb economic situation in 1986, and very probably will have for 2 or 3 years more.

We have, then, investments which will inevitably begin to increase when all of these factors are understood.

We see, then, that Dr Cavaco Silva is a very fortunate politician, but also one with undeniable financial and economic competence, and this merits praise.

We also see that Dr Cavaco Silva and his government are making it a point (as has never happened in democratic Portugal) of managing the publication of all reports, studies and public indices, even those of the autonomous state administrative institutions, themselves. This is an abuse, alien to democratic practice, but one which allows the government to influence public and economic opinion itself under the conditions most desirable for its own purposes.

In view of this undeniable reality, wherein a politically weak government has before it an optimistic economic picture, what can the PCP do? It can do one of three things. or example, it can seek to bring it down, before benefit is derived from a gradual recognition of a good economic situation.

Or it can resign itself to the fact that this economic situation is favorable to political stabilization lasting beyond this economic oasis, which would entail accepting bipolarization.

Otherwise, no path remains except to attack bipolarization, maintaining the present chaotic political and party situation and emphasizing the dependence of Dr Cavaco Silva and his cabinet on General Eanes and the PRD.

Which of these three paths will be pursued by our fellow countrymen who are communists?

Bringing the Government Down

As to forcing the cabinet out by an effort headed by the PCP, this is a typically impossible scenario.

It could not be done with massive strikes, nor with the real strength which the PCP would like to have but does not have today, even with all its appeals for unity of the opposition parties.

Even if this CDS were to die of envy, resentment or inanity in the presence of this PSD, the communists and the conservatives together would not have strength enough to bring down the government. Apart from the fact that Dr Adriano Moreira, who already suffers from the misfortune of heading a party which does not know where it is nor what fatal curse has befallen it, would have great difficulty in explaining to the centrist militants in Alijo the reason for alignment with Dr Cunhal against Dr Cavaco Silva. Neither their similarity of age, nor memories of the past, nor the harmony of the shared experience of their many years could console these blessed ladies when they are faced with the first visible indication of the Apocalypse--Christ extending a hand to the devil.

Similarly, no immediate step toward censuring the government can be expected from the PRD, just at the moment when General Eanes needs Dr Cavaco Silva to help him get into the saddle of power with the democratic renewal faction.

There remains the PS, which has already stated clearly that this is not its scenario. It will not vote at this beginning of the legislative session for any motion to censure the government. Nor will it provoke such a move unnecessarily in connection with the state budget.

This cannot be the scenario favored by the PCP, then.

PCP Aversion to Bipolarization

A second possible scenario would be resignation on the part of the PCP to an inevitable, gradual, sad and complicating decline.

Only this scenario, which in all good conscience would be the best for Portugal and the Portuguese citizenry in general, is not that for the PCP.

Unless we were to see, after 3 or 4 years of economic calm, a realization by the PSD and the PS that the time has come to create a political system which will guarantee future stability, even in periods of recession or economic crisis.

This is why the Portuguese party system is moving toward bipolarization, a context in which the PSD and the PS are credible points of focus for governmental alternatives.

This requires new legislative elections prior to the constitutional revision, and also depends on that revision and the electoral system.

Now the PCP needs to block this scenario, whatever the cost. It needs to mount an attack, although subtly, on the new PS leadership, which has already made it clear it relies on bipolarization and a communist decline. It needs to keep the PSD hesitating as to whether bipolarization is good or bad. It needs to advance by dint of maintaining lack of definition and the fears of others. It needs to pray with full (agnostic) fervency that the other forces will continue to navigate within sight of the coast.

But bipolarization never, as this would be fatal to the PCP.

Drawing Cavaco into the Arms of Eanes

There remains a third path, which would involve everything remaining the same politically, to the point of returning again to a period of economic crisis.

There are 2 or 3 years during which, since it is not possible to bring the government down immediately, it would then be possible to erode it socially, while guaranteeing that it would be this parliament which would vote on the constitutional revision.

With this parliament, the revision might well be a contradictory and senseless patchwork quilt. More authority for the parliament and less for the government. A touchup here and a little glue there, with everything negotiated on the basis of the subtleties of the PCP added to the resentments of the CDS and the imponderable moods of the democratic renewal faction.

Nothing promising for or favorable to bipolarization here.

Meanwhile, the PCP knows that with this government which represents a minority and is therefore politically weak, with a PRD which needs the PSD in order to stand on tiptoe, but can give the PSD the life insurance needed for a few more months in government--with all of this disturbance, it is the party which is the winner.

In short, the PCP will play every possible card to prevent bipolarization, drawing Dr Cavaco Silva into the arms of General Eanes.

The greater the lack of definition, confusion or political error, the better. But watch out!

It is this strategy which must be soundly trounced.

It is necessary to know what those who talk so much about the need to defeat the PCP and its strategy are thinking and saying. Will these be only words or will they proceed to action?

Are they satisfied with an alibi or do they want to resolve the problem?

Will they retreat in flight or do they want to advance toward the future?

Are they merely protesting the political strikes or do they actually want us to have bipolarization?

Do they only want to proceed to manage and enjoy the economic manna, or have they courage enough to use it to create true political stability in Portugal?

Are they statesmen because they can wait (weeks, months or years and years) or are they statesmen because they measure up to the true dimensions of the state?

There are many of us opposed to the strategy of the PCP. Today. At least verbally.

It remains to be seen how many of us there will be at the moment of truth, when it comes time to say yes or no to bipolarization.

It will be beyond understanding and tolerance if people who have the standing and the conditions necessary to recreate Portugal politically were to run the risk of zealously trying to correct the economy while letting new central bloc methods flourish. This would be like treating the fever while ignoring the malignant growth.

And Dr Cunhal would be laughing. Even while losing, he has already seen many adversaries who were extremely useful to him being born, growing and dying politically. Some of them even claim to be anticommunist.

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POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

## DEVELOPMENTS AT PCP-PRD CONFERENCE REPORTED

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 26 Sep 86 p 3

[Text] Delegations representing the PCP and the PRD held the first meeting yesterday in a series of conferences with other parties scheduled for the next few weeks on the initiative of the communists. The purpose, according to Alvaro Cunhal, is to discuss the present political situation with "the democratic parties."

The secretary general of the PCP, who said that his party has invited the PS, the MDP/CDE, the "Greens," the UDP and the PSR to participate in meetings of this same type, said that he believes it is "fundamental at this time for all democrats to reach an understanding, in order to find a democratic solution to the serious problems of the country." Such a solution, he said, requires a "convergence" as an alternative to the present government.

Herminio Martinho, the head of the democratic renewal delegation, for his part, said at the conclusion of the meeting held in the national headquarters of the PCP, which lasted about 2 hours, that his party is available for dialogue with the other political forces, and that it was "natural" to accept the invitation from the PCP.

Martinho emphasized that "it is public knowledge" that there are "differences" between the two parties on the political proposal and program levels.

On this occasion, he reasserted the position adopted, to the effect that the present executive branch "has the legitimate right to govern," and that the PRD has granted it a period "of confidence" (which has not as yet expired). Moreover, he termed the conflict between the cabinet and the Assembly of the Republic "artificial," going on to say that the PRD "views with some concern" the fact that the executive branch is seeking "to challenge the opposition in every possible situation."

The president of the PRD, speaking about the budget and his statements to the effect that he foresees no "difficulties" in the parliament when it is debated, emphasized that his statements were misinterpreted, because, he said, his party has not as yet seen the document and therefore has made no statement on the subject.

In addition to the two party leaders, the meeting was attended by Carlos Costa and Carlos Brito (of the PCP) and Marques Junior, Jose Carlos Vasconcelos, Vasco Marques and Paulo Guedes Campos (of the PRD).

5157
CSO:3542/8

## BRIEFS

CAVACO SILVA'S POPULARITY--A popularity pole made available to the government in recent days will influence Cavaco Silva's strategy for the coming months (see p 5). The results show an increase in the prime minister's popularity, which is not matched by the popularity of the cabinet or the PSD. Cavaco Silva is running comfortably ahead of the executive branch and enjoys greater favor than the PSD. This fact led Cavaco Silva to abandon the possibility of a drastic change completely, and to choose to extend the government's period of action in an effort to raise the popularity level both of the government and party. On the other hand, Cavaco does not want to be blamed directly for creating the crisis, leaving this role to the opposition. This is also likely to be one of the weapons in his electoral campaign. [Text] [Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 20 Sep 86 p 64] 5157

CSO:3542/8

## DIPLOMATIC, TRADE RELATIONS WITH BLOC EXPANDED

Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 8 Aug 86 p 2

[Article by Pal Feher: "East of the Bosphorous." The socialist countries and Turkey.]

[Text] According to the mischief-makers this year, the pilots of Turkey's government airplanes can not go on their summer vacations. Even though the gossip did not prove true, but that much is fact that the specially trained personnel must always stand ready to in case of need fly the official delegations in any directions of the compass. On several occasions this summer the planes furnished with the half-moon markings were dispatched in Eastern and Northern directions. It can be seen that Turkish diplomacy is paying increasing attention to grooming the connections it maintains with the socialist countries. In June of this year, the president of the republic, Kenan Evren visited our country, then not much later the chief Turkish diplomat, Vahit Halefoglu went to Prague. Next month prime minister Turgut Ozel visited Bukarest. And the Turkish diplomatic yearbook to be issued at the end of the year will obviously treat last week in a special way. The head of Turkey's government made an official visit to Moscow, reciprocating Nikolai Tikhonov's 1984 Ankara visit.

Recent relationships between the two countries reach back over six decades. After the conclusion of World War I, the Leninist Soviet state extended significant military and economic aid to the young Turkish Republic fighting a life-or-death struggle. But this does not mean that with the passing of years there were not problems in the relationship of the two countries. The Soviet Union especially disapproved of Turkey's becoming a NATO member and permitting American bases to be established along the [Soviet-Turkish] common border. This is even more important since turkey is the only NATO country bordering on the Soviet Union. (Not counting Norway's very short common border with the Soviet Union above the Arctic Circle, in inclement climate.)

In spite of all these factors, the relationship between the two countries has improved recently, even if we cannot speak of a "breakthrough." The Soviet Union provided help to improve Turkey's nonferrous metallurgy and even though, figuratively speaking, cannons stare at each other along their border, the two countries are linked by high-tension cables through which the Soviet Union furnishes Turkey with electricity.

Even more significant is the agreement they signed two years ago. According to the contract, the gas pipeline the other end of which will be at a Soviet natural gas field, will in 1988 reach Turkey's European areas. According to plans, each year 6 billion cubic meters of natural gas will travel from North to South by the end of this decade. This is even more important to Turkey's industry because in Anatolia they can find practically every raw material except for the energy sources. Turkey will probably pay for the natural gas with agricultural and consumer goods.

[Key to Figure. 1. Turkey's East European Trade 2. Soviet Union. 3. Poland 4. gDR 5. Czechoslovakia 6. Hungary 7. Yugoslavia 8. Romania 9. Albania 10. Bulgaria 11. Turkey 12. Black Sea 13. Turkish export--import ($ million)]

Both parties emphasized their mutual interests during the now-concluded visits of the heads of governments. The toasts showed that in the future the Soviet Union and Turkey would like to realize more concrete ideas in the area of economic cooperation. That is also the purpose of the documents they signed, since they have decided to expand the political, scientific, cultural and sports ties.

These are necessary especially since in 1985 Turkey's trade with European socialist countries decreased significantly. With the exception of Hungary, Yugoslavia and Albania, a strong cutback was seen in Turkish purchases. As a consequence of this, imports decreased by over 30 percent, from $948 million to $652 million. This process appears close to being halted by Turkish diplomacy, and trade and industrial experts are turning in the direction of European socialist countries.

Naturally, not only economic problems were discussed at the recently concluded Moscow talks, in spite of the fact that reporters assigned to Ankara are of the opinion that Turgut Ozal places economic problems ahead of political ones. Among the latter, the emphasis was primarily on the Cyprus question. In January the Soviet Union sent a comprehensive settlement proposal to the interested parties. Ankara has rejected this already at the time, saying that withdrawal of the Turkish troops from the island country can take place only after certain preconditions. It can be considered as good news that even if no agreement was reached on the Cyprus question and on other international questions, this has not led to the deterioration of the relationship between the two countries.

They have recognized in Ankara that the situation currently existing in the country's environment is offering a great opportunity to Turkey. The relatively strong and growing industry, the large number of people in the armed forces and Turkey's strategic location offers the possibility for the one-time sick man of Europe to become a medium-range regional power. Its currently still weak economy is at the present time an obstacle to this. But over the long range, it is not impossible for Turkey to accept a more significant international role than before--since in the immediate neighborhood of the Near-Eastern conflict and of the Iraq-Iran war, it represents even now a certain role as a stabilizing factor and it is absolutely necessary for this to maintain good relations with the socialist countries.

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CSO: 2500/463

COUNTRY SAID HAVING PROBLEMS WITH NEIGHBORING NATIONS

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 26 Aug 86 pp 1, 13

[Text] Ankara--The latest developments produced by the chasing into Iraq of bandits infiltrating into Southeastern Turkey has led to new tensions in Turkey's relations with its neighbors which were not very good to begin with.

The attitude of Libya, Syria, and Iran, which perceive the actions that the Turkish Armed Forces have taken--within the framework of the "hot pursuit" rule and with the prior agreement of Iraq, against the bands that enter Turkish territory and engage in armed activities--as a move against ethnic minorities in other countries, has caused a chill wind to blow in their relations with Turkey.

It is reckoned that this was one of the questions discussed at the hurried visit that Syrian Presdient Hafiz Al-Assad paid to Libya for talks with Qadhdhafi.

Syrian Vice-President Abdulhalim Khaddam also went to Tehran 3 days ago and had talks on Turkish military activities on Iraqi territory. Iran's reaction to Turkey's military actions--expressed in the statement issued following this meeting and described to a certain extent as "rather belated"--is said to have been half-hearted and the result of pressure by Syria and groups close to the Kurdish brigands.

Turkey is using diplomatic venues to the maximum to allay our southern neighbors' concern over military action in Iraqi territory. A foreign Ministry statement said that the target of the military action was not the civilian population but solely the separatist bands and that norms of international law were not exceeded, and Minister of Trade Cahit Aral had a meeting with Colonel Qadhdhafi during his visit to Libya. Aral explained to Qahdhafi that the operation was directed not against any particular ethnic group but bandits.

In a separate effort, the Foreign Ministry has kept in touch with Iran to point out that the military intervention was not meant as assistance to Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war. The incident, nevertheless, proved an undesirable new factor for tension in Turkey's relations with its neighbors.

As for our long-standing chronic problems with our neighbors, they continue unresolved and unabated.

1. Problems With Greece

Turkey's tensest relations are with Greece. With Turkey's recent decision to apply to the EEC for full membership, this tension looks set to get worse. Being aware that the improvement of Turkey's relations with the EEC will greatly hamper its efforts to settle leading Turkish-Greek problems unilaterally in its favor, Greece is trying to keep Europe apart from Turkey as far as possible. As a result, it is constantly engaging in measures designed to increase tension. Thus, it is militarizing the Aegean Islands, claiming that Turkey covets these islands and, at the same time, it is implementing a warlike new defense strategy against Turkey, its NATO ally. On the diplomatic side of thir strategy, Greece is using the support of the Greek lobby in the United States to compel the Reagan Administration to go slow in its relations with Turkey. It is also trying to mobilize the Europeans against Turkey.

For some time past, Greece had exploited the issue of human rights in Turkey in international forums in Europe. As this weapon slowly lost its validity, Greece began to shift focus to the claim that "Turkey covets the Aegean and Cyprus." Within the framework of this strategy, and despite all calls by Turkey for talks, Greece is carefully keeping the Aegean issue alive as one of a sea beset by problems. The well-known problems of the Aegean are the continental shelf, the extent of territorial waters, the airspace, and the Flight Information Region [FIR]. Greece, trying to use the Civil Aviation Authority as a tool of its policy, remains persistent in its demand that the rota it has drawn up for the flight line must be adhered to.

Another problem which is certainly not conducive to an easy solution arises from the pressures exerted against the Turks in Western Thrace. The Greek Government is trying to gain control of the religious leadership of the Turkish minority in order to have a free hand to apply and carry out these pressures. The Turks of the minority are striving to resist these pressures.

2. Problems With Bulgaria

Efforts for the Bulgarization of the Turkish minority lead the list of the problems that have darkened Turkey's relations with Bulgaria in recent years. In the period prior to 1980, the problem between the two countries was the question of contraband in narcotics and weapons. But Bulgarian efforts to force Turks to change their names and to obliterate the Turkish entity in Bulgaria have caused a substantial shift in the direction of relations.

The uncouth behavior, ill-treatment, and heavy traffic fines meted out by Bulgarian authorities to Turkish workers in transit constitute a second unresolved problem.

3. Problems With The Soviet Union

Soviet indifference to the Bulgarian efforts to Bulgarize the Turks is the main point in the Soviet attitude that is disturbing Turkey. Turkey is upset by the fact that the Soviet Union, with over 100 ethnic communities on its territory, is overlooking its own Leninist principles to remain a passive bystander over what is going on in Bulgaria.

Another problem between the two countries is the implausible procrastinations of the Soviet Union regarding Turkish requests to discuss the FIR in the Black Sea.

The ban on turbot fishing in the Black Sea by a unilateral Soviet decision is also creating a problem between the two countries as it hits the livelihood of many Turkish fishermen. The Soviets are dragging their feet over Suleymanov, the Bulgarian Turk who has sought asylum at the Turkish Embassy in Moscow, thus leaving yet another disagreeable issue in suspense. Finally, Turkey takes a poor view of the Soviet efforts to acquire a capacity for diplomatic intervention in the Cyprus problem by moving it to an international platform.

4. Problems With Iran

Until recently, Iran and Turkey were going through a period where they had no unresolved problems. However, the reduction of Turkish-Iranian trade from $3 billion to $800 million due to the drop in oil prices has initiated a period of hesitancy in these relations. Coming on top of this, Iran's opposition to the Turkish military operations in Iraq creates the impression that things are moving towards a period beset with problems.

5. Problems With Iraq

The signing of a Turkish-Iraqi agreement allowing the pursuit of infiltrating separatist bands across the border has solved an important problem of border security between the two countries at governmental level. Nevertheless, it looks as if the economic problem between the two countries will get steadily worse. As a result of the reduction of its oil revenues and the allocation of all its resources to military expenditures, Iraq is unable to repay its $1 billion debt to Turkey.

6. Problems With Syria

The absence of a Turkish-Syrian agreement on border security and any "right of hot pursuit" agreement along the lines of the Turkish agreement with Iraq comprise one of the important problems awaiting a solution between the two countries. The guerrilla camps in Syria continue to constitute a threat to Turkey's security.

In view of Syria's known opposition to the Turkish military operations on Iraqi territory, the possibility of achieving similar border security agreement between Turkey and Syria is considered slim. Therefore, for the time being, the sole guarantee against acts against Turkey by separatist bands in Syria lies in the Syrian government keeping a tight rein on these bandits. However, the possibility that the Syrian government might lose control over them at any given time continues to keep this issue, one of the problematic issues between the two countries, a live one.

Another reason for keeping Turkey and Syria apart is the dream of the Syrian Head of State Haffz al-Assad concerning Hatay [the Turkish province that was part of Syria until 1938].

And finally, the dam building in South Eastern Anatolia has transformed Syria's need for water into one of the high-priority issues between the two countries.

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CSO 3554/11

SOCIAL FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

STUDY SAYS YOUNG WORKERS ARE GOAL-ORIENTED, INDEPENDENT

Frankfurt FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU in German 26 Aug 86 p 1

[Article by Jutta Roitsch: "Neither Upright Bourgois Nor Revolutionary Proletariat Frankfurt Research Group Identifies Change in Values for Young Skilled Workers and Female White Collar Workers in Industry"]

[Text] Frankfurt, August 25 Today's young "working elite," welleducated blue and white collar workers in large scale industry consider themselves to be neither the revolutionary "young guard of the proletariat," nor the upright and sober citizens who prize work and well-ordered family life above all things. According to a study by a Frankfurt research group, this young elite is more likely to have marked confidence in their own abilities, and a detached attitude to work and workplace. On the other hand, however, they also exhibit a strong need for solidarity and honesty. Upon examination, they have received no political or moral guidance from unions or religious communities. As a result, they are aware that they must plot their own course.

In a study sponsored by the Bonn Ministry for Youth and Family, the "Arbeitsgemeinschaft ausserschulische Bilfung e.V." [Working Group for Non-Academic Training] responsible for the project focussed its attention on the young skilled worker and the female white collar worker in large-scale industry. According to a summary of the results which has appeared, the "working elite" has received the short end of the stick in most youth studies. In addition, there is a "particular myth which centers around young workers. It is espoused not only by those holding the now-rare leftist position who want to view youth as the "young guard of the proletariat", but also by the concerned SPD works committee "that wishes to conclude its contract on the legacy of the organization with the next generation by hook or by crook by concluding it with the young workers." And this way of thinking is also true of the employers "who today look with hope to industry's youth as the flexible and functionally capable and qualified workers and professionals who are to carry through changes resulting frome technological progress." The project group restricted its study to youth from the Rhine-Main, Ruhr, and Stuttgart areas. They exhaustively questioned young men and women ages 17 through 29.

The young skilled workers' attitude towards work is sensible and to the point. A career is necessary in order to make money, to be financially independent of parents, and to be recognized and acknowledged in one's circle of family, friends, and colleagues. Most could not imagine a life without working. They know exactly

what they would do if they were to suddenly have a lot of money. Sixty percent of the youth said they would cut down on their work, and in their acquired free time they would study, become involved in more social activities, or devote their time to a hobby. According to the research group, all youth had a strong need for a meaningful and self-determined work. This need was reflected again in questions concerning work ethics and virtues. Industry, order, cleanliness, punctuality are virtues ascribed to their parents' generation. Young workers see these "virtues" more as a means of discipline. "If we have to fall in, then we also want to know why and be able to have a say in the matter," is a sentiment which almost half of the youth share. Their most important social and educational goals (even for their own children) are to be independent, to have one's own opinion, and to respect the opinions of others.

In those firms which as a rule enjoy a favorable public reputation, the young men and women sense a discrepancy between that which they have learned and what is actually demanded of them. The study reports that "these everyday experiences also lead to less identification with the career work." Skilled workers (men and women) feel that they are not challenged enough. They are highly confident of their abilities. This is expecially true of the women, although they are aware of the difficulties of combining career and family. According to their own statements, they are ready to assume direct responsibility and participation in company decisions. However, as representatives of these interests the unions remain a blank for the youth, although two-thirds of them are members. This alienation is said to be due to the lack of tradition in the family and neighborhood. However, it can also be explained by the comment that, "as a rule (young workers) do not join the union voluntarily."

Shaky and inconsistent are their attitudes toward private and public morals and violence. Solidarity, credibility and honesty are high priorities, but these values are dealt with in a very calculated manner. One typical statement is, "One must also be able to use honesty tactically, especially in the business world and at work." According to the interview, common sense and detachment determine their attitude to the state. The majority of the youth, however, had clear difficulties with questions concerning violence, strikes, company sit-ins, or blockades in drawing for themselves the line between legality or legitimacy.

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CSO: 3620/808

SOCIAL ITALY

## CENSIS REPORT FOR 1980-85 DEPICTS CHANGES

Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 25 Jul 86 p 5

[Article by Giampiero Martinotti]

[Text] The Italy of the eighties defies classification, labels, and the pigeonhole into which the sociologists would like to place it. An X-ray taken of the country yields a hazy picture, and even Giuseppe De Rita, the "big boss" of CENSIS [Socioeconomic Studies Center], has to surrender: Italy absorbs changes slowly and metabolizes them through processes which are not always clearly identifiable.

The consolidation and restructuring of enterprises, the boom in the financial markets, the crisis in party and union representation and the manifestation of corporate efforts, the vertical split between policy and society are all elements that accumulate one on top of the other, without an internal hierarchy, without a driving element.

But an unsettling fact emerges from the analysis by the philosopher of the "submerged": there is also another economy that hides from the statistics, that of the underworld. The crime industry has a volume of business consisting of between 75,000 and 100,000 billion lire, and an element within it that assumes a particular significance is the corruption in the public administration sector. Between 20,000 and 40,000 public and private officials and administrators are said to be involved in percentages, bribes, and fraudulent brokerage to the tune of 8,000-12,000 billion lire, a substantial sum.

And that's not all. The estimate regarding the volume of business of illegal activities, indicates CENSIS, does not include tax evasion, illegal activities in the construction sector, and black market labor, which would significantly increase the "total sales."

CENSIS has sought to put some of the transformations on record with a report titled "Mid-Decade: Reflections and Facts about Italy from 1980 to 1985." Explaining the book, De Rita indicated the reason for this initiative: "We are sick of debates about the seventies. Everything that could be said about that decade has been said. Instead, now we need some in-depth reflection on the eighties, which are beginning to have characteristics of their own."

1980, maintains De Rita, saw the beginning of the process of industrial restructuring, the explosion of the "financialization" of the system, and the beginning of a policy that is very different from the previous one. The current decade may be defined as a continuous mixture of changes: the system blends everything "like a cement mixer," says De Rita, thus coining a new term for his imaginary sociologist; the "input" is new: "Everything is relatively new, everything is relatively slow."

De Rita does not share the opinion of those who maintain that Italy is experiencing a second economic miracle. The financial investment "boom" represents only a recovery with respect to the slump of the past years: "It would be wonderful if we were having a second miracle, but this would be true if you only looked at the financialization, and not at the relationship between finances and the economy."

In the face of the changes taking place during the eighties, CENSIS seems almost disoriented. It is no longer possible to isolate a phenomenon in order to exemplify a trend; you can only coin so many slogans for as many changes." These are the years "of the great restructuring (for the businesses), of distributive capitalism (for the tertiary sector), of financialization (for the savings sector), of the search for a stable high mean (for consumption), of the neobourgeois (for social characteristics), and of the new corporations (for the categories)."

But above all, surprisingly, De Rita affirms that these are the years in which the great desire for "deregulation" will be behind us. After asking to be liberated from "nooses and snares," society is now asking for reliable and enduring rules, a sort of "re-regulation."

Today, says the report, there is a "demand for new standards, which, arising from the not-yet-exhausted social and economic vitalism, would govern the collective and political dimension and would allow a rational reorganization of the problems related to it."

In De Rita's view, social Italy and political Italy travel on different tracks, which are always increasingly unrelated to each other. The civil society goes forward on its own and the political society has given up trying to control it and give it direction.

In short, the Palace is increasingly isolated in its impregnable blockhouse; political activity is self-justifying and keeps its distance. For De Rita, not all is negative; on the contrary. There is a risk of "schizophrenia" between the political and the social, but Italian politics are changing their structure, are "simplifying."

The separation process--maintains CENSIS with a clear reference to Craxi--"has not occurred roughly, with that simplistic decision-making that we so envied in the governments of other Western countries during the beginning of the eighties."

## Family Income and Consumption

| 1 regione | 2 Reddito medio mensile per famiglia* | | | 3 Consumi medi mensili per famiglia* | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 1981 | 1984 | var. % 1981-84 | 1981 | 1984 | var. % 1981-84 |
| Piemonte | 1.658 | 1.610 | -2,9 | 1.556 | 1.350 | -13,2 |
| Valle D'Aosta | 1.703 | 1.606 | -5,7 | 1.528 | 1.343 | -12,1 |
| Lombardia | 1.926 | 1.966 | 2,1 | 1.681 | 1.682 | 0,1 |
| Liguria | 1.499 | 1.472 | -1,8 | 1.313 | 1.264 | -3,7 |
| Trentino | 1.818 | 1.773 | -2,5 | 1.487 | 1.530 | 2,9 |
| Veneto | 1.929 | 1.804 | -6,5 | 1.774 | 1.624 | -8,5 |
| Friuli V.G. | 1.750 | 1.677 | -4,2 | 1.697 | 1.640 | -3,3 |
| Emilia Romagna | 1.744 | 1.805 | 3,5 | 1.581 | 1.574 | -0,5 |
| Toscana | 1.678 | 1.696 | 1,1 | 1.549 | 1.440 | -7,0 |
| Umbria | 1.559 | 1.516 | -2,8 | 1.320 | 1.229 | -6,9 |
| Marche | 1.792 | 1.769 | -1,3 | 1.655 | 1.625 | -1,8 |
| Lazio | 1.636 | 1.677 | 2,5 | 1.541 | 1.478 | -4,1 |
| Abruzzo | 1.908 | 1.466 | -23,2 | 1.525 | 1.272 | -16,6 |
| Molise | 1.293 | 1.177 | -9,0 | 1.152 | 983 | -14,7 |
| Campania | 1.374 | 1.492 | 8,6 | 1.241 | 1.211 | -2,4 |
| Puglia | 1.354 | 1.367 | 1,0 | 1.197 | 1.162 | -2,9 |
| Basilicata | 1.321 | 1.395 | 5,6 | 1.222 | 1.134 | -7,2 |
| Calabria | 1.334 | 1.342 | 0,6 | 1.240 | 1.133 | -8,6 |
| Sicilia | 1.405 | 1.346 | -4,2 | 1.295 | 1.170 | -9,7 |
| Sardegna | 1.284 | 1.437 | 11,9 | 1.149 | 1.320 | 14,9 |
| Italia Italy | 1.644 | 1.641 | -0,2 | 1.487 | 1.417 | -4,7 |

*In migliaia di lire - FONTE: Elaborazione CENSIS su dati ISTAT. 4

Key:

1. Region
2. Average monthly income per family
3. Average monthly consumption per family
4. *in thousands of lire - Source: CENSIS processing of ISTAT data.

13318/7358
CSO: 3528/5

SOCIAL ITALY

'TRUCE' BETWEEN IRI, UNIONS DISCUSSED

Rome L'ESPRESSO in Italian 14 Sep 86 pp 180-183

[Article by Paola Pilati: "The Big Truce"]

[Text] Prof Romano Prodi, president of IRI [Industrial Reconstruction Institute], has truly earned Paradise. Or at least that earthly paradise dreamed of by entrepreneurs which is called labor peace. You want to sell Alfa Romeo to the foreign Ford company? The labor union is completely unruffled. You have to lay off employees in the construction or the steel industry? The union takes the blow with the sangfroid of an English gentlemen. And even goes so far as to reproach the factory workers in Genoa, Terni and Piombino, who had erupted into spontaneous protest demonstrations.

But how did Professor Prodi succeed in obtaining so much? Prodi's recipe is called a "Protocol of Understanding" and was initialed in mid-July by IRI and the unions. It is an honest-to-goodness code of behavior, a "code of etiquette" between those who manage the business and those who work in it, a set of regulations to see that the conflict of interests between the choices of industrial strategy and those of union policy is smoothed down.

One example: if the IRI decides on an important strategic agreement, like the one that will link Italtel and Telettra, it will not let the unions learn about it from the newspapers, but rather has the obligation of calling a meeting with them to inform them immediately after the official decision of the board of directors. Another case: the union is given updates on every significant phase of Ford's negotiations with Alfa. And the thorny questions of personnel cuts and comprehensive company restructuring are always addressed preventively between IRI and the secretariats of the CGIL [Italian General Confederation of Labor], CISL [Italian Confederation of Labor Unions] and UIL [Italian Union of Labor] within the permanent committee established by the protocol.

In appearance, it is merely a formal ceremony. In substance, it is the application of a brief rule: take time. Take time, first of all, when inviting the unions to sit at the same table; obtain another pause of approximately six days with the "cooling-down" procedures that must precede the call for a strike; reduce as much as possible even the possibility of litigation regarding the procedures of the Protocol itself through the establishment of a guaranty committee: instead of rushing before a judge, all family quarrels will be settled

first by a jury composed of nothing less than former presidents of the Constitutional court.

The system seems to function so well that by now the IRI Protocol has become, for the union especially, the ideal model for industrial relations. So much that the sister organization, ENI, is also thinking of adopting a similar one. "Thanks to the collaboration with the ranking trade unions we have succeeded in managing dramatic situations, such as that of the public chemical companies," says Guido Fantoni, vice president of ASAP (the labor association of the ENI companies), "and to resolve many problems, among which those in the textile industry. The only thing left now is to formalize the procedure with the three labor confederations." In short, labor conflict seems to have become a thing of the past, and harsh disputes, strikes and pickets, stuff to be forgotten. Negotiations are no longer conducted in front of the factory gates, but rather around the glass table of the "conference rooms."

But has the labor union really entered the room of the three-piece suits, when previously it remained at the door, hat in hand? "No, we are certainly not dealing with 'codetermination,'" maintains Fausto Bertinotti, secretary of the CGIL confederation, "which means collaboration of the union with the employer for a joint administration of the enterprise. This, if anything, is the "management of conflict": in exchange for information, the union makes a commitment to maintain peace in the factory." All the same, even if we are not really dealing with "Mitbestimmung," German-style codetermination, we are certainly dealing with something that is rather like it.

The evidence of the creation of a new climate between labor and the industrial organizations comes actually from the most unexpected source, Federmeccanica--the organization of companies from the mechanical sector--led by Felice Mortillaro, the most anti-labor of the employers' paladins. A survey conducted recently among the associated companies shows, in fact, that workplace relations now take place under the banner of the most complete collaboration. Nearly half of the companies polled regularly consult the factory council, and with optimum results: a reduction in absenteeism, a rise in productivity, greater individual yield. Another important indication of the normalization of the climate in the factories lies in the fact that the entrepreneurs, who until yesterday could not tolerate contractual demands at the company level, today accept them, and in 84 percent of cases, evaluate them positively.

"While we were arguing with Confindustria about the payment of decimals," explains Silvano Veronese, secretary of the UIL confederation, "or the representatives from the three labor confederations were not speaking to each other, the most advanced agreements in recent years were being signed at the factories." From this "spontaneous" unionism have arisen at least 3,500 contracts during the past year and a half, with the involvement of nearly two million workers. "It's been the season of a hundred flowers, a different reconquering of contractual space under the banner of 'coming to an agreement,'" says Berrtinotti, "but it has nothing to do with the plan for the policy of demands that the union must have. And yet, even without an explicit and orderly strategy, the ensemble of the company contracts contains elements of a true revolution. A few examples? Overtime, night work, and Sunday work are a few

of the taboos that have crumbled in the new agreements between the employers and the workers. And furthermore, production awards, salary allowances tied to productivity, or to the quality of the work performed." "And this has not happened only in the small companies, but also in the large factories that influence political opinion," announces Paolo Lucchesi, assistant general secretary of the Lombard CGIL: "Falck, Breda, Marelli, OM from the Fiat group, Pirelli; and also at IBM, Montedison and Mondadori." Currently slated to receive a part of the salary that is linked to the productivity indexes (nearly one third of the raises obtained by the company, that is, a figure between 20,000 and 30,000 lire a head) are the workers at Pirelli, SNIA and also those of Carlo Erba.

At Marzotto, the company contract signed last spring provides that half of the monthly raise of 50,000 lire be tied to productivity. If a certain production index is reached, 20,000 lire will be received for each point above it. Otherwise, the same figure will be docked. One of the most advanced cases is FIAR, a company of the Ericsson group: the employees have accepted that next year's salary increases be decided on the basis of the total sales and the net income received in 1986.

In the area of the work schedules and of the workers' willingness to adapt to them, the company contracts have also taken giant steps forward. Let's take one of the bitterest disputes of these recent months, that at Standa, where Montedison decided to cut 3,000 jobs. "We found a solution acknowledging the company's right to ask for different work schedules according to the necessities of business, or even to close some shops in order to open elsewhere," says Domenico Trucchi, the CISL secretary, who followed the negotiations. "So, we sell until midnight in tourist places, and we're all open on Saturday 16 August." At FIAT, along with the agreement for the reentry of the last unemployed, Cesare Romiti obtained a third shift at the Rivalta establishment: in practice, a night shift during which--violating the last prohibition, that of night work by women--the female workers will also be employed.

But will this new climate help to defuse the tension of the negotiations for the renewal of the large, important contracts, which are scheduled for this fall? Among the most important platforms, together with the requests for raises of approximately 100,000-150,000 lire, the so-called right to know is very important. The unions would like, therefore, to see the private industrialists take specific steps towards the concessions of the famous Prodi Protocol. But this is a subject that Confindustria is not willing to discuss. "SASIB, Carlo de Benedetti's company near Bologna, has renounced the cooling-down procedures for strikes as well as refused us the right to participate in company decisions," says Francesco Garibaldo, general secretary of FIOM [Federation of Employees in Metallurgical Industries] in Emilia-Romagna.

And even though there may be some shadows in the relationships along the periphery, at the center the positions are decidedly more rigid: "What works for IRI, which has a system of large-scale companies, does not work for us, where 80 percent of our members have no more than 30 employees," argues Paolo Annibaldi, general manager of Confindustria. "And besides the models for labor relations cannot be modified with each contract: and those that exist now are already at the most advanced stage possible."

The industrial front line, therefore, has been drawn. And in order to guarantee respect from the orthodoxy, this year the negotiating table will be attended by an "observer" sent by the glass building at EUR. A sort of political commissioner whose signature will be indispensable to close the contracts. And the season of "1 hundred flowers" runs the danger of withering up into an icy fall.

## Six Million To Expire

These are all the categories of the private sector workers who will be affected by the forthcoming contractual renewals. From industry to agriculture to the service industry, there are almost 6 million of them, and many have been waiting for over a year.

| | SECTORS | NUMBER OF WORKERS CONCERNED |
|---|---|---|
| AGRICULTURE | | |
| | Agriculture | 900,000 |
| INDUSTRY | | |
| | Monopolies | 15,000 |
| | Ceramics | 55,000 |
| | Paper | 75,000 |
| | Shoes | 130,000 |
| | Chemical | 200,000 |
| | Oil | 20,000 |
| | Mechanical | 1,200,000 |
| | Cement | 40,000 |
| | Construction | 1,000,000 |
| | Timber | 320,000 |
| | Glass | 50,000 |
| | Textiles | 840,000 |
| | Various manufacturing | 15,000 |
| | Fur and leather | 50,000 |
| | Toys | 140,000 |
| | Umbrellas | 25,000 |
| | Foodstuffs | 340,000 |
| | Mining | 40,000 |
| SERVICES | | |
| | Transportation and telecommunications | 400,000 |
| | Trade | 800,000 |
| | Credit and insurance | 300,000 |
| | Various services | 400,000 |

[Boxed insert, p 182]

And Benvenuto Is Waiting for a Law

Giorgio Benvenuto, general secretary of UIL, is the most enthusiastic supporter of a radical change in industrial relations towards a sort of "Italian-style codetermination." Is this an objective which will already be achieved with the forthcoming contracts?

[Answer] "I prefer to talk about "joint decisionmaking": that is, a system in which the union has the right to express an obligatory--although not binding--opinion about the company decisions. Even though Confindustria is prejudiced against it, many companies already practice a collaboration of this sort with the local union."

[Question] The "periphery" is usually more advanced than the center: this is true not only for Confindustria, but also for you...

[Answer] It's true: if the economy is going well, the employers open their purse-strings. The workers aren't dead set against mobility in the rigid defense of the workplace: the days are past when if your proposed working on Saturdays they would beat you up. Nowadays there is a large number of workers that espouse an advanced unionism, who have obtained more innovative company contracts. When ISTAT announces a 10-percent raise in salaries, it is demonstrating precisely the world of company salaries and production awards."

[Question] To what extent will these experiences remain at the time of the forthcoming national contracts?

[Answer] If the old protesting spirit of the union were to become strong again, it would be ruinous. With the salary requests in the platforms even a single day of striking could cost the workers much. But also the industrialists, because it would cause the spirit of collaboration that has begun to collapse.

[Question] According to you, the means to future industrial relations will be under the banner of the "IRI Protocol?"

[Answer] Yes, and I am of the opinion that the protocol between IRI and the union for the right to know should be made into a law. Today, participation in innovation, in the transformation of the workplaces strengthens the union more than an iron fist when dealing with the employers: when you know what the situation is you are in a better position to defend the worker."

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CSO: 3528/5

ECONOMIC ITALY

# ITALIIMPIANTI SETS TECHNOLOGICAL, DIVERSIFICATION OBJECTIVES

Milan LA METALLURGIA ITALIANA in English Nos 7-8 Jul-Aug 86 pp 568-569

[Article by N. Mignogna]

[Summary] The continuous and rapid evolution of industrial plants and the slack demand in the plant market, which fortunately has been mitigated in recent months by comforting signs of a pick up, require companies like Italimpianti, which operate with a clear entrepreneurial philosophy, to be careful and direct resources toward two aspects of business management: technological innovation and diversification.

In this connection, Italimpianti's strategy is carried out through a series of technical, commercial, financial and organizational measures which involve employees, instruments, methods, and structures.

The channels needed to successfully meet the various stages of the innovative process are:

-integration of knowledge and abilities available in the companies of the plant engineering and construction group, of which Italimpianti is the sector leader, and in the production, manufacturing and research companies belonging to the IRI group;

-stipulation of agreements for technology-based alliances or licenses with firms holding advanced technologies which are recognized as fully valid and successful;

-acquisition of production trademarks;

-acquisition of shares in companies which already have a footing in special market fields;

-research and development activities aiming at obtaining technical innovations, improving technological property and work methods, and insuring the independence of the company in key sectors.

With regard to iron and steel technologies, these are now marked by a flurry of initiatives and projects aimed at achieving qualitative and economical objectives through the following measures:

-improvement of product characteristics;

-development of new products with higher and more qualifying properties;

-reduction in investment and production costs;

-improvement of working conditions.

A summary of Italimpianti's current innovative programs and recent achievements is given below. In the iron and steel field:

-the establishment of continuous iron prerefining techniques at the blast furnace cast house for subsequent use of hot metal in oxygen converters for high-purity steel production;

-studies are in progress on alternative plant and process systems for the production of iron with a limited use of coke and sinter, and for the production of steel with reduction of hot metal percentage in the converter charge;

-research and experiments are now in progress aiming at improving the quality of continuously cast semifinished products in order to reduce surface conditioning work;

-construction in an Italian steelmaking plant of a prototype of the scrap preheating system;

-moving to the industrial phase of research on direct current supply to the electric arc furnace;

-definition of rolling and post-rolling methods of steels at controlled temperature;

-research work on a large pilot plant, installed at the Metallurgical Experimental Center in Rome, with the purpose of improving new processes for the treatment and coating of steel sheet, mainly intended for the automotive industry, with high corrosion resistance and high workability characteristics;

-studies are under way on compaction and rationalization of production cycles by means of a close connection between two or more phases of the iron and steel process, and with the aid of operation continuity, more advanced automation, adoption of processes requiring reduced capital, energy and labor;

-use of alternative fuels in the form of high density coal-water and coal-tar slurries, aiming at the reduction in the consumption of fuel oil and natural gas;

-adoption of process automation and control systems, with advanced and original features on steel plant units, particularly on reheating and heat treatment furnaces and on oxygen steel-making shops.

With regard to production diversification:

-stepping into the market of incinerating plants and, more generally, of the municipal and industrial solid waste treatment and disposal plants;

-engineering and construction is now in progress of a pilot plant for the incineration of municipal solid waste according to a process using the fluidized bed technology;

-in the carbochemical sector (setting-up of the project of a tunnel furnace for the baking of anodes to be used in the electrolytic process of aluminium production), and in the nonferrous metallurgy sector (studies for the passage from pilot plant to industrial prototype of an innovative system for the production of titanium through the electrolytic process);

-studies for original solutions in the engineering and construction field of territory and port plants.

The validity of Italimpianti's strategy in technological innovation and production diversification has been confirmed by recent successful results. The following are the most significant achievements involving the delivery of turnkey plants:

-centralized computer system for the production, maintenance and management control of the Misurata, Libya steel works, with related data processing center;

-electrogalvanizing line with advanced features, to be installed in the LAF Works at Turin for the production of galvanized steel sheets for use in the automotive industry;

-steel complex at Voljski, USSR, for the production of seamless tubes to be used in the research and exploitation of energy sources (oil and natural gas);

-desalination plants of the multiflash process type and, recently, of the reverse osmosis process type, in Middle Eastern countries;

-food processing plants at Vladicin Han, Yugoslavia, and at Avellino, Italy;

-municipal solid waste incinerating plant, with energy recovery, for the city of Bergamo, Italy;

-port works for the first stage of the new port of Genoa-Voltri, Italy;

-water and fume treatment and cleaning plants in Italy and West Germany.

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ECONOMIC NETHERLANDS

## ECONOMIST VIEWS PROPOSED BUDGET FOR 1987

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 16 Sep 86 p 9

[Article by J. M. M. Ritzen, professor of public sector economics at the Erasmus University: "A Reasonably Balanced Budget"]

[Text] The 1987 budget has its roots in the 1986 policy agreement within the governing coalition. The main lines of that policy agreement's financial and economic policy can be summed up as follows:

The government deficit must be further reduced by reducing spending by 10.7 billion guilders net (compared to the Multi-year Estimates), and by increasing revenues by 3.8 billion (through additional tax measures), for a total of 14.5 billion guilders in deficit-reducing measures (not counting the effects of sales of additional natural gas and state-owned shares in companies as well as the effects of the fight against fraud).

These measures are, to be sure, more extensive than those presented in the 1986 Central Economic Plan and in the programs of the three main political parties but this difference can be ascribed mainly to the date at which these packages were drawn up. The three main political parties presented their programs before it became known that the great fall in petroleum prices would reduce 1987 natural gas profits by 12.6 billion guilders, while the 1986 Central Economic Plan took that only partly into account.

The 1987 budget outlines the schedule for the deficit-reducing measures provided for in the policy agreement. The main effort falls in 1987: 8.7 billion; after that only lesser sums remain for subsequent years: 2.7, 2.3, and 0.8 billion for 1988, 1989, and 1990 respectively (amounts exclusive of the fight against fraud and the sale of state-owned shares and additional gas).

The 1983 policy agreement's emphasis on cuts in the first year had to be interpreted mainly as a rather unattractive result of the political cycle (in which cabinets in their last year of government once again seek to entice voters). This time there is a sound economic reason for the same thing, namely the fact that in 1987 natural gas profits will fall so steeply.

## Small Step Further

The 1987 budget goes a small step further than the policy agreement in regard to deficit-reducing measures, because otherwise the deficit would go over 8 percent of net national income. The planned measures are supposed to reduce the deficit by 9.8 billion guilders, i.e. 1.1 billion more than provided for in the policy agreement. Given the fairly reasonable rate of economic growth, this package cannot be described as exorbitant.

It is not entirely clear whether this more moderate rate of deficit reduction (compared to the previous 4 years) is the result of a change in political preferences or of a change in what is politically feasible under altered circumstances. This is because it would be extremely difficult to make larger cuts. Because of the change from inflation to deflation and the low nominal pay increases that go with that, freezing public assistance payments and the pay of civil servants and trend-followers will not result in large gains. The cabinet probably feels that the losses it would suffer among its own supporters if it reduced these incomes nominally would be too large compared to the gains.

Too, the fact that it turns out to be harder and harder to make cuts in government spending probably played a role in the choice of how much to cut. Among the things that suggest this are the very many indications that the "reconsideration procedure" is coming to a standstill. The latest of these indications is the fact that the 1987 budget notes that, alas, the results of the reconsideration procedure in the 1986 budget are still not ready and will be sent to the Second Chamber later.

## Breath of Fresh Air

The 1987 budget is a breath of fresh air compared to those of the recent past. The line of argument is taut and the number of slogan-mongering comments has fallen considerably. More than in past years, the discussion is supported by arguments.

It is striking that in the budget, just as in the 1986 Central Economic Plan, there is no mention of the dangers which deflation presents to the collective sector and to the economy in general. The fear of inflation is obviously still so strong that we are prepared to tolerate an equally great evil (but one with other consequences).

Some criticized the size of the cuts in the 1983 and 1984 budgets, with good reason. Precisely during a recession, they said, an attempt to reduce the deficit by a considerable amount can so hobble the economy that the actual reduction in the deficit will be less than expected. In retrospect many elements of this argument turn out to have been correct: investments fell in that period, private consumption dropped, and real government revenues stagnated or fell. Without aid from the international economic situation, the Netherlands would have faced very hard times.

However, for the present period of reasonable growth, the principle of counter-cyclical policy requires that a high priority be given to reducing the deficit. There are the familiar arguments:

--The deficit can lead to "crowding out"; that is certainly true now that investments are attractive again.

--The deficit increases the national debt; interest payments increasingly crowd out other government expenditures; moreover, they shift to the future the cost of our present enjoyment of the things government provides.

Against this background, the 1987 budget made a balanced choice regarding deficit reduction: given these cuts, the "Macro-Economische Verkenning" (MEV) [Macroeconomic Survey] still estimates growth in real disposible income at around 3 percent in 1987.

Excise Tax

Too, the distribution of deficit-reducing measures between taxes and cuts is much more balanced than in the past. In the past the emphasis was on cuts, while deficit reduction is now more spread out over various measures. It is plausible to assume that the negative effect on the economy of a small number of nonmarginal changes (production and employment) is greater than that of a larger number of marginal changes (which produce the same sum). With small changes firms can still adjust on the basis of existing products and production technologies, while with larger changes there are high adjustment costs, because it is necessary to shift over to new technologies.

So too can households adjust to small changes within their existing working or spending patterns, whereas larger changes force them to go beyond those (with resulting delays in taking effect). In this connection the additional excise tax on petroleum is a wise choice, since it works to stabilize prices.

The present distribution of deficit-reducing measures (with more attention to taxes) also has fewer negative effects on income distribution.

The result of this distribution of deficit-reducing measures, however, is that the tax burden remains high. Looking at the microeconomic effects, one might well say that it is too high, bearing in mind that we are moving toward a situation of full employment in parts of the labor market. After all, it is precisely in such a situation that taxes affect the labor supply in such a way as to lead to less than maximum production. And given the profitability of fraud/evasion/avoidance, one can say that the tax burden is too high. In the end it will be desirable to make some adjustments to parts of the tax system.

In order to prevent new American tax legislation from causing American firms to transfer their profits from the Netherlands to the United States, it will be necessary to reduce the corporate tax rate for these firms in any case. In order to reduce the deficit after 1990 and to reduce the tax burden, we see that it will be necessary to have a cautious policy on government spending until far into the 1990's.

Degradation

The ideological tone is considerably reduced in the 1987 budget compared to previous years. Only occasionally is there mention of "runaway government spending" or "burdens being pushed off on to the government." That is only reasonable because the cabinet lives in a glass house itself. Even the 1986 budget made it clear in table 5.2.1 how poor national spending discipline was.

The 1987 budget further calculates that in the period 1983-1986 there was a good 13.5 billion guilders in "policy intensifications" (6 billion) and "exogenous changes" (7.5 billion) that were not accounted for in advance in the budgets or were due to the growth in interest payments, unemployment spending, growth expressed in multi-year figures, or inflation. This was balanced by a total of 7 billion guilders of extra cuts in government spending, of which an estimated 5.5-6.0 billion was in the national budget (compared to total cuts in the national budget of 24.5 billion over this period).

One might in all seriousness ask whether each additional expenditure should not have to undergo the same examination as existing spending undergoes in the reconsideration procedure.

It is hard to escape the feeling that the policy intensifications in particular are the result of a "public choice" process in which the minister of finance and later the prime minister are confronted by 14 ministers, all representing their own interests, all wanting to do something nice for people, especially since they are after all so burdened by unpopular cuts. If this impression is correct, then there is no rationality in determining government spending. If this process continues, the government sector will continue to be under pressure to reduce the deficit longer than it needs to be. And at the same time the budget will not be what it was always planned to be: a framework in which to consider and judge proposed financial and economic policy.

The coalition's policy agreement talks tough with the intention of counteracting this degradation of the budgetary process. So too does the 1987 budget, which also claims to want to try to elucidate the multi-year figures horizontally and vertically. Horizontally and vertically means explaining the multi-year figures [sic]. One can note the background of these figures in demography, for instance, expected economic growth, or policy assumptions. Vertical explanation means giving the reasons why the actual figures vary from the multi-year figures. These causes then can always be interpreted in terms of the background of the multi-year figures.

This kind of elucidation is an improvement. It will make it easier to monitor results afterwards and may well have a preventive effect in advance. Despite this, one may suppose that without structural changes in the decision-making process within the cabinet, budgetary discipline will be extremely weak for the coming years. Structural change in decision-making might consist of an extra level (an inner cabinet, for instance) to strengthen the minister of finance's position on the question of maintaining budgetary discipline.

De-Levelling

Since the Second World War there has been a considerable reduction in the differences among incomes. A small part of this development was due to a reduction in the differences among gross salaries. For the most part income distribution became less unequal because of the progressivity of the income tax and especially because of public assistance payments.

Around 1983 this development came to an abrupt end. Although we do not yet have available the statistical data necessary to form a complete picture of what is happening to income distribution, it is clear that there has been a de-levelling, mainly through the reduction in public assistance payments in real terms (cf. the "Sociaal en Cultureel Rapport 1986"). For 1986 the "Macro-Economische Verkenning" foresees an increase in real disposable income of 2.5 percent for the modal worker, while the poorest will lag behind with 1.0-1.5 percent (not counting the purchasing power supplement for the very poorest). In 1987, too, improvements in purchasing power will vary (up 2.5 percent for the modal worker, compared to 1.5-2.0 percent for the poorest).

Another indication of increased inequality in incomes is the comment in the "Macro-Economische Verkenning" that the biggest increase in private consumption will be in spending with a relatively high income-elasticity (particularly durable consumer goods and tourism).

Differences

Given the present level of public assistance payments, this further income de-levelling cannot be due, or can be only slightly due, to people's (un)willingness to work. For most categories of public assistance recipients, the difference between public assistance and pay from work is too great for that. Furthermore, for a number of categories (particularly the General Old Age Act, the largest sector of the social security system in guilder terms) one would hardly expect the willingness to work to have any effect. At the same time it is clear that the willingness to work is affected not by general income-reducing measures, but by specific structural measures.

Not only has income inequality increased, but inequality in the distribution of wealth has increased in recent years too (this is based on the data from the wealth tax), with a consequent long-term increase in the possibility of deriving income from capital.

For a government that strives in its socio-economic policy to help attain an acceptable distribution of income, it would be desirable to avoid a de-levelling like the one that is now continuing.

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ECONOMIC SPAIN

## DIFFICULTIES FORESEEN IN ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT SECTOR

Madrid MERCADO in Spanish 10 Oct 86 pp 43-44

[Text] If at first you don't succeed... The reconversion of the electronic equipment sector, which has been pushed and prodded along, now has a clear content. The ultimatum has been issued, and the resolution will be a decisive one. "The situation won't go on like this anymore!" If the administration refuses, CONELEC will be the first company to stop payments before the end of this year. On 30 September the majority group in this sector, composed of CENEMESA, CONELEC, and CADEMASA, submitted a new plan to the director general of the steel and metalworking industries, Jose Sanchez Junco. This plan, prepared by SOFEMASA, attempts to improve upon the latest plan which had been submitted and rejected, the McKinsey plan. Now it is time for the head of the ministry of industry, Luis Carlos Croissier, to make the decision.

The negotiations are ready now. The 1987-1990 4-year plan prepared by SOFEMASA contains clear economic, labor, and industrial measures. The economic measures call for new investments, a freeze on the debts of the companies in this sector to improve their financial health, and the creation of a Job Promotion Fund. The investments required amount to 4.9 billion pesetas, basically for the modernization of production equipment. The plan calls for freezing the 15-billion peseta debt contracted with Social Security and Finance, with payments on this debt to begin in 1990. Establishing the Job Promotion Fund would require 15.2 billion pesetas in aid from the government.

### First Response

The 2,230 surplus workers from these three enterprises who might be laid off would be covered by this fund. The plan's industrial measures call for concentration in production units, the closing and creation of new centers in each of the subsectors: generation, transformation, traction, and rigging equipment. The subsector of motors would remain outside this strategic framework, as "its complexity makes it hard to encompass within this structure," said a CENEMESA spokesman.

The study was done on behalf of the major companies in this sector—CENEMESA, CONELEC, and CADEMESA--and it is "a response to the administration's statement that it wants to consider reconversion." On 12 March of this year the government called for proposals from "a group of companies which would present some clear industrial objectives." This step was taken last July when CENEMESA, formerly Westinghouse Espana, was created with 30 percent of the capital of CONELEC, formerly General Electric Espanola. No additional shares were needed to exercise management control. Moreover, CENEMESA holds 100 percent of CADEMESA, the former Spanish subsidiary of Brown Bovery. Thus, the strongest group in the sector was created with minimal competition. It now dominates the generation subsector; in traction it competes with Maquinista Terrestre y Maritima of INI [National Institute of Industry]; in transformers, it shares the market with some medium and small-sized firms, and in rigging equipment, it competes with the moribund Isodel.

No to Interest Payments

The expected 2,230-job surplus calls for a reduction by almost half of the total workforce--5,000 workers--of this business group. The alternative proposal presented is the creation of a Job Promotion Fund. This fund would disappear at the end of the 4 years covered by this plan, upon coverage of any losses which occur and through new hiring programs. Experts in this sector feel that "the demand for electrical equipment will revive within 3 years and other production lines may then be opened up." But it will be the administration which has to take over this surplus pool of workers. This will mean paying 3.8 billion pesetas a year, for a total aid package of 15.2 billion pesetas.

Furthermore, the plan proposes to freeze these companies' current debts, calculated at 15 billion pesetas, 12 billion of which are exclusively CONELEC's debts. Payment on this debt would then begin starting in 1990: the 7.8 billion owed to Social Security; 5 billion to Finance; and 2.2 billion to the Industrial Credit Bank. As a counterpart for this nonpayment of interest on the debt, the three companies would pledge to make themselves responsible for their obligations to Social Security and to the treasury, starting from the first year, if the plan is put into effect.

Industrial Measures

The investments scheduled for the business group are listed at 4.9 billion pesetas for the 4-year period and are designed to improve quality, to introduce digitally-controlled machines and tools, and to modernize production equipment and computer-aided-design systems. Starting in 1988, the year after the plan goes into effect, CENEMESA, CONELEC, and CADEMESA should be generating a surplus balance of 2 billion pesetas, which will be used "to pay part of the debt." The group's sales during the next 3 years are expected to range between 22 and 24 billion pesetas.

The industrial measures advocated are specific to each subsector. In the generation subsector, production would be concentrated at CADEMESA's Sabadell centers and at CONELEC's Galindo center. This would imply closing the CENEMESA facility in Erandio. In transformation, CONELEC and CENEMESA would abandon their production of small transformers--less than 10 megawatts. To meet the demand for equipment under 10 mva, the plan calls for establishing two groups: one in the Basque territory, formed by INCOESA, OASA, and ALKARGO, and another in Zaragoza, using the firm DIESTRE.

A Solution for ISODEL?

For the traction subsector, a combination of the CENEMESA and CONELEC facilities has been proposed, leaving some plants in the Basque territory--presumably in Galindo--which would handle control equipment, and another facility in Reinosa, where the entire production of traction motors would be concentrated. In the rigging equipment subsector, CENEMESA's Cordoba plant would handle high voltage equipment, and medium voltage equipment "would be reserved, in principle, for ISODEL, because we think ISODEL should survive," said one of the plan's instigators.

Some Uncertainty

But Banesto is in control at ISODEL. Directly or indirectly, it is the majority stockholder. This company's deficit is 13 billion pesetas, and Lopez de Letona, according to UGT [General Union of Workers], sources, "has no intention whatsoever of saving the company; he would rather let it die a natural death." Now there is a proposal that both Banesto and the UGT will have to consider. The UGT has already prepared its own industrial plan, and it has stated: "We will accept no action which is not our own, nor one which would mean the company's natural death."

If neither this plan nor another alternative is put into effect, "the government knows that these companies may gradually disappear. To start with, 2,400 CONELEC workers could be taken off the payroll before the end of the year... but, maybe, it would like the sector to disappear," said some sources close to CENEMESA. Croissier's answer "may range from 'that is fantastic' to 'it's unfinanceable'." The same sources expressed some feelings of pessimism: "The problem will only be solved halfway, because there isn't any money, and over 5,000 workers' jobs are at stake." The last word will be up to Croissier.

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MILITARY

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

RADAR MODEL PROPOSED FOR EFA

Rome INTERARMA in Italian 10 Sep 86 p 460

[Unattributed report: "European Radar for EFA"]

[Text] The photograph shows the engineering model of ECR90 (European Collaborative Radar 90) offered by Ferranti (Great Britain), FIAR (Italy), and INISEL (Spain) for use in the future European fighter aircraft.

The phase of definition is already well advanced; meanwhile, the German member of the industrial consortium remains to be named (AEG--INTERARMA recalls--chose to enter the competing consortium, together with the American Hughes). Each company--and respective nation--will participate in the joint development project and acquire the capacity to produce the complete system at its own expense and provide for maintenance of the system, with full access to all the pertinent technologies both for export purposes and for applications to future programs. The contributions of the current partners in the area of technology are based on important expertise: Ferranti is refining its "Blue Vixen" radar, modernizing the "Sea Harrier" with pulse-Doppler radar derived from the first truly multimodal "Blue Falcon"; FIAR--the leading company in Italy for avionic radars--has developed the pulse-Doppler technology for its own "Grifo," in addition to having developed "Altair"; and INISEL has produced the experimental automatic systems for the radar of the Spanish EF-18 "Hornet."



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MILITARY ITALY

PROPOSAL TO ABOLISH MANDATORY MILITARY SERVICE OPPOSED

Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 28 Aug 86 p 4

[Article by Vittorio Mimmi: "Give the Professionals a Chance"]

[Text] Welcomed only by the neo-fascist MSI "This is an argument we have single-handedly put forward for years,") Socialist spokesman Balzamo's motion to abolish the draft and start building a volunteer army seems destined to go nowhere. The firefight over "nonnismo" (refusal to register for military service), over draft exemption, and over the use of draftees has, even so, won support from all political parties for the argument that changes must be made somewhere in the structure and operations of the military service.

Among those who find the argument persuasive is perhaps the most knowledgeable political expert on military matters, Giulio Andreotti, who served six times as defense minister. "Spadolini was absolutely right," wrote the foreign minister in his "Notebooks" column in EUROPEO, "when he brushed aside speculations, but at the same time admitted that a good many improvements can and must be made. Not, he made it clear, just to break with tradition, but simply to recognize the fact that times are changing." What sort of reforms does Andreotti have in mind? "Restructuring the barracks and procedures, so as to give young men the kind of training and experience that will serve them well in civilian life" and "a gradual shift toward building a military force made up of long-term enlistees."

The biggest problem, argues Andreotti, consists "in making sure that the conscription period helps the draftee to learn or advance in a trade, to study languages, to participate reasonably in sports and to learn appropriate attitudes toward sports, and so on." The fact is that today "there are a lot of idle hours in all but a few exceptional cases," and "the soldier sometimes gets the feeling that he is wasting a precious year while his peers, who have wangled exemptions on one pretext or another, are already on the way to lifetime careers in the professions. Endemic boredom and pervasive doubts as to the fairness of compensation in service to one's country are two sore points on which challenges, protests, special pleading, and favoritism thrive."

The Christian Democrat minister recalled what happened to him more than 40 years ago when, rejected for officers' candidate school because of a a weak chest, he was assigned as a private to the college of forensic medicine, and put to work there on the legal aspects of service-connected disabilities.

"I was delighted and grateful: the only thing I found wrong with it was having to wear a uniform and being required to perform a whole string of pointless tasks at the barracks (from which obligations Lt Gen Dr Alfredo Bucciante was exempt)."

Yet another cabinet member, Interior Minister Oscar Luigi Scalfaro, cited his own first-hand experience in the infantry—to contest Balzamo's proposal: "What has always been called the "lousy, stinking Army" has done a lot for me, at both the educational and the spiritual levels."

Scalfaro also holds that it is wrong to grant requests that draftees be permitted to serve their time in the military close to home,"still tied to mama's apron-strings." "It is one thing to criticize the notion that because a young fellow lives in Cuneo he ought to be sent to Siracusa for his stint in the military—he says— but quite another to be asked, as I have been asked, to intercede so that a young recruit be transfered from one barracks to another in the same city solely because the latter is closer to his family's house."

Another no to Balsamo came from recently appointed Justice Minister Rognoni. "I cannot go along with his proposal,"said the DC spokesman, because the present situation, no matter how you look at it, is preferable to any other, and affords the maximum assurance of democratic treatment."

The list of those opposed lengthens daily. In the view of Senator Franza (PSDI), who chairs the Defense Commission at Palazzo Madama, "in this phase we dare not stray from the dictates of the constitution," (which calls for obligatory military service). Left-wing Independent Eliseo Milani styled the Socialist deputy's proposal "a dangerous passel of foolishness that would inevitably spawn a policy aimed at implementing an international police operation that has nothing whatsoever to do with national defense."

As Liberal spokesman Battistuzzi put it, "Doing that would add to the constitutional difficulties the threat inherent in a completely professional army."

Squaring off against each other, of course, are the youthful contingents of the PCI and MSI. The PCCI denounced Balzamo's outburst as "absurd and and grave," because "there is no need now for an army of Green Berets; what we need is a complete rethinking of the whole concept of military service. The Youth Front, though, finds it "an extremely encouraging sign that the

whole issue of a volunteer army on a professional footing has become a subject for debate."

While this was going on, yet another proposal came from DC Senator Saverio D'Amelio, who asked for "more vigorous action that cannot be confined to the proposals, laudable though they may be, for modernizing the barracks." "What I think, though," said D'Amelio, "is that, without prejudice to open debate, with no holds barred, we must at least start thinking now about cutting back on our draft contingents, of regionalizing the military services, about recruiting young men for civilian service and in civil protection, once they have completed the short period (2 to 3 months at most) of military training and competence in the use of weapons."

6182

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MILITARY ITALY

DEFENSE FIRMS REPRESENTED AT FARNBOROUGH AIR SHOW

Rome INTERARMA in Italian 10 Sep 86 pp 464-467

[Unattributed report: "Strong Presence of the Italian Defense Component Companies"; first paragraph is English-language summary by INTERARMA]

[Summary] As far as the sector of defense products is concerned, numerous Italian firms present at Farnborough proved their excellent capabilities and the extremely high level of technology which has been reached in this country. The credibility of these firms (the majority of which are modest in size, are almost all private concerns, and are self-financing) has become a concrete fact. In this edition of INTERARMA a panorama of some of their most interesting products and programs is outlined to INTERARMA by representatives of Italian firms present at the show, namely, representatives of Contraves Italiana, Elmer (eng Guido Ricciardi), FAREM (eng Carlo Manca), Industrie FACE Standard (eng Enzo Bruno), Litton Italia (eng Angelo Meneghetti), Magnaghi Oleodinamica (eng Claudio Domeniconi), Magnaghi Napoli (eng Luigi Marinucci), Magneti Marelli (eng Rosario Bifulco), Marconi Italiana (eng Domenico Vaccari), Meteor (eng Fulvio Scalera), Microtecnica (eng Umberto Penco), Secondo Mona (eng Sergio Boni), and SMA (eng Sergio Bertini).

[Text] Farnborough (INTERARMA correspondent)--In the defense sector, the Italian aerospace companies have demonstrated--at this 27th Farnborough Air Show--a special and highly-appreciated vitality. As has been the case in the airframe, automotive, and missile sectors--and also in the equipment and electronics sectors--the Italian companies have not failed to make their mark, by offering a high-quality range of products, and have succeeded in attracting the attention of foreign companies interested in interacting with the Italians. Some of them even claim to have had contacts with (inquiries from) the United States. This is no small achievement, if one looks back at a past that is actually not very distant. The credibility of these companies (almost all of modest size, almost all privately owned, almost all self-financed and dominated by a sincere desire to free themselves from the remnants of technological subordination to the United States) has now become an accomplished fact both for those who work day by day in these companies in Italy and also for their foreign interlocutors, but perhaps not so much so (although that is not very surprising) for those who in our country must set in motion those mechanisms of incentive and development that are designed to encourage--among others--this sector of domestic industry.

INTERARMA herewith presents a panorama of the most interesting defense-industry exhibits in the "Italian pavilion" at the London air show, as set forth in statements made by officials of a number of the companies represented.

[1.] Contraves Italiana: C.A. [Antiaircraft] Radar "Pagoda"

At the show, Contraves Italiana presented "Pagoda," a short-range antiair defense radar. "Pagoda" is a derivative version of the "Shorar" radar (short-range acquisition radar) family designed and produced by Contraves Italiana. Two Oerlikon mobile antiaircraft defense systems are adopting other versions of "Shorar": the ADATS missile system and the AA system with Escorter-35 guns. In the next issue of INTERARMA we shall give a detailed description of this Contraves innovation.

[2.] Elmer: Confidence in Satellite Navigation

"One of the significant commitments of ELMER, a company of the SI.EL. group, is to the development of satellite navigation, which is a field of great interest to all the Armed Forces." This statement--INTERARMA says--was made by Guido Ricciardi at Farnborough, where the Italian company was present with its latest achievements. "The GPS (Global Position System)," Ricciardi added, "will be adopted for all the mobile platforms of the Armed Forces--naval, ground, and air." In association with the U.S. Magnavox, ELMER has transferred to Italy a large part of the American "know-how" and is currently developing systems at its own expense and in collaboration with other European companies; for this purpose the EURNAV Consortium has been formed together with French, German, and British partners. ELMER is also working in the electronic warfare sector, where among other things it has produced a "scanner" capable of analyzing at great speed (80,000 channels in 1 second) the 1,000 MGh spectrum. "We have produced the fastest receivers currently on the market," Ricciardi said, "and we are producing complete electronic systems, active and passive, for the communications field. In collaboration with Elettronica, moreover, we are developing new systems for the Italian Ministry of Defense."

[3.] FAREM: Multifunction Display

"For EFA, 'Tonal,' and NH-90, we are offering the most advanced products of electronic technology, as for example multifunction displays." This statement was made to INTERARMA by the FAREM general manager, Eng Carlo Manca. "For NH-90," he added, "we have submitted informal bids; for EFA and 'Tonal' we are in contact with the companies of the various participating countries. Our instruments are meanwhile continuing to be applied to the 'Tornado,' AMX, S.211, SF.600, and A.109. Our sensory instruments (such as the triple pressure indicator installed on ATR.42) can also have applications in nonaeronautical fields: as for example, armored vehicles and ships."

[4.] Industrie FACE Standard: DME-P To Be Evaluated by AMI

"The first DME-P (precision DME--editor's note) produced by FACE Standard will be evaluated by AMI early next year together with the already-installed MLS (Microwave Landing System)." This statement was made to INTERARMA by Eng Enzo

Bruno, head of the defense and avionics division of FACE Standard. The DME-P is the latest product of this company to be offered on the Italian market, and continues the course of development of avionic products for the complex of air navigation aids that FACE Standard is producing in the military and civilian fields. "We have a new, completely microprocessorized TACAN," Engineer Bruno added, "that has already won several contracts in NATO countries (Portugal and Norway) and will be up for evaluation in West Germany in September." FACE Standard, says Engineer Bruno, "also has--together with Aeritalia--a research and development contract with AMI for the production of a fiber-optic 'bus' for G.222. It is an experimental project; the tests on board the aircraft will begin by late 1987, and will also serve to verify the adaptability of the system to EFA--the project for which we have already submitted our bid. In collaboration with Selenia, on the other hand, we have a research contract for a multibus to be installed on naval units--a multibus that will be able to process data, transmit voice, and even transmit images; this study can also have an application for EFA."

[5.] Litton Italia: Toward Automation of Artillery

"Functioning through the instrumentality of Litton Italia--which forms part of a consortium that includes Galilei, Marconi, and SEPA--we shall take part, in the near future, in an important competition for bids conducted by the Italian Army for the purpose of acquiring a system that will automate our artillery." This statement was made to INTERARMA, at the 1986 Farnborough Air Show, by Eng Angelo Meneghetti, marketing director of Litton Italia. Guidance systems and inertial navigation equipment are Litton Italia's field; the company began its activities in our country 20 years ago by constructing such equipment--under a U.S. license--for the F-104's built in Italy. "It was then that we realized the necessity for developing equipment of our own design," Meneghetti declared. That was the beginning of the "LISA family," together with reference and position systems that can have applications on aircraft, on ships, and in torpedoes. In the aeronautical field, LISA is doing its share in AMX, S.211, A.129, EH.101, and "Pilatus" PC.7 and PC.9. "The LISA 2,000, mounted on a PC.9," Meneghetti said, "is now being marketed in Australia, where Pilatus has obtained major orders; for each PC.9 we shall install a LISA system, possibly pursuant to agreements for on-site coproduction, such as indicated in a letter of intent that we have received from Australia."

[6.] Magnaghi Oleodinamica: Redundancy in the Control Systems

"We have everything in readiness to participate in the EFA program, in that we have already worked together in a more than satisfactory manner on the production of EAP." This statement was made by Claudio Domeniconi, head of the technical department of Magnaghi Oleodinamica, who gave INTERARMA a brief explanation of the company's activities. "In the servocontrols sector," Domeniconi continued, "the trend is toward 'fly by wire' systems, possibly integrated with emergency systems, including manual systems. For military aircraft the problem is survivability, given their ballistic vulnerability; the solutions that we in our company are also studying are based on the redundancy of the systems and on the transition to the 'fly by light' system--a system that is immune to interference from any possible electronic measures." Magnaghi Oleodinamica is at

this moment busy--as far as military products are concerned--with the new "dumpers" for the rotor of the Agusta A.129, equipment for the EH.101, and new devices for the AMX, and is ready to evaluate the technical aspects of the EFA program as soon as the definitive specifications are disclosed.

[7.] Magnaghi Napoli

Eng Luigi Marinucci has told INTERARMA that this company--which specializes in the production of parts for aircraft undercarriages--is also awaiting the specifications for the EFA program, in which it plans to participate. Meanwhile, it is continuing its studies of new composite materials, and in this sector has initiated a large-scale program of research and development.

[8.] Magneti Marelli: Systems for the New Italian Tank

"The programs of Magneti Marelli include--for the military sector--development of the electrical system and braking system for the second-generation Italian tank. This statement was made to INTERARMA by Eng Rosario Bifulco, director of the company's Avionics Division. The system for the tank was developed in collaboration with the French Messier company, while another system--the fuel system--was developed in collaboration with the Italian company Seconda Mona. For the new armored car, Magneti Marelli is in the process of developing the electrical system and--also in collaboration with Seconda Mona--the fuel distribution system. The company is present in the A.129 "Mangusta" (direct- and alternating-current electrical system); EH.101 (a complete electrical system developed in association with Lucas; and AMX.

[9.] Marconi Italiana: Multiuse Computers in CATRIN

"Our latest products relate to multiuse computers for the CATRIN system currently being developed for the Italian Army--a system in which we also have a presence in the form of a radio-link communications network." This statement was made to INTERARMA at Farnborough 1986 by Eng Domenico Vaccari, the technical and marketing director of Marconi Italiana. Formed for the purpose of developing civilian electronic systems, Marconi Italiana has extended its expertise into the military sphere as well, and is currently carrying out an important program for modernization of the electronic system of all the ALE helicopters, with particular attention to autonomous navigation, radio-assisted navigation, and communications. In fixed-wing aircraft, the Marconi devices are to be found on the G.222 and MB.339. For the future, the company is developing programs that are part of the GPS (Ground Position System) and hopes to be among the suppliers of EFA and NH-90.

[10.] Meteor: To Fight From the Ground Is the Objective

"The ultimate objective of the research on the RPV--and therefore our objective--is to have combatants on land or that maneuver self-sufficient devices in flight." This statement was made to INTERARMA by Fulvio Scalera, the P.R. director of Meteor, in explaining the company's presence at Farnborough 1986. "To this end, we are concentrating on marketing the mini-RPV 'Mirach' 20--an experimental set of which we shall be delivering to the Italian Army--and

are continuing to improve the 'Mirach' 100 mobile target, increasing its motor power and autonomy. In collaboration with Aeritalia--a 50 percent partner in our company--we are developing a stabilizing platform for mini-RPV's and are collaborating with Pacific Aerosystem Inc (USA) on the avionics for these vehicles."

[11.] MICROTECNICA: Single Computer for EFA

"The same high degree of integration of aircraft systems will be achieved for EFA that has been achieved in the United States (which has preceded us in this field by several years) for aircraft of the F-18 or F-20 type." This statement was made to INTERARMA by Eng Umberto Penco, marketing director of Microtecnica, who added: "In contradistinction to AMX, which has a variety of computers to operate the various functions such as flight controls, air intakes, etc, consideration is being given--in the case of EFA--to a single large central computer that will incorporate all these functions." In this context, companies such as Microtecnica have the task of achieving "the delivery--ready for use--of systems that are completely integrated and perfectly capable of interfacing with the aircraft."

Penco recalled that the systems-oriented vocation of his company originated more than 15 years ago in connection with "Tornado," for which Microtecnica supplied the entire secondary flight control system. "Since that time," Penco explained, "electronics has developed to the point of bringing about the transition to digital intelligence, which provides for the integration of systems that are much more advanced than those in the past and now has applications in the area of domestic products as well."

[12.] Secondo Mona: We Shall Equip EH.101

"In collaboration with the American Plessey, Secondo Mona has already won the contract to supply equipment for the EH.101, the Anglo-Italian helicopter." This statement was made to INTERARMA by Sergio Bogni, who explained that the field of activity of his company is directed primarily toward the production of fuel systems for aircraft and--more sp[illegible]lly--fuel pumps. "In this connection," he said, "we are working on some [illegible]es of equipment for the A.129 'Mangusta'; these are systems the contracts for which have not yet been awarded and that we are developing at our own expense. We accordingly have high hopes for EFA, given the fact that our decanting pumps and valve pumps are already present in EAP."

[13.] SMA: Anti-Helicopter Radar for the New Tank

"Together with OTO Melara, we are developing the radar system for the new Italian tank," Eng Sergio Bertini, managing director of SMA, told INTERARMA. "It will be a system designed for the detection of low-flying helicopters and guidance radar for the reaction of the tank." The field of medium-to-short range detection radar and guidance radar is the classic field of SMA, which has produced ground, naval, and air equipment in addition to missile equipment (the SMA is present in the 'Otomat' system). "We may say," Bertini added, "that we are working in the entire sector of microwave active and passive sensors: these projects range from the EH.101 naval helicopter--for which we

are developing a new system in collaboration (a 50 percent participation) with FIAR--to our investments in research for the frigates of the 1990's and investments that we are currently making in the development of a new radar (the APS 707) for use on Italian helicopters sold abroad."

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MILITARY PORTUGAL

'TRIDENT 86' MANEUVERS IN AZORES DESCRIBED

Maneuvers Detailed

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 19 Sep 86 pp 12-14

[Article by Cesario Borga]

[Excerpts] For a week, the island of Porto Santo was threatened by enemy forces dispatched for North Africa for the purpose of an African takeover of the Madeira archipelago. The invaders, who managed to land on the island, frequently had recourse to terrorist methods, according to government sources.

Some observers reported with confidence that the threat to Porto Santo originated in Libya and had been organized by individuals linked with Col al'Qadhdhafi.

Fortunately, all of this was make-believe, merely a part of the "Trident 86" war games.

It was 8:30 am in Porto Santo on Wednesday, the 18th of the month. A state of emergency had been declared on the island 24 hours earlier. The vast beach of fine sand along the coast was practically deserted. A commando platoon in camouflage gear, faces blackened, with G-3s and swords slung from their shoulders, scanned the 9 kilometers of beach carefully. The "state of emergency" was a simulated one, part of the war games given the name "Trident 86," which were staged for the purpose of testing the island's defense against an enemy invading from North Africa.

Scattered over the island were 1,200 men, antiaircraft guns, some cannons and at least one portable missile launcher. It was known that the "enemy" had succeeded in landing on the island during the night, and this caused some nervousness, not so much because of fear but because the enemy here was a naval force, and the soldiers commented to each other that "with these guys one never knows."

The enemy (orange forces), we learned later, consisted of a unit of 11 riflemen (one officer and 10 privates). They penetrated the defenses of the island, and in order to leave no evidence in enemy hands, they adopted a suitable style for evading and overwhelming the "native troops."

There was moonlight on the night of the third. The group of infantrymen realized that they would never reach the island alive. The rubber navy rafts which carried them would be easily seen.

The "Enemy" Lands

They then decided to divide up, with a part of the group approaching in the rubber rafts, while the others walked into the town calmly in sports clothes, as if they were on their way to have a drink at the Big Boy, the most popular drinking spot in Porto Santo because it is the only one there. Just minutes later they abandoned their civilian clothing and adopted the determined aspect of "enemies" from somewhere in North Africa. The other half of the group arrived in two rafts, dressed in bathing suits. As they neared the shore, they jumped into the water and swam the rest of the way, allowing the defenders of the island the honor of capturing the vessels. The weapons and the uniforms they used subsequently had been previously hidden on the island.

I was convinced that after a few blanks were fired by the troops defending the coast, the "enemy" would consider itself defeated. However, a short distance from the beach where the commando unit we accompanied for some time was located, in an area known as Portela, the "riflemen" decided to evade the simulated fire, took over the fuel deposits, climbed the slope, and when the commando unit confronted them, decided to settle old accounts. In order to avoid an unnecessary alarm and the sound of gunfire, they settled it all quietly. According to a witness to whom we talked, they neutralized the commando unit and disarmed the artillery garrison, dealing with their adversaries quite harshly, as befits true warriors. Flat on the ground, at the moment of attack, the defenders found swords at their throats and guns pointed at their heads.

But then everything was as before. On Wednesday night, all the positions were garrisoned. and they were reviewed by Gen Lemos Ferreira, chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, and Brig Gen Loureiro dos Santos, commander of the Madeira Military Zone. The "blue forces," the defenders, were gaining ground over the "orange forces." In the final analysis, both conducted themselves well, and as always, the exercise achieved its objectives.

An Enemy from North Africa

But in reality, who was the "enemy," or, put in another way, with what enemy in mind was this exercise planned? At a press conference held in the field for journalists, an army spokesman said that what was contemplated was an enemy coming from North Africa for the purpose of a "African takeover of the islands," and making frequent use of terrorist methods. As far as is known, it has to date been Col al'Qadhdhafi who has made statements which could be interpreted as expressing a desire to "Africanize" the islands, including the Canaries, and in Western circles, he is regarded as the main instigator of terrorism as a method of exerting pressure on his adversaries. The island of Porto Santo, then, tested its defense capability against a hypothetical Libyan threat being carried out in a first phase through the infiltration of small groups for the purpose of locating and destroying sensitive targets. With the equipment and the available personnel in place, and with coordination among

the various forces, would our troops be in a position to provide a response? Even a first response to an enemy which would presumably arrive in Porto Santo well armed, well trained and well informed?

This question was asked of Gen Lemos Ferreira by O JORNAL. In the first part of his answer, he minimized the idea of an enemy coming from North Africa, saying that the origin might be anywhere else, but he did not deny this possibility, as had moreover had been made clear shortly before in the meeting with newsmen. The military official responsible for armed forces operations did not hesitate, however, to state that taking the resources the armed forces has available, and not exclusively those established on Porto Santo for the "Trident 86" maneuvers, into account, it would be possible to respond to a threat from North Africa such as that simulated here.

Defense on Castelo Peak

Castelo Peak is one of the three hills on the island of Porto Santo. It is the second highest (407 meters) and the only tree-covered area on the island. A large part of the antiaircraft artillery was installed on this elevation. The trees provided almost perfect camouflage, the height allowed a view of almost all of the island, and from there, one can see the air approaches to the airport. Thus for about a week, Castelo Peak was a war zone dotted with machine guns, command and communications posts, and the scene of intensive military vehicle movement.

Many years have passed since the days when the war materiel installed on Castelo Peak for "Trident 86" might have been of great use in combating possible enemy aircraft. As far as we could see, there were 10 antiaircraft guns installed on the island—four 12/7s, each with four barrels, and six 40 millimeter single-barrel guns. In addition, there was a "blowpipe" portable missile launcher. The antiaircraft batteries might possibly do some damage to airplanes flying at a low altitude, or as they begin to dive to strafe targets or drop bombs, but it would not be possible to affect planes flying above 3,000 meters at supersonic speeds.

The 40-millimeter gun is actually a museum piece. It could perhaps fire three rounds per second, but not for long, for the barrel might overheat and thus soften. It is not a question, of course, of the men behind the weapons, who might, in the final analysis, as is believed today, be the most decisive element in a localized war with the opposing forces using the most modern technology. Thus to expect to function in wartime today with such equipment is like asking for a miracle. The least that could be said is that the equipment installed there was only a symbol, like the old cannon at the ancient fortress.

The antiaircraft equipment included a portable "blowpipe" missile launcher, but its efficiency could not be tested because plans did not call for firing it. This missile has a range of 3,000 meters and it has an aiming mechanism. Slight corrections to the trajectory can be made after firing. This requires well-trained marksmen which it is difficult to provide, since for financial reasons, this missile is not fired regularly. The "blowpipe" is only designed for targets located at very low altitudes, and the missiles self-destruct

after traveling 3,000 meters if they have missed the target. Neither the heat produced by the target nor the airplane fuselage attracts the missile, and the target aircraft will not be destroyed if the missile fails to come within 3 meters of it.

## Resources Lacking

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 19 Sep 86 p 12

[Article by C.B.]

[Text] To an observer with the slightest interest in military matters, the somewhat artificial manner in which the military authorities justify these silent war games cannot go unnoticed. They are always presented as ways of testing the commando units. It might be noted that during the maneuvers held in Porto Santo, not one shot was fired. Obviously there are other ways of assessing the resolution of the problems presented, but the real reason there was no "actual firing" was lack of financing.

The island of Porto Santo has a key location in the so-called Portuguese strategic triangle formed by the island territories (Azores and Madeira) and the continent. Its position in the triangle allows it to serve as a base for any operation against the Azores, the African coast, the continental territory of Portugal or the Canary Islands. Porto Santo is 1,200 kilometers from Lajes, 900 kilometers from Lisbon, 660 kilometers from the Canary Islands, 500 kilometers from the African coast and a bare 50 kilometers from Madeira. A defense exercise on an island whose strategic importance is challenged by no one should in principle also serve as a deterrent for any potential enemy, particularly that imagined in planning the exercise. But this did not by any means happen on the island of Porto Santo.

In a way it could be said that a military exercise carried out at a point of strategic importance such as the island of Porto Santo points out, both at home and abroad, Portugal's status as a "weak nation" which is not even in a position to impress its adversaries or its friends with a "bluff." The image wanted is that we would be capable of defending Porto Santo against the first thrusts of a serious attack.

It is not easy for the military to resolve the dilemma when resources are limited. Brig Gen Loureiro dos Santos, who is at present the commander of the Madeira Military Zone, said in his book "Incursions in the Realm of Strategy" that in a small country, "The military tool should not be economically ruinous (this would be like killing the patient with the cure)," or, in other words, the military in their operations must take the existing economic conditions into account because, according to the thesis of the commander in chief of the Madeira forces, "The simple fact that a military apparatus exists would make a possible invader think twice before attacking."

However, the situation is more difficult to understand if we realize that such rigorous austerity is not to be found in all sectors. After reading the report of the parliamentary commission on the choices made in purchasing materiel, aircraft in particular, it is hard to understand why the only

portable missile launcher on Porto Santo had to be carried from one place to another on the island during the maneuvers, for there were several positions assigned for the single launcher. The fact is that, lacking aid from outer space, it would be hard to find a missile launcher which can be everywhere at once.

5157
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MILITARY

SPAIN

## DEFENSE MINISTRY ANNOUNCES CHANGES IN MILITARY SERVICE

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 19 Oct 86 pp 16-17

[Text] Barcelona--In January 1987, youths who have not yet joined the ranks may aspire to occupy one of the approximately 13,000 slots that the Defense Ministry will create for the first graduating class of special volunteers in the three service branches. With a service period of from 18 months to 3 years, the future specialists will become the backbone of the troop ranks of a smaller, more specialized Army. The traditional "mili" is starting to change in many other respects: a reduction in the period for performing compulsory service; a change in recruitment methods; an expansion of assignments in the region of origin; simplification of deferments; and an increase in grounds for granting them. The Defense Ministry now intends to undertake an extensive program to reform the content of military service: what the youths who will be wearing the uniform during the 12 months learn, and how they learn it.

As of this very year, youths who have joined the Land and Air Armies know that they will be performing their service for a 12-month period. Starting with the replacement in January, this term will also apply to those who have been assigned to the Navy. This reduction, hoped for by generations of recruits and periodically announced in the barracks by "radio knapsack," since the first months of the transition, is, along with the gradual rise in the number of surplus quotas, one of the most obvious signs that something is changing in the "mili."

The 5,471 youths who "escaped" the "mili" in 1982 were a select group of fortunate ones in the eyes of their 233,212 comrades who marched off to the camps. This year, the number of "fortunate ones" which had gradually risen in the 1983, 1984, and 1985 conscriptions, has shot up to 71,113. In other words, over one out of every four youths has been declared surplus quota.

The gradually reduction in the size of the Land Army and the fact that incorporation into the ranks has been moved up a year, according to the new Military Service Law (of June 1984), which has required calling up youths aged 19 and 20 years jointly, in a transition period, are the two factors that have caused breaking the record for surpluses this year.

The 13,000 special volunteers due to start training in 1987 will amount to a total of 40,000 soldiers in 3 years ("if Mr Solchaga allows it," in the words of one of the minister's military advisers). In the future, this contingent

will assume the responsibility for handling the new weaponry and will become "the soul of the modern Army."

Personnel missiles, combat tanks, radar, and even trucks of large size are being requested by soldiers with special training, for the sake of efficiency in the handling and conservation of the equipment. In addition to being able to serve as specialists in the various branches and corps, the volunteers will be able to opt for membership in an elite unit, such as the Legion, the Paratrooper Brigade, or the Marines.

Minimum Wage

The Defense Ministry's bill wants those who join the volunteer service for a 3-year period to be able to earn at least the interprofessional minimum wage (40,141 pesetas per month). The existence of this new corps, which does not preclude the rendering of traditional volunteer service, reduced to 16 months, will make it possible to release each year another 40,000 youths from compulsory service; because the Defense Ministry's intention is not to add personnel, but rather to substitute replacement troops with qualified volunteers.

The reduction in the contingent of troops who will perform compulsory military service will, as the defense minister announced to the Congress on 17 September, make it possible "to eliminate (...) an increasing number of youths who, owing to their mental and physical qualities, had not been taken into consideration to any great extent up until now and whom we do not regard it as feasible to have taking military service (...)."

The Defense Ministry bill calls for the formalization of an agreement, over the long term, with the Health Ministry so that the medical examinations of the youths will not be made by the military, but rather by social security. The bill stipulates that the medical checkups before joining the ranks are to be made of all youths, and not only those who have alleged something; which, according to the same sources, is the only way of limiting the disturbing number of disqualifications that occur after incorporation into the ranks. According to unofficial statistics from the ministry, in 1 year, nearly 20 percent of the Navy personnel and 12 percent of the Army personnel, are released for incompetence that was not discovered before their incorporation into the ranks.

The Land Army Modernization Plan (META) has concurrently led to the closing of the doors, almost without any publicity, of the Recruit Instruction Centers (CIR), in which the future soldiers were given their first inspection. Next year, there will be only two CIR left in all of Spain, one to deal with the instruction of the personnel to be sent to Ceuta and Melilla, where "it is impossible to hold drills of any kind for lack of space," according to Defense MInistry sources, and another in Madrid, used for all units in the central services.

The brigades, converted into the Army's basic unit, are assuming responsibility for the instruction of the recruits in their facilities.

Next year, the regionalization of the service, in other words, the assignment of youths to units located in the same military region in which they reside, will amount to 60 percent of the young men. The Defense Ministry considers this percentage the highest ceiling possible to attain, given the territorial structure of the Army units. The criteria for streamlining will also make it possible, starting with the January replacement, for all the youths in the military regions with a personnel shortage not to have to leave them.

In this way, the youths from the Canaries and the Balearics, and from the districts of Ceuta and Melilla, are guaranteed that they will remain at home. For those who have to be moved, the trend will be to assign them to a border region and, within it, the military headquarters have instructions to assign the troops to units whose site is as close as possible to their residence.

Conscientious Objection

On the controverial issue of conscientious objection, the regulatory law for which (of December 1984) is being appealed by the people's defender, the ministry confined itself to giving a reminder that this is a matter that depends directly on the Office of the President of the Government. The new military service law includes the objection as a cause for exclusion from military service, and turns it over to the National Council on Conscientious Objection, which has jurisdiction over each case and on which the ministry has a single representative.

The Defense Ministry considers the number of objectors (fewer than 1,000 per year) to be insignificant, and claims that its only concern is the "sudden" objectors, that is, those who claim it when they have already been incorporated into the ranks.

The ministry now considers it a priority matter for this legislature, in connection with military service, to make a series of changes in the instruction of the troops that will make it possible to improve their learning and to impart a greater sense of usefulness to the year invested in the ranks.

An adviser to the minister remarks: "There now remains a job to be done in the barracks, of an internal nature, will which not be reflected in a new law. How we focus on the instruction of the troops during the coming years will depend largely on the awareness acquired by Spanish society that national defense is everyone's responsibility."

2909
CSO: 3548/11

MILITARY SPAIN

## ARMAMENT, DUTIES OF NEW FRIGATE DESCRIBED

Madrid EL ALCAZAR in Spanish 11 Oct 86 p 10

[Text] Starting Sunday morning, the Spanish Navy will have the frigate "Santa Maria," a warship of the new generation capable of fighting with the most advanced electronic systems under nuclear and bacteriological warfare conditions. The frigate "Santa Maria" is the first in a series of four which, together with the aircraft carrier "Principe de Asturias," will constitute the force of the Navy's aeronaval group.

The frigate "Santa Maria" is associated with the American "Oliver Hazard Perry" design, series FFG-50, the construction of which began during the American fiscal year 1981.

The primary mission of the FFG frigates, the cost of which exceeds 30 billion pesetas, is to act as escorts for supply groups, amphibian forces, and convoys, and to operate offensively against submarines.

This warship incorporates as an innovation an antisubmarine and antisurface "go no further" device which "works" permanently with a Sea Hawk helicopter. Also noteworthy is the antiaircraft defense feature of this frigate.

In the antisubmarine battle version, the light airborne multiple mission system, "Lamps," is incorporated into the Sea Hawk helicopter (Spain has purchased six units for transporting it, valued at 30 billion pesetas) to operate in connection with a tactical towed sonar chain, "Tactas," device which tows the frigate.

Through the combined operation of the "Tactas" and the "Lamps," submarines located over 100 kilometers from the vessel can be detected and attacked.

The data picked up by the helicopters are sent automatically to all ships in the combat group, from which the order to pursue or attack the detected submarine can also be issued.

### Its Objectives Include Control of the Strait of Gibraltar

Among the fundamental missions of the frigate "Santa Maria" will be the control of the Strait of Gibraltar, an area through which 52,000 ships and over 100 nuclear submarines of the United States, the USSR, the United Kingdom, and France currently pass.

If the threat comes from a rapid missile carrier vessel located 60 miles distant, the worst case, the "Lamps" engages in an antisurface pursuit, making it possible to provide information on the missiles launched, and will make it possible to guide, by means of the helicopter's electronic equipment, the combat group's"Harpoon" antimissile defense against the enemy ship.

The helicopter's recovery and secure sytem, "Rast," aboard the frigate, makes it possible to operate with the "Lamps" under the most severe weather conditions. The unit comprised of the FFG frigates and the "Tactas"-"Lamps" system is completely inseparable,because the ship has been designed precisely to be able to take on the Sea Hawk helicopter.

The frigate combined with "Tactas"-"Lamps III" is not a mere addition of equipment and weapons operating in isolated fashion, but rather constitutes a weapon consisting of various components.

With this system, the FFG's advanced position nevertheless allows for the extension of air scouting up to nearly 400 miles from the center of the combat group against attacking aircraft and missiles, combining the defense of its "Standard" and "Meroka" antimissile systems with the famous "Harrier" vertical takeoff aircraft located on the "Principe de Asturas" aircraft carrier and the Sea Hawk helicopters.

Thus established, the combat group will respond to the technology of the 1990's, and the Navy will be equipped to provide suitable protection for the survival of the national maritime trade.

Included among the weaponry to be carried by the frigate "Santa Maria " is the "Meroka" multitube antimissile system, develped in Spain: eight "Harpoon" antiship missiles and 32 "Standard" antiaircraft missiles, both of American origin; as well as two triple torpedo launcher assemblies and an "Oto Melara" automatic cannon.

The frigate is 135 meters long, with a beam of 13.7 meters, a draft of 7.5 meters, and a displacement of 3,600 tons.

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MILITARY SPAIN

INISEL WINS CONTRACT FOR EF-18 TEST BED

Madrid EL ALCAZAR in Spanish 11 Oct 86 p 10

[Text] The Defense Ministry has awarded INISEL the contract for the development and manufacture of an AIRSIM (Aircraft Simulator) type test bed for the inertial flight unit of the EF-18 airplane. The inertial flight system is one of the most complex types of equipment in current aircraft technology, because it enables the airplane to fly without external cues.

The AIRSIM test bed is intended to fill the gap existing in the maintenance of the gyrostabilized platform, by being able to isolate a breakdown of any of the 13 subsystems comprising the inertial navigation system. These subsystems are of three types: the aforementioned gyrostabilized platform, a set of computer cards, and supply sources.

With the present contract, which amounts to 355 million pesetas, this company is consolidating its activity in the test bed field, the experience with which will be applicable to the future European combat plane, in which Spain is participating along with Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Great Britain.

The awarding of this contract to a Spanish company by the Defense Ministry will intensify the activity of the national industry in the realm of advanced technologies and the development of new weapons systems.

The King Will Pilot an EF-18

Moreover, King Don Juan Carlos will pilot one of the EF-18 planes recently acquired from the United States by Spain, as part of the FACA (future aircraft for combat and attack) program, next Tuesday.

The Zaragoza Air Transport Command (MATRA) confirmed the king's visit to that city's air base, during which he will test one of the EF-18 fighter-bombers, considered to be the most sophisticated in the world.

On 10 July, the first EF-18A's landed in Zaragoza, and will continue to arrive during 1987, 1988, 1989, and 1990, until the completion of the 72 aircraft purchased by the Spanish Government.

One of the main features of this aircraft is the ability to perform attack, air-to-surface, or air-to-air missions, indiscriminately, with a mere change.

In the EF-18, with a capacity to carry 10,000 kilograms of bombs, the pilot controls the entire process of an attack or combat automatically; the radar follows 10 targets simultaneously; and the computer selects the closest threats, and advises the type of weapon to be used at all times to destroy them.

For the purchase of the EF-18A, the individual cost of which is about $22 million, the manufacturing firm,McDonnell Douglas, promised to provide business to Spanish companies valued at $1.543 billion in 1981 dollars.

Spain is the fourth country in the world to have this type of airplane, which is part of the air forces of the United States, Canada, and Australia.

2909
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MILITARY SPAIN

## DEFENSE MINISTRY REPORTEDLY CONCERNED ABOUT DEATHS, DRUG USE

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 19 Oct 86 p 17

[Text] Barcelona--The accidents, suicides, and drug consumption in the barracks are three of the matters which most concern the Defense Ministry insofar as the prevention measures adopted are concerned.

According to the ministry's report, prepared after the first 4 years of the Socialist government, the accident prevention policy "has achieved a beneficial effect" in reducing them. The official figures for 1983 indicate that, based on 209 fatal accidents which occurred during the rendering of military service, 118 took place as a result of a traffic accident, 29 were caused by weapons and explosives, and 62 happened during instruction or based on other causes. According to the same official statistics, the percentages in comparison with other countries put the Spanish death rate (0.060 percent) at a level similar to that of France (0.057 percent), the United Kingdom (0.067 percent), and Italy (0.091 percent).

According to the same document, the number of fatalities from traffic accidents occurring in a civilian vehicle, when the soldier was on leave, accounts for half of the deaths during the period for rendering military service. In this regard, it is believed that the increased regionalization of the service, which will entail a reduction in the travel of soldiers on leave through the Spanish geographical area, will help to cause a decline in the figure.

The report does not embark upon a study of the other accidents, although it notes that a statistical plan has been established that will make it possible to ascertain the number and causes thereof, as well as the measures to be adopted for their prevention.

### Handling of Weapons

The Defense Ministry expressed the view in its report that military service "cannot be considered a specific cause of suicides," although it admits that "it is possible that reasons for committing it could stem from it (military service), both on the basis of concurrent social factors and the mere fact of handling weapons." Specifically, according to official statistics, the number of soldiers dying from suicide in Spain between 1 January 1984 and 1 October 1985 amounted to 70, whereas the number of those injured totaled 180.

According to the ministry, the inducing factor "is some type of lack of social integration and despair over attaining prospects of achieving it." An adviser to the minister explained that many of the suicides had as a cause "emotional or family problems."

The search for the causes extends to the general context of the current society. "The slight increase, with chances for receding" that has occurred in the number of suicides within the Armed Forces, "is merely the reflection of a parallel process in a direction similar to that occurring in Spanish society as a whole, wherein there is evidence of a rise in the number of suicides, particularly among the youth," according to the Defense Ministry.

The ministry admits that "there is continued incorporation of young people with psychopathological conditions into the branches of service," and calls upon families with children who have problems of this type to provide the medical reports before their incorporation, taking advantage of the fact that the new list of exclusions places "greater emphasis on mental diseases."

With regard to drug addiction in the quarters, the minister's advisers agree in stating that the problem "is not as serious" as in the society as a whole, "except in the Legion." The National Antidrug Plan is also carrying out its activities in the Armed Forces, which are coordinated by the interministerial commission to control it through the Defense Ministry.

The ministry's report notes that, according to a poll taken in the Land Army during 1985, 27 percent of the youths incorporated into the ranks were occasional drug consumers, while 6 percent were regular consumers. The poll made it possible to discern "a strong increasing trend in the percentages of drug addicts." According to the official statistics, during 1984 and 1985 2,394 youths were excluded from military service because of drug addiction.

2909
CSO: 3548/11

## LOWER OIL PRICES YIELD SAVINGS FOR NATION

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 30 Sep 86 p 24

[Text] In the first 7 months of this year, Portugal has seen savings of 71.5 million contos on its foreign purchases of oil and fuels, figures released by the National Statistics Institute indicate.

Portuguese imports of fuels, oils and ores in the period between January and July of this year came to a total of 141.9 million contos, equivalent to a reduction of 33.5 percent in the energy bill paid for the comparable period in 1985.

During the period under consideration, two other factors were also evident in the Portuguese trade balance. They were the 37.3 percent decline in the cost grain products and the 30.3 percent decline in the invoices for oleaginous crops.

These are three products--oil, grains and oleaginous crops--for which Portugal is heavily dependent on foreign sources. Variations in their prices contribute heavily to the changes in the Portuguese trade balance. Between January and July of this year, Portugal purchased grains worth 21.7 million contos and oleaginous products worth 20.2 million contos.

The savings on grain purchases came to about 13 million contos, to which was added a saving of 18.7 million contos on foreign purchases of oleaginous products, seeds and fruits.

Cotton was another product for which imports declined. In the first 7 months of this year, purchases of cotton products totaled 27.2 million contos, down 24.9 percent from the figure for the comparable period last year.

5157
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## GOVERNMENT REBUTS CRITICISM BY ECOLOGY GROUPS

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 16 Oct 86 p 30

[Text] Madrid--The new directors of the leading agencies engaged in managing the environmental policy, the General Directorate of Environment (DGMA) and the National Institute for Conservation of Nature (ICONA), consider the criticism made by the ecology groups of these agencies to be exaggerated and biased. In their opinion, the changes are due to the opening of a new era, prompted both by Spain's entry into the European Community (EEC), which necessitates abiding by the guidelines set by the Community in the area of environment, and by the transfer of authority to the different autonomous communities.

The previous director of ICONA, Angel Barbero, claims that the reasons for his dismissal were not very specific, although he admits that the constant criticism from the news media and ecology groups of the institute carried weight in his departure from the position.

Barbero thinks that the criticism "has been very out of focus and biased, because it has been concentrated on the issue of repopulation and forest fires. The exacerbated handling of these matters by ecology groups, telling half-truths, not only has not helped to solve the problems, but has managed to attract potential firebugs, and this really worries me."

### Sufficient Regulations

The new head of the General Directorate of Environment (DGMA), Fernando Martinez Salcedo, thinks that one of the petitions on which the ecologists are most insistent, namely, the promulgation of a general law on environment, has no justification at present. "The community regulations that we have to enforce in Spain stipulate a higher standard of requirements than any law that we could have made now. At the present time, we have the Law on Management of Toxic and Dangerous Waste, the decree on evaulation of environmental impact, and the bases for taking action to optimize the system of vigilance over atmospheric pollution. What we must do is enforce all these regulations."

Nor does Martinez Salcedo consider it necessary to create a Ministry of Environment, because "it would be a very large box for a very small contents." "In this connection, I don't think that we are at the threshold of a substantive change in the Spanish administraiton. Nevertheless, I am certain that the

present DGMA is totally insufficient to meet the challenges that will come to us from the European Community." Salcedo admits that there are serious difficulties for enforcing the community guidelines on the subject of environment, under the conditions in our country. He acknowledged: "We are aware that some of the community guidelines entail an economic cost that we cannot afford."

Some guidelines, such as the one requiring a reduction in sulphur dioxide emissions or gearing the Spanish hydrographic system to the European Community's requirements pose insurmountable problems, in the opinion of Martinez Salcedo; so much so that, adapting to the community parameters in the area of water for human consumption or bathing would mean that our country would have to close many industrial installations.

The newly appointed director of ICONA, Mariano Sanz, who until recently was civil governor of Orense, expresses himself in terms similar to those of his predecessor, regarding the criticism that this institution has had to withstand from sectors and individuals associated with the ecology movement. "There has been a certain amount of morbidity in the criticism made of this agency and, in some instances, that criticism has been groundless. I consider a major debate to be necessary, so that those who have serious things to say may say them, and the mere echoes may be silenced. Let those who know about ecology and environment speak, and those who are making criticism with banality please not disturb the debate."

The new function of ICONA, in the view of its director, will consist of "coordinating and devising the major context of efforts," in cooperation with the autonomous communities and other agencies. Some of these efforts relate to the battle against erosion and desert formation, and hydrological restoration. Sanz claims that he is willing to cooperate with everyone to prevent "the administrative patrimonialism from becoming a poison."

2909
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ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUED SPAIN

## INSECTICIDE CONTAMINATION REPORTED IN NATIONAL PARK

### Thousands of Birds Reportedly Killed

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 28 Sep 86 p 24

[Article by Enrique Chueca, Seville]

[Text] Thousands of birds, most of them ducks of various species, are dying along the marshy boundaries of the Donana National Park as a result of massive contamination. According to data supplied by scientists working in the area, the number of dead animals comes to something like 25,000 but it is feared that the final count may be much higher. In spite of these dramatic figures and the timely discovery of this ecological disaster, no responsible agency has taken measures to check this contamination.

The origin of this massive contamination, which was detected during the last days of August, could consist of the indiscriminate use of insecticides by rice growers in the Guadalquivir swamps. Scientists and ICONA [National Nature Preservation Institute] guards, who prefer to remain anonymous, stated that "the small aircraft have been parked here, in the vicinity" during the month of August and the so-called Brazo de la Torre, in the middle of the Donana National Park, was even fumigated on 19 September, something which is completely prohibited.

From that day on, "animals began to die by the hundreds," said Jose Manuel de Benito, the curator at the Donana Park, who was alerted by the guards. De Benito said that, after an inspection of the stricken areas, containers of insecticides, that are prohibited in areas with water fauna, were found. Among these he mentioned Cirial 50, Endosulfan, and Malathion. De Benito reported this to his superiors.

The most heavily hit sections were the Cantarita Canal near the approach to the park, and El Lucio del Cangrejo, located in the same park approach area at Donana and owned by the Jose Maria Blanc Foundation. During the first week of September, 2,300 dead ducks were counted in the El Lucio del Cangrejo section.

One of the Foundation's biologists reported that his veterinarians had by that time already figured out that this was a "presumed case of poisoning

caused by insecticides" and that this was certainly not an epidemic. The strongest suspicion is that various products were mixed for the purpose of boosting the effectiveness of the fumigation. Cans of prohibited insecticides were found in the water arms of the swamps.

In recent days, personnel from the Donana Biological Station, ICONA, rice growers and hunters from Villafranco del Guadalquivir--a town located near the swamp--buried or burned the cadavers of the ducks, "each being concerned with this in a different way." Some did so to prevent contagion from spreading to the park's general fauna; others, it is suspected, were trying to conceal evidence of the disaster that had been brought about here. The stricken species include spoon-bill ducks, royal ducks, and golden ducks and, to a lesser extent, king herons and sharp-beaked waders. Widgeon linnets also died; this species is about to disappear from Spain and is one of the rarest found in Donana.

The animals die slowly as their muscles are paralyzed or they die "dry," according to a Donana guard. The birds appear to have burst open and blood oozes out through the beak and the anus.

Nobody has found any justification for the fact that the Crop Protection Service of the Andalucia Board failed to check on the fumigation. It is likewise not known why "those in charge of this nature preserve concealed the events at Donana from public opinion," according to Jesus Vozmediano, president of the Andalucian Ecologist Association.

## Blame Put on Banned Insecticide

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 30 Sep 86 p 28

[Article by Enrique Chueca, Seville]

[Text] The poisoning of birds in the vicinity of the Donana National Park, which has caused the death of more than 25,000 ducks and other animals, originated from the ingestion of an insecticide, according to initial official reports. The product, whose sale is authorized, even though the Board did not permit its use in the Andalucian swamps, "can be used to eliminate crabs that ruin the rice crops," said Tomas Azcarate, director of AMA (Autonomic Environment Agency), yesterday.

The regional government has recommended to the local population that it refrain from buying or consuming Anatidae because there is reason to suspect that poachers and clandestine traffickers are selling the poisoned ducks.

The Andalucia Board yesterday officially reported on the ecological disaster that occurred in areas bordering on the Donana National Park where thousands of birds have been dying since 5 August. A note disseminated by the agriculture and health councils of the Andalucia Board and by the AMA points out that these agencies conducted coordinated investigations "since the middle of this month" in order to discover the causes leading to this mass death. The note explains that this massive poisoning is due to the ingestion of a

substance, called methyl-parathion, which is an organic phosphorated preparation that is banned throughout the autonomous community. According to the agency report, this much can be learned from the first report sent out by the National Agricultural Laboratory and the Majadahonda (Madrid) National Toxicology Center.

Official announcements followed each other in rapid succession yesterday; at the same time, personnel of the Environmental Agency, from the Donana Biological Station, and from the Jose Maria Blanc Foundation--the owner of one of the areas most heavily hit by this ecological disaster, Lucio del Cangrejo--worked hard to collect the cadavers of the animals that continued to die as a result of this contamination. The animals for the most part are ducks but herons, golden ducks, and sharp-beaked waders have also died, along with other protected species, such as flamingoes. The cadavers are piled up and incinerated to prevent the spread of this contamination.

The Crop Protection Service, which is responsible for handling pests in the Guadalquivir swamps, stated that there was no truth in the story to the effect that rice growers used the methy-parathion insecticide. Juan Ignacio Caballero, the head of this agency, said that there was "strict control" on fumigations during the summer in the course of the two official programs carried out in the rice-growing area. However, Caballero did point out that the rice growers can conduct individual fumigations "over which we have no control." He added, on the other hand, that "until 19 September" there had been no official report on the massive death of birds. Biologists from the ICONA (National Nature Conservation Institute) said that they verbally reported the disaster during the first few days of August and that they did so in writing on 23 September. According to the Donana acting curator Juan Manuel de Benito, no response had been received as of last Saturday.

Officially, suspicions as to the source of this contamination centers on persons, who, either individually or collectively, sprayed the contaminating product or dumped it into the swamps. The rice growers deny any responsibility for this matter.

The PCE [Spanish Communist Party] has demanded the resignation of officials in charge at Donana, including Alfonso Guerra, chairman of the Board of Trustees, who is accused of having "ordered the evidence of the disaster to be hidden."

## Area of Bird Kill Spreads Beyond Park

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 1 Oct 86 p 26

[Article by Enrique Chueca, Seville]

[Text] The number of water birds that died due to massive contamination along the edges of the Donana National Park in recent days reached an estimated 27,000. According to an announcement made yesterday by Juan Manuel de Benito, the acting curator at Donana, there is a new center of mass death in the so-called Lucio del Italiano section, inside the area described as the approach to the park which therefore is entitled to "special protection."

De Benito however noted that the situation "continues to be serious" in the Seville rice-growing marshes, the place where the ecological disaster began.

The AMA, in turn, will today supply the final analyses of the specimens of poisoned birds and of mud from the swamps that were sent to the National Agricultural Laboratory. The first report from that agency shows that the product that caused the disaster was the insecticide called methyl-parathion, a product whose use is banned in water areas by the Andalucia Board, even though its sale in Spain is legal.

According to AMA Director Tomas Azcatare, the insecticide perhaps was used to "eliminate the crabs that ruin the rice crops," a possibility which the rice growers deny emphatically.

Initial Suspicions

The administration's initial suspicions on the source of this contamination centered on persons who, either individually or collectively, used the contaminating product to fumigate the swamps or simply dumped it into the swamps.

Jose Hermano Mateu, a rice grower and member of the rice consultative committee of the European Community, publicly challenged those who are making these charges to prove that the Guadalquivir swamp rice growers have anything to do with this event. Hermano Mateu admitted that perhaps "some unscrupulous person" used banned products.

The discovery of a new source of mass death in Lucio del Italiano, located in the northern part of the Donana Park approach, was viewed with concern by biologists from ICONA.

According to Juan Manuel de Benito, ICONA and AMA will today step up efforts to continue collecting the animal cadavers, both in Lucio del Italiano and in the Cantarita rice-growing marshes, where the situation continues to be serious.

After the collection has been completed--for which purpose dogs will be used--it will be possible with greater accuracy to determine the number of dead birds.

In any case, it can be stated that the figure will not fall below 27,000, as De Benito reported.

The Andalucian Ecologist Association, which has asked Alfonso Guerra, who in turn is chairman of the Donana Board of Trustees, to intervene in this matter, last Monday requested an urgent summons for this institution to meet in order to analyze these events. Andalucian President Jesus Vozmedianio declared that he will demand criminal liability on the grounds of "absolute ineffectiveness" displayed by the Administration in averting the ecological disaster. Ecologists also disagree with reports to the effect that there is no connection between the rice-growing swamps and the Donana National Park.

"It must be kept in mind," emphasized Vozmedianio, "that most of the Donana birds during the summer move to the swamps because there is no water in the park."

## Individuals Responsible for Disaster Sought

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 4 Oct 86 p 25

[Article by Enrique Chueca, Seville]

[Text] Government Vice President Alfonso Guerra, who in turn is chairman of the Donana National Park Board of Trustees, will today ask that "liability charges" be made against public agencies and individuals connected with the ecological disaster that took place in the areas bordering on Donana, as Jaime Montaner, vice chairman of the Board of Trustees, hinted yesterday. The Permanent Commission of the Board of Trustees will hold a regular meeting in Seville today in whose course, among other things, it will study the "mass death of water fauna discovered in the area covered by the National Park," which involved thousands of birds.

Jaime Montaner, vice chairman of the Board of Trustees and Public Works Council member of the Andalucia Board, yesterday rejected any responsibility on the part of the Board of Trustees in the Donana disaster and emphasized that its action was "on time, impeccable, careful, respectful, and urgent."

He pointed out that "the Board of Trustees, through its chairman, will state the liabilities of public agencies and individuals" in relation to the death of some 27,000 birds in the vicinity and in the Donana Park approach, an ecological disaster that began during the first few days of August.

### Judicial Investigation

The ICONA yesterday released an announcement in Madrid in which it stated that it has filed charges in the death of the birds and has asked for a judicial investigation so as to "make it possible to determine any liability of any kind that could be derived from this, if the use of toxic products around the park is proven, with possible effects on the living conditions of the birds located in the park."

The Donana Board of Trustees, an agency which, for administrative purposes, is under the Agriculture Ministry, has the job of "watching over" compliance with the standards established in the Donana Law which, among its principles includes "protecting the integrity of the minerals, the fauna, the flora, the waters and the atmosphere, and, finally, the group of ecosystems in the Donana National Park."

The law devotes a special section to protection or park approach areas, places where thousands of birds died, according to Juan Manuel de Benito, Donana acting curator.

Analyses

The Andalucian board member stated that he had no knowledge as to what happened in the area around Donana until 25 September, the date he received a preliminary report from ICONA, signed by Juan Manuel de Benito, the park's acting curator.

According to Montaner, this report reached the office of the Board of Trustees on 24 September, "it studied it on 25 September and Alfonso Guerra had it in his hands on 26 September." Montaner said that he did not know the reasons why ICONA, which is responsible for the law managing the park, did so. The note made public by ICONA in Madrid asserts that the mass death of birds outside the park's perimeter was discovered at the end of August. "This was immediately reported to the competent authorities of the Andalucia Board, in particular, the Environmental Agency."

The AMA indicates that it is waiting to receive--"perhaps early next week"--the last analyses of specimens sent in to conduct investigations in the National Toxicology Institute, the Cordoba Veterinary School, and the National Agricultural Institute.

## Botulism Epidemic Feared in Park

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 5 Oct 86 p 18

[Article by Enrique Chueca, Seville]

[Text] Donana Board of Trustees Chairman Alfonso Guerra announced yesterday that there is a danger of botulism developing in the National Park as a result of the side effect produced by the thousands of dead birds in areas bordering on Donana. The results of this epidemic, he said, could reach incalculable proportions. On the other hand, Guerra pointed out that all agencies that have any responsibility in connection with this ecological disaster "proved and are still proving" that they were coordinated and that they acted correctly.

The Donana National Park Board of Directors, whose permanent commission met yesterday in Seville, believes that "the most probable cause" of the high mortality in the Donana vicinity and park approach is "an acute poisoning with pesticides of the organic-phosphorated type," that is to say, by products that are highly dangerous to the bird fauna and that are banned by the Andalucian Government. The assumption presented yesterday was rejected last Thursday by Migue Manaute, Agriculture Council member of the Andalucian Board, and by the AMA.

Alfonso Guerra, who repeatedly emphasized that "nothing is happening in the Donana Park today," said that he did not know who might be responsible for dumping the insecticides into the water but he noted that the Board of Trustees will promote a judicial investigation on the events "and will ask for the determination of any liability of any kind that could spring from this, regardless of whether this may involve public or private property."

Three Phases of Mass Death

According to reports from the Board of Trustees, there were three differentiated phases concerning this mass death throughout August and September; the rate was low in August, it became acute during the first few days of September and the side effects spread during the last days of that month, with very few deaths.

Guerra however stressed that the main concern at this time has to do with the possible appearance of an outbreak of botulism as a result of the earlier phases. "There is a danger," said Alfonso Guerra, "of a repetition of what happened in 1973 when, as a result of poisoning, there was an epidemic of botulism that caused a large number of deaths, close to 70,000." To prevent this possible disaster, a series of measures were taken, including the burning of all bird cadavers.

On the other hand, "although it only has consultative and advisory functions," the Donana Board of Trustees will propose and promote, in dealing with responsible government agencies, certain short-term and medium-term preventive and corrective measures, as well as others that can be carried out inside and outside the National Park. In this connection, Guerra mentioned the stepped-up vigilance, the artificial supply of fodder for migratory birds that will arrive soon at the Park, and the drainage of the rice paddies where a higher death rate was discovered. It is also considered necessary to regulate the use of insecticides and to keep close tabs on fumigations in the marshes.

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ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUED SPAIN

## SIGNIFICANT POLLUTION REPORTED AT MADRID RESERVOIR

Madrid ABC in Spanish 5 Oct 86 p 43

[Text] Madrid--Flies attracted by garbage, bottles, cans, wads of toilet paper, infants' diapers, paper, and excrement are some of the waste that anyone can find in the vicinity of the Madrid "beach," in other words, the San Juan reservoir. This beautiful spot has been invaded by Sunday visitors; only there are dozens of motor boats afloat on the docks.

The San Juan reservoir is situated between the municipal boundaries of Pelayos de la Presa and San Martin de Valdeiglesias. This large artificial reservoir is part of the Isabel II channel facilities supplying water to the capital. It also contributes to the group of tourist sites that the region's residents have available to spend a holiday , a weekend, or even an entire summer. Some leave their field tents and vans set up throughout the year; all of this without paying anything to occupy a plot of land.

One is not only surprised upon viewing the regrettable appearance evinced by the shores and areas adjoining the reservoir. The visitor who decides to go to this "beach" for the first time may easily become lost. The reason is none other than a lack of signs. Navas del Rey is usually the locality in which the only sign posted at the side of the highway appears, if one persists in approaching, regardless. Once there, it is only necessary to ask one of the town's kind residents, in order to take the route leading to the desired spot.

Upon entering the pine grove, along a goat path, one reaches the reservoir dock. The visitor has now arrived.

A few steps, if this route is chosen, or a grade, along which cars are driven, lead the new arrival to two stands. One is called "Kiosco Madrid," and the other,"El Muro." While Manolo, the person responsible for tending the first-named snack bar, was serving a couple of beers, he remarked: "Look,many tourists come here, especially on weekends. This is becoming impossible; besides, with so much boating...In the past there was more room for bathing, but now the land has been taken over by the dock. They claim that, when they move it up above, this area will be left cleaner. Right now, as you can see, there is almost no room for the bathers."

The employee's comments could not be more correct. Under the embankment, one observes the main dock. Dozens of motors and boats with outboard motors are moored to the timbers on the passageway, to which entry is banned. Next to this small dock one reads a sign: "Bathing prohibited."

Before beginning the visual inspection, the new arrival has had the opportunity to read the placard advertising the services offered by the El Ancla dock: "Mooring sites for private vessels for rent. Rentals of rowboats, paddle boats, canoes, and motors (gas-oil); machine shop. Repairs for all makes of marine motors, both in and outboard. Sail and motorboat nautical repairs. Purchase and sale of boats."

One would appear to be at the entrance to Puerto Banus, with so much service, so many boats, and so many motors. "Do you know what? I wouldn't go into the water for anything in the world. The other day a youngster came out with injuries that were painful to see. As for me? For nothing in the world." These comments by the waiter dispel the enchantment and bring the observer back to the reality of what is turning into a dung heap.

But the matter does not stop here. A little farther on, there is someone who has fenced in a plot of land in the middle of which he has set up his field tent and his van. Colored wires demarcate the land, as if it were private property. They have installed antennas, and decorated the entrance with small rugs...One notes a certain amount of cleanliness inside the quarters. Outside, it is something else. Wads of toilet paper, other paper, excrement, remains of boats with rotted wood, pieces of iron. The garbage cans which can hardly be found around there are rusty bins apparently not cared for by anyone.

"No one pays any money here. They come, set up their belongings, install their facilities, and even stay all summer."

"Do you say that they don't pay for camping?"

"Of course. This place is a mess. Up to here, it belongs to Pelayos de la Presa, and from here to there, it belongs to San Martin de Valdeiglesias. (The waiter, Manolo, indicates a spot that is almost an abstraction. He talks in meters, but no one really knows the boundaries exactly.)

None of the proprietors wants to hear about sanitation either. The flies flutter around the heads of those located in the snack bar. There are no sanitary facilities.

2909
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ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUED SPAIN

## ALBACETE WATER SUPPLY SUSPENDED FOR POLLUTION

Madrid ABC in Spanish 5 Oct 86 p 33

[Text] Albacete--This capital's over 125,000 residents have been without water for 3 days as a result of damage which occurred in the conduit pipes, into which sewage flowing through a parallel pipe penetrated, and both were broken by an excavator shovel.

Although the authorities have attempted to calm the population, claiming that the situation has not become particularly serious, there is the condition whereby, as a result of this damage, classes have been stopped in all educational centers, both in the primary and secondary schools, as a result of which about 40,000 students are on compulsory vacation. With the persistent recommendation that water not be consumed for drinking and household uses unless it has been previously boiled, the public has set forth en masse to supermarkets and food stores where it has managed to purchase nearly a million liters of water. According to public complaints, it has so happened that, in some establishments, they have charged 10 pesetas more than the normal price for a bottle of mineral water, and the point has been reached when the supplies have been depleted.

The mineral water supply was quickly normalized in some establishments, while many Albaceta residents went to the neighboring towns to procure supplies of the essential liquid.

The municipal slaughterhouse and food industries in the capital have halted their activities. In some coffee shops, coffee made with mineral water is being served. Purchases of bread and bakery goods have declined considerably, as has public attendance at restaurants and coffee shops.

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ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUED

SPAIN

CHEMICAL POLLUTION IN HUELVA RIVER KILLS 30,000 FISH

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 16 Oct 86 p 31

[Text] Huelva--The results of the first analyses made by the Sevilla Toxicological Institute to learn the reasons for the death of thousands of fish, mainly striped mullet, last Tuesday, in the Odiel (Huelva) estuary indicate that chemical substances (sulphuric acid or phosphoric acid) have been discovered in the Huelva estuary.

The first estimates made by the Environment Agency's provincial directorate indicate, at the outset, a death rate of 30,000 fish, although this figure could increase considerably.

The first conjectures noted by the Environment Agency and the Huelva civil government indicated as the origin of this incident "the storms that have occurred in Huelva and its province, which may have caused a sudden change in the PH of the water, due to the effects of acidification." This natural phenomenon was rejected from the beginning by the Andalus ecological association which considered it "impossible for rain to have occurred which was heavy enough to bring about this effect, considering the extensive area over which the fish appeared (8 kilometers)."

As for the possibility of the accumulation of heavy metals in the Odiel River, coming from the province's pyrite mines, this was also precluded by Andalus, "because the deaths of fish would not have been so massive, nor would the effects have been so great, in such a short period of time."

Andalus claims, on the contrary, that this death toll was caused "by some type of toxic waste emitted by a boat or a chemical company in the industrial enclave, which empty their liquid waste into the estuary every day." The ecological association has filed a complaint for an alleged ecological crime.

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END